JAMAR E. PLUNKETT, Pеtitioner-Appellant, v. DAN SPROUL, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 20-2461
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2021 — DECIDED OCTOBER 20, 2021
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and FLAUM, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 19-cv-00655 — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Chief Judge.
I. Background
A. Underlying Criminal Case Proceedings
In January 2013, Plunkett sold crack cocaine to a confidential informаnt. A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Plunkett on one count of distributing cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of
Faced with a possible thirty-year prison term, Plunkett reached an agreement with the government to plead guilty in October 2013. In his plea agreement, Plunkett and the government agreed that he qualified as a career offender and that his advisory range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. The government further agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the sentencing range. In return, Plunkett agreed to waive his rights to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction or sentence, with limited exceptions. Among these, Plunkett preserved his right
The district court accepted Plunkett‘s guilty plea. During the change-of-plea hearing, the court informed Plunkett multiple times that he faced a statutory maximum sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment and engaged him in a lengthy colloquy regarding his understanding of his waiver of his appeal and collateral-attack rights.
The district court then held a sentencing hearing in January 2014. The court found that Plunkett qualified as a career offender and faced a statutory maximum sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. The court further found that the Guidelines recommended an advisory sentencing range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. Neither party objected to these findings. Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the government then recommended a low-end Guidelines sentence of 188 months. The district court, however, rejected the government‘s recommendation and ultimately sentenced Plunkett to 212 months in prison—two years above the Guidelines minimum—and six years of supervised release. The court also imposed a $500 fine and a $100 assessment.
B. Collateral Challenges
1. Section 2255 Motion
Plunkett did not appeal his conviction or sentence, but in January 2015 he filed a pro se motion in the district court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under
The district court denied Plunkett‘s
2. Section 2241 Petition
In 2016, while Plunkett‘s
In June 2019, two years after the denial of his
The district court denied Plunkett‘s
Plunkett again filed a motion for reconsideration. He asserted that the district court misinterpreted his petition as a challenge to his career-offender designation, when in fact he sought to challenge the use of his prior Illinois convictions as predicate offenses for the career-offender enhancement. The district court denied the motion. The court denied misunderstanding the nature of Plunkett‘s challenge and reiterated that it would not grant relief because Plunkett‘s final sentence fell within the 240-month statutory maximum even absent the enhancement. The court also explained that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), foreclosed Plunkett‘s argument that the allegedly erroneous increase in the statutory maximum sentеnce distorted the plea negotiations and influenced his decision to plead guilty; the court noted that at the time he entered into the plea agreement, Plunkett agreed with the government‘s assessment that his Illinois drug conviction exposed him to a sentence ranging between 188 and 235 months. The district court concluded that because his sentence fell squarely within that range, he did not raise a viable habeas claim.
II. Discussion
Plunkett appeals the denial of his
A defendant may waive his right to challenge his sentence on collateral review through a plea agreement, assuming such waiver is knowing and voluntary. See Dowell v. United States, 694 F.3d 898, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2012);
A. Scope of Plunkett‘s Collateral-Attack Waiver
As described above, Plunkett‘s plea agreement contained a broad waiver of his right to seek collateral review of his conviction or sentence. Specifically, Plunkett acknowledged “that Title 18, Title 28, and other provisions of the United States Code afford every defendant limited rights to contest a conviction and/or sentence through appeal or collateral attack,” but he agreed to “waive[] his right to contest any aspect of his conviction and sentence that could be contested under Title 18 or Title 28, or under any other provision of fеderal law,” other than to appeal the reasonableness of his sentence.
Plunkett argues, however, that his petition falls outside the ambit of the collateral-attack waiver because the plea agreement preserved his right to challenge his sentence based on “any subsequent change in the interpretation of the law by the United States Supreme Court or the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that is declared retroactive by those Courts and that renders Defendant actually innocent
The determinative issue, therefore, is the meaning of the phrase “actually innocent of the charges covered herein.” The government essentially contends that this phrase refers only to the underlying offense to which Plunkett pleaded guilty in the agreement.3 If this definition applies, Plunkett‘s challenge does not fall within the exception to his collateral-attack waiver because he would remain guilty—that is, not actually innocent—of his federal drug offense, regardless of whether he prevails on his challenge to his sentence. Plunkett, on the other hand, argues that, when read in context, the phrase also refers to the applicable sentence enhancement.
We agree with the government‘s interpretation of the wаiver‘s language. In interpreting plea agreements, we apply
Petitioner points to the government‘s use of the phrase “Charging Prior Offenses” to refer to the relevant prior drug offense in its filing titled “Information as to Sentencing” to suggest that the government itself refers to the sentencing enhancement as a “charge.” While this argument is not entirely without merit, it is significantly undercut by the fact that this document has no operative effect other than to provide the sentencing court with information relevant to its sentencing decision. See
The plea agreement itself extinguishes any lingering doubt as to the meaning of “charges covered [t]herein.” The only “charge[] covered [t]herein” is the charge for the distribution of cocaine base. The plea agreement never refers to the sentencing enhancement as a charge, and, in fact, language from another provision of the agreement demonstrates that it recognizes charges and sentencing enhancements as distinct. That provision states that if the Defendant violates any provision of the plea agreement, “the Government is not bound by
Given that the plea agreement refers to charges and sentencing enhancements as distinct concepts and given that the plain meaning of the term “charges” refers to charged offenses, we hold that a successful challenge to his sentence would not render Plunkett “actually innocent of the charges covered” in the plea agreement. Therefore, this appeal falls squarely into the category of appeals that Plunkett has waived his right to bring.
B. Plunkett‘s Waiver Was Knowing and Voluntary
Plunkett may nonetheless escape application of this waiver if it was not knowing and voluntary. In determining whether a waiver contained in a plea agreement was knowing and voluntary, “we must examine the language of the plea agreement itself and also look to the plea colloquy between the defendant and the judge.” United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2010). A defendant‘s waiver is knowing and voluntary if he “understand[s] the choice confronting him and … understand[s] that choice is his to make.” United States v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2012) (alterations in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1182–83 (7th Cir. 1983)); see also United States v. Johnson, 934 F.3d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that we consider circumstances surrounding the plea to “evaluat[e] whether the district court ‘properly informed the defendant that the waiver may bar the right to appeal‘” (quoting United States v. Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011))). “A written appellate waiver signed by the defendant will typically be
Plunkett asserts that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence under Mathis because he did not know the correct statutory maximum sentence when he pleaded guilty. We have long expressed the view, however, that plea-bargain appeal waivers involve risk:
By binding oneself one assumes the risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which one‘s bargain may prove to have been a bad one. That is the risk inherent in all contracts; they limit the parties’ ability to take advantage of what may happen over the period in which the contract is in effect.
United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005). “That the risk materialized for [Plunkett] does not trump the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea and waiver when he accepted the [g]overnment‘s deal.” Alcala, 678 F.3d at 580.
Plunkett argues that our longstanding rule does not apply to challenges, like his, based on intervening retroactive decisions construing the statutory sentence applicable at the time the defendant pleaded guilty. Here, Plunkett draws too fine a distinction. “We have consistently rejected arguments that an appeal waiver is invalid because the defendant did not anticipate subsequent legal developments.” United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2009). “[T]here is abundant case law that appeal waivers … are effective even if the law changes in favor of the defendant after sentencing,” even if those changes are “unforeseen legal changes” that bring
The record here otherwise reveals that Plunkett knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to collaterally challenge his conviction and sentence. In addition to signing a written waiver, which is presumed to be enforceable, see Galloway, 917 F.3d at 606, Plunkett also attested in his plea colloquy—to which we lend “particular credence,” Alcala, 678 F.3d at 578—to the fact that he made the waiver knowingly and voluntarily. And there is simply nothing else in the record to suggest otherwise.
III. Conclusion
Because Plunkett‘s plea agreement contained a valid waiver of his right to collaterally attack his sentence, this appeal is DISMISSED.
