JACOB YOUNG, III. v. THE STATE.
A25A1240
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
November 3, 2025
RICKMAN, Presiding Judge.
SECOND DIVISION, RICKMAN, P. J., GOBEIL and DAVIS, JJ.
RICKMAN, Presiding Judge.
Following a jury trial, Jacob Young, III was convicted on one count of child molestation for acts inflicted on the victim, his minor daughter.1 He argues on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of two prior acts of child molestation pursuant to
On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to support the jury‘s verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. We do not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, but determine only whеther the evidence authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LEd2d 560) (1979).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Laster v. State, 340 Ga. App. 96, 97 (796 SE2d 484) (2017).
So construed, the evidence adduced at trial showed that in 2019, the victim‘s cousin, then 12 years old, reported to his mother that a year or two earlier, Young (his uncle and the victim‘s father) had rubbed his penis on the outside of his pajama bottoms in a circular motion. The cousin stated that it had happened one evening when Young, himself, and several other children had been in bed watching cartoons
Approximately a year after her cousin‘s outcry, the victim became withdrawn and was entertaining thoughts of suicide and engaging in self-harm. She disclosed to her best friend that Young had, in fact, touched her inappropriately over the years. She then reported the same to her cousin, who encouraged her to tell her mother and her aunt. The victim did so and as a result, she was referred for a second forensic
During the ensuing trial,2 the victim testified that when she was between three and five years old, Young entered her bedroom in the night and rubbed his hands on her thighs, chest, and “private area.” He entered her room again in the night when she was around five or six years old and touched her in much the same way. Young instructed the victim not to tell anyone what he had done as he was leaving her bedroom. The next incident occurred when the victim was around seven years old and was preparing to go to sleep on the couch in the apartment in which her family then lived. Young got on top of the victim and touched both the inside and the outside of her “private area” with his own “private area.” The victim testified that she felt pain as he did so and that at some point, Young placed his hand over her mouth. The last incident occurred when the victim was 12 or 13 years old and her family was living in a trailer. Young again entered her bedroom as she slept, removed her pajama bottoms,
In addition to the victim‘s testimony, the jury watched both of her forensic interviews and heard testimony from the forensic interviewer, who explained that it is not uncommon for victims of sexual abuse to initially deny abuse before later disclosing it. The State also presented testimony from the victim‘s mother and the victim‘s best friend to whom she made the initial outcry, as well as a sexual assault nurse who did not examine the victim, but testified that since the victim‘s outcry came more than 72 hours after the abuse, COVID protocols in place at the time did not dictate that she receive a sexual assault exam because there would likely be no physical evidence of abuse.
Finally, the State admitted, over Young‘s objection, evidence of prior acts of child molestation pursuant to Rule 414. That evidence consisted of testimony from
The jury convicted Young on one count of child molestation. He filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
Rule 414 (a) provides that, “[i]n a criminal proceeding in which the accused is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the accused‘s commission of another offense of child molestation shall be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” The relevance standard under Georgia law is a liberal one, and is satisfied if the evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Nevertheless, even if evidence is considered relevant and admissible under the liberal rules of Rule 414, the trial court must still make a determination that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Rule 403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . .“); see Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 77 (2) (b) (ii) (829 SE2d 142) (2019) (“The major function of [Rule 403] is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by its heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect[.]“) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[T]he application of Rule 403 to exclude evidence offered under Rule 414 eliminates due process concerns posed by evidence of a defendant‘s other offenses of child molestation that might be so prejudicial that the admission of that evidence would violate the defendant‘s fundamental right to a fair trial.” Wilson, 312 Ga. at 189-190 (2).
When analyzing the probative value of prior child molestation offenses under the Rule 403 balancing test, the courts “must make a common sense assessment of all the circumstances that may logically bear on the probative or prejudicial value of the evidence, including the need for the evidence, the overall similarity between the prior offenses of molestation and the charged conduct, and the temporal remoteness of the prior offenses.” Id. at 190-191 (2); see Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 310 (2) (d) (1) (845 SE2d 653) (2020). Because Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy, “we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Morgan v. State, 307 Ga. 889, 897-898 (3) (d) (838 SE2d 878) (2020). We will address each of Young‘s arguments in turn.
In a trial lacking physical evidence in which the State bore the burden of proving that Young had inappropriate sexual contact with his daughter whose outcry was delayed, the State‘s need for evidence that Young‘s son recalled Young touching his penis and making him feel distinctly “uncomfortable” was significant. The incident was similar to those reported by the victim (and her cousin) in that all involved Young getting into bed with the children and, without prеamble, touching their genitals. And similar to the victim, Young‘s son reported that the contact occurred when he was 5 or 6 years old. Thus, although the episode may have been temporally remote by the time Young was arrested and charged, it was within a few years of the time that the victim reported being first abused.
(b) We cannot say the same for the trial court‘s admission of evidence related to the South Carolina offense. During the pretrial hearing on Young‘s motion in limine to exclude the evidence, the State made a proffer that it anticipated the South Carolina witness would testify she “was forcibly raped against her will.” Based upon that proffer, the trial court held that the evidence was relevant and admissible pursuant to Rule 414 and Rule 403. And, had the evidence presented been one of forcible rape, we would agree that it would have been admissible in the current trial.
As set forth above, however, the witness did not testify to a forcible rape. To be sure, she did describe acts that would amount to a sexual offense under Georgia law
The probative value of the evidence was sсant, rendering the State‘s need for the evidence minimal. See Armstrong v. State, 310 Ga. 598, 603 (2) (b) (852 SE2d 824) (2020) (“The probative value of evidence is a combination of its logical force to prove a point and the need at trial for evidence on that point.“). That a 19- or 20-year-old Young snuck into the woods with a 15-year-old girl to engage in sexual activity does little to shed light on the question of whether he, as a fully adult male, would enter into the bedroom of his young child and forcibly molest that child.
Moreover, there were very few similarities between the crimes, and yet their differences are great. At the time of the South Carolina offense, the witness was 15 years old and Young was four or five years older. The witness joined Young of her own volition and, although she could not legally consent to the sexual acts and appeared at trial to harbor deep regrets about the incident, she described a “sweet” and “nice” Young, and denied that he used force. In contrast, the victim in the
There is also a 15-year gap between the South Carolina offense and the earliest crimes alleged in this case, further diminishing its probative value given the lack of similarities between the crimes. See State v. Dowdell, 335 Ga. App. 773, 779 (2) (c) (783 SE2d 138) (2016) (physical precedent only) (affirming, in defendant‘s trial for forcible rape, the trial court‘s exclusion of prior acts evidence when defendant was a teenager upon concluding that the evidence was not probative to the issues at trial, “given the lack of similarity between those acts and the charged offense, the decade separating the other acts from the charged offense, and the defendant‘s immaturity at the time the other acts were committed“); see generally Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 274-277 (3) (e) (ii) (B) (1) (875 SE2d 659) (2022); Morgan v. State, 307 Ga. 889, 897-898 (3) (d) (838 SE2d 878) (2020).
The minimally probative value of evidence of the South Carolina offense wаs substantially outweighed by the danger of its unfair prejudice. We recognize that evidence of a prior offense of child molestation, while naturally prejudicial, is not generally unfairly prejudicial; “rather it is prejudicial for the same reason it is
In such a case, we must assume that the propensity evidence carried substantial weight and that the erroneous admission of the South Carolina offense was unfairly prejudicial. Cf. Collum v. State, 376 Ga. App. 376, 386-388 (1) (f) (918 SE2d 171) (2025) (holding evidence of appellant‘s extensive collection of “teen theme” pornography was unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded under Rule 403 in child molestation trial); see generally Harris, 314 Ga. at 274-277 (3) (e) (ii) (B) (1).
That does not end our inquiry, however. We must still assess whether the erroneous admission of evidence of the South Carolina offense can bе deemed
For the same reasons that we determined that evidencе to be overly prejudicial, we cannot say it is highly probable that the evidence did not contribute to the jury‘s verdict. See Collum, 376 Ga. App. at 389-391 (1) (h); King v. State, 346 Ga. App. 362, 369-370 (1) (816 SE2d 390) (2018); Gaskin v. State, 334 Ga. App. 758, 764-765 (1) (b) (780 SE2d 426) (2015). Thus, although the evidence was certainly sufficient to support Young‘s conviction,6 the admission of the South Carolina offense was not
2. Because the evidence against Young was legally sufficient to sustain his conviction, he may be subject to rеtrial by the State. See generally Olsen v. State, 371 Ga. App. 12, 13 (899 SE2d 518) (2024). We will therefore address Young‘s remaining enumeration of error.
Young contends that the trial court erroneously limited his presentation of character evidence. We disagree.
In his defense, Young presented the testimony of three character witnesses. The witnesses, two of whom worked in law enforcement, generally testified as to how long they had known Young; that Young was a hard worker and a good man; that Young had spent time arоund their children and/or grandchildren; and that Young had a reputation for truthfulness. When Young‘s counsel began questioning the witnesses about the specific interactions between the witnesses’ children and/or
At the motion for new trial hearing, Young elicited testimony from each of his character witnesses that he contends the trial court erroneously excluded. The witnesses denied having observеd Young exhibit inappropriate conduct toward his own children, toward their children or grandchildren, or toward their wives or other women, and the witnesses stated that they would not allow their children and/or grandchildren to be around him if they believed him to be a child molester. Additionally, one of the witnesses testified that he had known Young his entire life and that Young had never engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with him when he was a child.
Young asserts that he should have been рermitted to admit this testimony in order to rebut the State‘s evidence and to prove that he had “a reputation for not having a lustful disposition toward other children.” Specifically, he argues that since the State admitted propensity evidence pursuant to Rule 414 that went to his character
Young‘s argument fails for at least two reasons. First, the State‘s prior act evidence was admitted pursuant to Rule 414 — a rule specifically governing prior acts of child molestation in cases involving charges of child molestation — and there is no provision in Rule 414 that allows for an accused to admit evidence of specific instances of good character to rebut evidence admitted pursuant to that rule. See King, 346 Ga. App. at 364 (1) (recognizing that Rule 414 is the more specific statute that supercedes the provisions of Rule 404 in child molestation cases).
Second, we do not believe that evidence that Young may not have molested other witnesses’ children or grandchildren is necessarily relevant to the question of
Judgment reversed. Davis, J., concurs, and Gobeil, J., concurs fully in Divisions 1 (a) and 2, and concurs in judgment only in Division 1 (b).