65 P. 826 | Cal. | 1901
This is an original petition here for a writ of prohibition to arrest all further proceedings upon *365 a certain order of the respondent the superior court appointing a receiver.
The apointment of the receiver was made in a certain action brought by one Gillis against one Galvan and others to foreclose a mortgage executed by Galvan and wife to Gillis on a certain tract of farming land. The order appointing a receiver authorizes him to take possession of said land, with the crops growing thereon, etc. The receiver took possession in accordance with the order, and ousted petitioners, who claim to have been in possession as lessees of the mortgagor, and to have had growing crops on the land.
Petitioners argue strenuously, that, under the facts shown, they were owners of the growing crops; that the plaintiff in the action, being merely a mortgagee of the naked land, has no legal right, before foreclosure sale, to interfere, by receivership or otherwise, with their possession and control of said crops; and that for these reasons, and other reasons given, the appointment of the receiver was unwarranted. On the other hand, respondents contend that the asserted lease was without consideration, intended merely to delay creditors, and void. But, without examining into these questions, or determining whether or not the appointment of the receiver was proper and authorized by law, it is sufficient to say that this petition for prohibition cannot be sustained, because petitioners have "a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," within the meaning of section
Formerly — and when Havemeyer v. Superior Court,
The filing of the undertaking operates as a supersedeas,
suspends all authority of the receiver under the order, withdraws from him the right to the control and possession of the property involved, and restores the same to the appealing party, from whom it had been taken. (Buckley v. George,
In Farmers' National Bank v. Backus,
The case of Los Angeles City Water Co. v. Superior Court,
There might, perhaps, be exceptional facts in a case which would call for a writ of prohibition nothwithstanding an appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but the general rule is as above stated, and applies to the case at bar.
The petition is denied and the proceeding dismissed.
Temple, J., Van Dyke, J., Henshaw, J., Garoutte, J., and Beatty, C.J. concurred.