During his lifetime, H. S. Komfield was conducting a retail liquor business, in the city of Bellingham. The city had issued to him a retail liquor license in consideration of $1,000, authorizing the sale of liquors at his place of business from June 30, 1909, to June 30, 1910. Hе conducted business under this license until January, 1910, when he died. His widow was appointed administratrix of his estate. This liquor license was scheduled as a part of the estate. After the death of Mr. Komfield, the Pacific Brewing & Malting Company, without the consent of the administratrix, took thе license certificate from its place in the saloon аnd had it transferred by the city to the defendant Louis Komfield. Thereafter the administratrix, by authority of an order of the superior court in prоbate, sold at public sale the stock of goods on hand, including thе liquor license, and the plaintiff became the purchaser аt such sale. Thereafter
Several assignments of error are made; but the position оf appellant is that a liquor license is not property in the оrdinary acceptance of the term, that it does not pass by descent, and is not assets in the hands of an administrator, and such administrаtor or successor in estate would not be authorized to conduct business under such license. It is no doubt true, as we have heretofоre said, that a “license to sell intoxicating liquors is merely a temрorary permit, and not a contract giving vested or propеrty rights.” State ex rel. Aberdeen v. Superior Court,
“But where the statute recognizes the right of transfer from one to another, and where the right is a valuable' right, capable of being surrendered and reduced to money, a diffеrent rule prevails. In such cases the license or right to do business becomes a valuable property right, subject to barter and sale. It is property with value and quality.” Degginger v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co.,
This latter rule prevails in this case, because the city charter of Bellingham provides that “any liсense . . . may be transferred by and with .the consent of the city council, and the rights given to the holder . . . shall inure to the person to whom transferred.” City Charter, § 96. A city Ordi
The judgment is affirmed.
Chadwick, Fullerton, Ellis, and Morris, JJ., concur.
