309 N.Y. 258 | NY | 1955
Lead Opinion
These two actions challenge the propriety of the billing method in use by the New York Telephone Compan; (hereinafter called the Company) since 1950. At that time following hearings before the Public Service Commission (here inafter called the Commission), the Company extended its Nev York City dial system into Nassau and lower Westchestei counties, and thereafter, in pursuance of its duty to collect th( New York City sales tax, billed plaintiff, and other subscriber; similarly situated, 3% on concededly nontaxable calls dialed t( points outside the city limits as well as on admittedly taxable local city calls, due to the inability of the Company’s equipmen to differentiate between such calls.
In the first action, the Company, under rule 106 of the Rules o: Civil Practice, and the City of New York (hereinafter called the City), under rule 212 of the Rules of Civil Practice, moved te dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Both motions were granted with out leave to amend, and the Appellate Division affirmed. We al agree that this complaint was properly dismissed.
Both defendants again moved, this time under rules 106 and L07 of the Buies of Civil Practice, to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, which motions Special Term denied. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed and dismissed the complaint under rule 106. It did so “ without prejudice to any action or proceeding plaintiff may be advised to institute after the Public Service Commission (on its own motion or on complaint), in the irst instance, has made a determination on the reasonableness, propriety, adequacy and sufficiency of the practices and services lerein involved ”. The Appellate Division, moreover, modified )n the law, a direction of Special Term that, while an injunction pendente lite would be “ denied ”, the “ status quo of the funds s to be maintained ” pending the determination of the issues n a trial; plaintiff’s motion was thus denied “ unqualifiedly ”, nstead of “ qualifiedly ”.
We agree with the well-reasoned unanimous opinion of the Ippellate Division. The Company, in extending its dial system vith the approval of the Commission, was nevertheless mandated 3y the sales tax law of the City to collect sales taxes. Becognizng that to a comparatively small extent it was collecting excess iharges in its compliance with the sales tax law, the Company irranged to make appropriate refunds to subscribers upon ipplication. Plaintiff concedes that these moneys were not colected “ as tax ’’but only6 ‘ as an inevitable incident and coneomtant of its actual tax collection ”. There is thus in no event any )asis for an accounting decree here, since the Company, an icknowledged debtor, has at all times been willing to refund to
Nor is there any justiciable controversy here. If, by plaintiff’s demand for declaratory judgment, the court is being asked merely to declare what both defendants admit, namely, that suburban calls are not taxable and that the Company has no right to keep any moneys not properly chargeable, the requisite “ actual controversy ” is lacking and no declaratory judgment may be had (New York Operators v. State Liq. Auth., 285 N. Y. 272, 276; James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N. Y. 298, 305; 5 Carmody on New York Practice, § 1960; Borchard on Declaratory Judgments [2d ed.], pp. 33-48). The situation is thus quite unlike Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. (279 N. Y. 304) for there the company claimed it had the right to collect and retain for itself service charges which were expressly prohibited by law, and there were none of the drastic consequences here involved. Furthermore, even if the declaration sought by plaintiff is to the effect that the Company may not utilize the particular system in question to collect 3% on all dialed calls and provide for refunds to subscribers who are thus overcharged, then the court below was entitled to refuse to entertain the application in its discretion under section 473 of the Civil Practice Act, and rule 212 of the Eules of Civil Practice — whether or not motion was made therefor — until after plaintiff first sought relief provided for elsewhere, specifically, before the Commission in a determination of 11 the reasonableness, propriety, adequacy and sufficiency of the practices and services herein involved ’ ’. Where such an 11 adequate remedy is already provided ”, and there is thus no real need for resorting to a declaratory judgment, the court, in its discretion, may decline to accept jurisdiction and deny such relief (Bareham v. City of Rochester, 246 N. Y. 140, 143; James v. Alderton Dock Yards, supra, p. 305).
Plaintiff alleges that the Company could overcome its present inability to differentiate between local and suburban calls by installing new equipment, systems and procedures — a not inconsequential undertaking, and a matter that is'clearly within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Appellate Division appropriately recognized that the latter body, created "by law even as are the courts, is in a much better position, with its superior
The injunctive relief sought here is sweeping; it might seriously interfere with the Company’s duty to collect the sales tax concededly due; and the direction that the Company install an entirely new system, with all its consequences, is one that should not be made — at least until the Commission has acted. As to the restraint sought to be imposed upon the Company from paying to the City the amounts collected, this is an issue not presented by the pleadings and is not properly before us.
Under all the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Appellate Division not only exercised sound judgment, but it had the power to do what it did in the exercise of discretion, both as to declaratory and injunctive relief, with which we have no right to interfere.
The judgments in both actions should be affirmed, without costs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I agree that, as these cases come to us, we may ignore the first complaint, and examine, as to sufficiency, the complaint in Action No. 2, only. I agree, too, that, for several reasons, the cause of action for an accounting, being the sixth count in Complaint No. 2, is inadequate.
However, Complaint No. 2 does include a sufficient cause of action for a declaratory judgment and a sufficient cause of action for an injunction. The basic ground asserted for relief is that defendant telephone company, with the at least passive acquiescence of defendant city, has been carrying on for five years and intends to continue an illegal practice of collecting from the telephone subscribers taxes concededly not owed by the latter. That the company has no present method of distinguishing between taxable and nontaxable messages, explains but does not justify the illegality. The telephone company acts as to these taxes as the city’s collecting agency only and holds as trustee for the city the tax moneys when collected as such (Administrative Code of City of New York, § N41-2.0; Matter of American Cyanamid & Chem. Corp. v. Joseph, 308 N. Y. 259; New York
Declaratory judgment relief has been denied to plaintiff b the courts below, not in the exercise of discretion (see Rules Cr Prac., rule 212) but on the ground that there is no justiciabl dispute between plaintiff and either defendant. All partie agree that the collection of these New York City local taxes o telephone calls to extra-city points is forbidden by the applicah statute (L. 1934, ch. 873, subd. 1, as last amd. by L. 1952, ch. 232 But from that it does not follow that there is no dispute for tl courts to settle. Defendant telephone company, while admittin invalidity asserts necessity and tells us that there is no oth( way of charging for these calls, in the first instance, and that intends, therefore, to continue its present practices. Thus, justiciable controversy exists not as to whether Manhattai Westchester calls are taxable but as to whether defendant tel phone company may continue to force its subscribers to pay tax( not due and require those subscribers to submit to the company private procedures as to refunds. Whether or not the cour will in the end enter a declaratory judgment, and, if so, whs will be its terms, is not now before us on this motion to dismis the complaint for insufficiency.
Similar reasons require the validation of the injunction com in Complaint No. 2. We are told that resort should first be Ile to the Public Service Commission on the theory that plaintiff grievance is as to the adequacy of the company’s service, equi ment or practices (Public Service Law, § 97, subd. 2). Not s The wrong plaintiff alleges is the illegal collection by the publ utility of taxes not statutorily authorized. Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. (279 N. Y. 304) established the rule in such situ tians that “ direct application for relief may be made to tl
In the view I take, it is unnecessary to decide whether this is an individually-brought or representative-type action.
In Action No. 1, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, without costs.
In Action No. 2, the judgment appealed from should be modified so as to provide for the dismissal of the sixth cause of action only, without costs.
In Action No. 1: Conwat, Ch. J., Desmond, Dye, Fuld and Van Voorhis, JJ., concur with Froessel, J.; Burke, J., taking no part.
In Action No. 2: Conway, Ch. J., Dye and Van Voorhis, JJ., concur with Froessel, J.; Desmond, J., dissents in an opinion in which Fuld, J., concurs; Burke, J., taking no part.
In Actions Nos. 1 and 2: Judgment affirmed.
