James A. O'COnnOr v. United StatesJames A. O'COnnOr v. United States
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Easterbrook
After his conviction for racketeering was affirmed, 953 F.2d 338 (7th Cir.1992), James O’Connor filed motions under
Our order of last July posed but did not answer the question whether post-trial motions under Rule 33 count as collateral attacks for purposes of the recent rule severely curtailing second or successive collateral attacks. See
The United States does not tell us why the 1994 petition was dismissed and does not seem to think that the reason matters. Yet as we stressed in
Felder v. McVicar,
113 F.3d 696 (7th Cir.1997), and
Benton v. Washington,
106 F.3d 162 (7th Cir.1996), it is essential to know what happened to the initial petition in the district court. A peti tion that is “returned” as insufficient under Rule 2(e) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (or Rule 2(d) of the Rules Governing
O’Connor’s latest petition was thrown out of court because it was filed while the appeal from the denial of the Rule 33 motion was on our docket. As he had in 1994, the district judge remarked that only extraordinary circumstances justify entertaining a collateral attack while another proceeding that might upset the conviction is under consideration. See
United States v. Robinson,
8 F.3d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1993). O’Connor argued that his petition was supported by just such a circumstance: there were only six days to go before the first anniversary of the Antiter-rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. That anniversary was significant for three reasons: first, the aedpa added a one-year statute of limitations for commencing collateral attacks, see
The district court relied on a principle that as originally articulated was limited to direct appeals from the conviction and sentence. It makes no sense to crank up a collateral attack while a pending appeal may afford the prisoner the relief he seeks.
United States v. Davis,
604 F.2d 474, 484-85 (7th Cir.1979). We have never considered whether the same approach is best when the appeal concerns the denial of a post-trial motion. Perhaps the question has not arisen because it did not matter before the aedpa. A prisoner may select from a palette of post-trial motions the one that best suits his circumstances, and if more than one is made at the same time the court can and should consider them together. Consolidation is harder if the decision con
Davis
and similar cases established a rule of sound judicial administration giving priority to whatever proceeding was first put in hand. Priority now must go to petitions under
A district court sometimes may find it prudent to grant or deny a
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.