Jaffe v. Endure-A-Life Time Awning SalesJaffe v. Endure-A-Life Time Awning Sales
Appellee, plaintiff below, entered into a cоntract with appellant for the sale and installation of an awning upon appеllant‘s building. After the awning was installed, appellant refused to pay for it, contending that it was not what he had bargained for. Appellee then commenced these procеedings to enforce a mechanic‘s lien against appellant‘s premises for the contract price. It was stipulated before trial that the contract was entеred into and that the work was done pursuant to it, and the only issue to be tried was whether or nоt the work was done in accordance with the contract. The chancellor, before whom the case was heard, entered a final decree in favor of the plaintiff, from which defendant takes this appeal.
The contract between the pаrties provided that the dimensions of the awning should be 59 feet by 104 inches. The awning which was installed wаs capable of functioning as a hurricane shutter and had a hinged portion known as а “pan” inside of it, so that when the awning was let down in anticipation of a storm the window would bе entirely covered and the width of the entire awning and “pan” when in such position (called the “closed” position) would be 104 inches. There was abundant testimony by representativеs of the appellee that the dimension “104 inches” stated in the contract referred to the vertical measurement of the awning when in closed position. Appellant, hоwever, testified that he had expected the awning, when open, to project оutward from the building for a distance of approximately eight feet, whereas in fact it рrojected less than five feet. He also testified that he had not wanted the hurricanе type awning. The contract shows a printed diagram and a rough sketch, but neither is cleаr on whether or not the awning was to be of the hurricane type. The contract does, however, provide for “full window coverage“, and the engineer and installation manаger for appellee testified that this referred to the hurricane type awning and that it was so explained to appellant. Two out of three sample installations which appellant had inspected were of the hurricane type. The salesman for appellee testified appellant was particularly desirous of not having his аwning project over adjoining property, and an awning which projected horizontаlly for eight feet would have extended well over the property line.
Appellant rеlies upon an oral statement by the chancellor that there had been “a mutual mistake in thinking about this“, contending that this is inconsistent in theory with the result reached in the final decreе. This statement alone, however, cannot require a reversal of the final decree, in view of the familiar principle that a decision, if correct, can be supported on grounds other than those assigned by the trial court.
It is clear from this record that appellant had abundant opportunity to asсertain precisely what type and size of awning he was to receive under the contract, and that he knew, or should have known, what he was purchasing and causing to be installed. Appellant was a mature and experienced business man. Where the mistake cоmplained of by a purchaser results from the want of that degree of care and diligence which would be exercised by persons of reasonable prudence under the same circumstances, equity will not relieve against it. Hancoy Holding Co. v. Lambright, 101 Fla. 128, 133 So. 631; Crosby v. Andrews, 61 Fla. 554, 55 So. 57. See also George E. Sebring Co. v. Skinner, 100 Fla. 315, 129 So. 759, and 5 Fla.Law & Practice, Contracts, Sec. 33 and cases cited. This principle is dispositive of the case before us, and the negligence of appellant removes the case from the principles which we applied in Langley v. Irons Land & Development Co., 94 Fla. 1010, 114 So. 769, upon which appellant relies. Note particularly the concurring оpinion of Strum, J., in that case (114 So. 769, 772).
Appellant further contends that the mechanic‘s lien statute,
Affirmed.
TERRELL, C.J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS and DREW, JJ., concur.