132 N.Y.S. 657 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1911
The premises in. controversy are a sandy,, gravelly strip of beach connecting a parcel of land known as East island with the main land of Long Island in the town of Oyster Bay, Nassau county. As the foregoing sentence would indicate, East island is not an actual island, but is a parcel of upland, connected with the main land by the strip of beach in question. It is, however, and has been for many years, popularly known as an island. Originally the only means of access to it was by way of this sandy beach. Later, however, a caitseway was built from the main land to another island near it known as West island, and still later the two islands were connected by another causeway. During the early times, between these islands and the main land was a low lying tract of meadow and that intersected by creeks. Later, by the building of the causeway above mentioned, these meadows have been converted into a pond or ponds. In the causeway are constructed tidal gates which open with the incoming tide, permitting the water to flow in, and close when the tide starts to flow out, thus imprisoning these waters and forming ponds. . The strip of beach in question is between the easterly of these ponds and Long Island sound. It is approximately half a mile in length and from 170 to 200 feet in width, and rises to 6 or 7 feet above high water mark.' It is washed by the tides on its north and south shores. Originally its south boundary was the meadows which are now covered by the waters of the pond.
The plaintiff claims to make title to the premises in three ways: First, that they are appurtenant to and passed as part of East island. S&cond, that they are included in the boundaries of and passed as a part of the meadows. Third, by adverse possession.
The defendant, the town of Oyster Bay, claims to be the owner in fee under a certain charter or patent made the 29th day of September, 1677, by Edmund Andros, then Governor-General of the Province of New York.
The plaintiff’s title begins in 1667 in seven deeds from the Indians to seven individuals who are the .predecessors in title of the plaintiff. One of these individuals, Robert Williams, by the same deed from the Indians, obtained title
The other shares of the meadow are described in exactly the same manner as the share conveyed to Williams, and it is that portion of these meadows lying south of East island which has been flooded and forms the pond heretofore mentioned and known as Dosoris pond. The title to the land under the waters of this pond has been the subject of an action tried in this court and subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals. Dosoris Pond Co. v. Campbell, 25 App. Div. 180; 164 N. Y. 596. In that action it was decided that plaintiff’s predecessors in title had title to these lands under the waters of the pond under the same chain of title which plaintiff relies upon now to make title to the premises in question. It would, therefore, seem to follow as a necessary and logical conclusion that the questions involved' in the first and second of plaintiff’s contentions are questions of boundaries only. It is not plaintiff’s contention that he makes title under the conveyances from the Indians, or that title can be so made; but he does contend that these conveyances and the record of them, under the laws then existing, are some evidence that the grantees had complied with all the legal requirements and had obtained the neces
The first question, then, to be determined is as to whether or not the conveyances to Williams and others above mentioned included the premises. I am of the opinion that they did. The premises in question, as stated above, which the courts have found are conveyed and of which .good title is made under the chain of title now offered by the plaintiff, were separated from the sound by this strip of sandy, gravelly beach. The evidence shows that under this beach, or sand and gravel, are still found the meadow lands, -and that, at times of heavy storms, the sands are washed away and this meadow land is disclosed. I think. the situation here shown comes .well within the principle enunciated in McRoberts v. Bergman, 132 N. Y. 73—83. “A grant of a salt meadow separated from the sea only by a beach formed by the sand thrown by the waves upon the meadow itself, ought not, in the absence of evidence of the public reserva
In the course of the devolution of the title the meadows in question were divided, and it is claimed by the defendant that the description in some of these allotments of the meadow indicate that the beach is excluded. I do not think that this is a correct interpretation of these descriptions. Some of the boundaries are given as ranging from a stake on the edge of the upland to the beach, and another ranges from the edge of the upland to a bush on the beach. I think within the principle stated in Trustees of East Hampton v. Kirk, 68 N. Y. 450, that a boundary of this character must be construed as running to high water mark on the beach on the sound side. These objects are not designated as the termini of the lines, but are objects through which the lines run. I think that the situation is somewhat analogous to a boundary upon a stream of water or along a highway. In Gouverneur v. National Ice Co., 134 N. Y. 355, it is held that a conveyance of land to a lake or pond adjoining, or to some monument on the land at the water, and thence along the pond to some other monument on the bank, carries title to the center of the pond. A number of cases of similar import are cited in that case, and from many of them quotations are made, among them the following: “ In Child v. Starr, 4 Hill, 375, the chancellor remarked that (running, to a monument standing on the bank, and from thence by the river or along the river, does not restrict the grant to the bank of the stream, for the monuments in such cases are referred to only as giving the direction of the lines to the
The fact that, at the time when the earliest conveyances were made of East island, this strip of beach was a necessity for access to it, I think is worthy of some consideration. The grantee of the island would, of course, have a right of access along the shore (Barnes v. Midland R. R. Terminal Co., 193 N. Y. 378); but this means of communication, if confined to the space between high and low water mark, would be a very precarious and uncertain one and, during high spring tides and severe storms, the whole strip of 'beach itself would afford a path none too certain in its character.
Then, it is of some importance to consider what object there would be in any reservation of this character. The Indians had conveyed the island. They had conveyed the meadows between the island .and the main land. What purpose could they possibly have in reserving this small strip of beach ?
I think that the evidence indicates- that the town never
It is true there is some evidence of. the use of this1 beach by inhabitants of the town for the purpose of gathering gravel, seaweed and drift wood, but there is no evidence that it was done under any claim of title in the town, or by reason of any license from the town, or that the town in any way knew what these persons were doing; and this evidence is further qualified by the fact that the persons who exercised this privilege did not discriminate in any way between the beach which the town now lays claim to and other beaches which are concededly the subject of private ownership, but they gathered- gravel, seaweed and drift wherever they found it,.from Peacock’s Point to Miatinnecock Point, thus going about a half a mile or more each side of the premises in question.
While I am of the opinion/ that the town would, under its patent, acquire title to all lands not granted to private persons when the .Indian title was extinguished, still, I • think it is a matter of some moment that the town did not, so far as the evidence shows, acquire any Indian titles in this locality and did all it could for the purchasers of lands in this vicinity. It did purchase from the Indians in other parts of the town. . This would go to show that the town authorities were of the opinion that at the time of the patent all the land in this section was the subject of private ownership.
As to plaintiff’s claim of title by adverse possession, I do not think the proof is sufficient to show he had acquired title in that way. I think there is no proof' of the hostility of his claim; neither was his possession sufficient to give it notoriety and the proof is far from showing that it was exclusive. In fact, all the inhabitants of the town who oared to exercised the same privileges as plaintiff and Ms pred
The plaintiff is entitled to judgment, decreeing that he is the owner of the premises in question, with costs.
Judgment for plaintiff, with costs.