*2 HEANEY, LAY, Judgе, Chief Before ARNOLD, JOHN R. McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, FAGG, GIBSON, MAGILL, Circuit WOLLMAN, and banc. Judges, en Judge. WOLLMAN, Circuit under suit filed this Warren Jackson City of against (1982) U.S.C. § Lin- three (the City), and Lincoln, Nebraska of War- the close At officers. police coln dis- court1 case-in-chief, district ren’s Sandra Officer against as the action missed the conclu- City. Upon Myers L. verdict returned a trial, of the sion defendants, Offi- remaining of the in favor After Beggs. David Breen cers James banc,2 we affirm. en case hearing I. April 4:30 a.m. approximately At responded police Lincoln someone claimed who a man call from apartment his into to break attempted
just
man
story window.
a second
through
had fled
intruder, who
described
east,
a slender
foot toward
scene on
wearing a
early twenties
his
male in
white
offi-
One
shirt.
short-sleeved
white
teamed
was
call
responded who
cers
intrud-
tracked
dog, which
police
awith
scene
the crime
from
east
er’s scent
one-
four and
car
parked
Warren’s
Jackson
previous
filed
this court
opinion of
Urbom,
2. The
Chief
K.
The Honorable
Lincoln,
City
ly, Warren
Dis-
for the
Court
District
States
Judge, United
automatically
1987),
vacated
Cir.
of Nebraska.
trict
granted.
rehearing was
petition for
away.
half blocks
Warren is a slender Warren’s complaint alleged
po-
white male
at the time of
who
the incident
officers,
lice
pursuant to
police
Lincoln
de-
years
wearing light-
nineteen
old and
partment policy, violated his constitutional
colored short-sleevеd shirt.
police
As the
rights in
fourth,
contravention of the
fifth,
approached
car,
the Warren
en-
started his
sixth, and fourteenth
amendments
false-
gine
away.
to drive
ly
him,
imprisoning
denying him access to
*3
counsel, subjecting him to harassing inter-
police
A
flagged
officer
Warren down
rogation, fingerprinting him,
photo-
and
and
park
told him to
his car. Officer
graphing him.
Myers
approached
then
Warren in his car
and asked for some identification. She
After the district court dismissed the
briefly questioned Warren and then ran a City
Myers
and Officer
suit,
from the
check on
squad
Warren’s license from her
jury returned verdicts in
favor
Detec-
car. She
outstanding
discovered an
war-
tives Breen
Beggs.
and
appealed.
Warren
rant for Warren’s arrest fоr
ap-
failure to
The
opinion held that
the district
pear on a
Myers
traffic violation.
arrested
committed error
failing to instruct
Warren on the failure-to-appear warrant,
pretextual
arrest,
that the jury
performed
pat-down search,
put
and
him
post-arrest
instructions on
detention and
in
squad
her
car.
qualified immunity
erroneous,
and
that the district court improperly
Myers
dismissed
took Warren to the
jail
Lincoln
Myers and
City.
We
complex
conclude that
and turned him over to Detective
Warren’s detention was lawful because
Breen at approximately 5:00 a.m. Breen
probable cause existed to arrest him
investigating
been
burgla-
series of
attempted burglary. We also
ries
conclude
and sexual assaults that had some
grounds
Warren’s other
for recovery
April
similarities to the
13
bur-
are without merit.
glary.
questioned
Breen
Warren on his
background and on his whereabouts earlier
II.
day,
telling
ques-
Warren that he was
tioning
him
connection with recent Warren’s primary argument
is that his
prowling
point
incidents. At
during
one
detention was in
rights
violation of
guaran
the questioning
Beggs
Detective
entered
teed him
amendment,
under the fourth
the room and examined Warren’s hands
applicable
made
to the
through
states
shoes,
and
looking for
trace evidence.
fourteenth
amendment. We therefore
Breen denied Warren’s requests to see an must first ascertain into which of the three
attorney
neither
nor any
Breen
categories
other
police-citizen
encounters the
police
Lincoln
officer read Warren his
encounter between Warren
rights pursuant
Arizona,
Miranda v.
falls,
Poitier,
see United States v.
—
U.S.
86 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
Cir.1987),
-,
U.S.
108 S.Ct.
(1988),for
category justifies
each
a differ
After
questioning,
Breen took War-
ent level of detention.
ren to
police
station
fingerprints
and photographs. Beggs, who had dusted
category
first
consists of consensual
for fingerprints at the scene of the at-
communications between officers and citi-
tempted burglary, took
prints
zens,
numerous
involving no coercion or restraint of
fingers
Warren’s
palms. Beggs
also liberty. Such encounters do not constitute
took three mug shots and three instant
seizures and
beyond
thus are
scoрe
photos
camera
of Warren. Breen then re-
the fourth amendment. See Florida turned Warren
jail.
Warren
Royer,
called
491, 497,
friends,
seeking money
post
order to
L.Ed.2d 229
The second
bond on the failure-to-appear warrant. Af-
category is the so-called Terry stop, see
waiting
ter
for a friend to arrive with the Terry Ohio,
21-22,
88 S.Ct.
money
completion
and for
1868, 1879-80,
his release
L.Ed.2d 889
Flor-
forms, Warren left the jail at 7:10 a.m.
Royer,
498-99,
ida v.
460 U.S. at
A.
1324-25, pursuant
an officer
having
suspicion that a
a reasonable
Myers
Officer
and Detective Breen
to commit a
committed or
about
they
testified that
believed
lacked
person for
may temporarily seize the
crime
for the
Finally,
investigative purposes.
limited
attemptеd burglary.
testimony,
Such
how
arrests, which must be
there are full-scale
ever,
inquiry,
does not end the
it is
Poitier,
by probable cause.
supported
“that
well-settled
test of
‘[t]he
F.2d at 682.
cause is
police
articulation of the
agree
All
the officers’ reasonable
subjective theory
objective
man’s
but the
suspicion
involvement
of Warren’s
”
view
the facts.’
United States v.
justified
attempted burglary
the initial
O’Connell,
(8th Cir.)
argue
that Warren’s
stop. The
(quoting
States,
White v. United
discovery
arrest was based
*4
250,
(8th Cir.1971),
denied,
254
405
cert.
warrant, and that the detention
valid arrest
926,
974,
U.S.
92 S.Ct.
30
798
L.Ed.2d
supported by
war-
at the station was
—
(1972)),
denied,
-,
rant,
suspicion
108
as their reasonable
cert.
U.S.
well
burgla-
attempted
2857,
(1988).
of his involvement in
101 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
893
banc, however,
ry.
rehearing
On
en
Royer,
sought
sup
the defendant
to
argument
officers also had
add
press
ground
evidence on the
that he was
objective probable cause to arrest Warren
being illegally detained
he
when
consented
attempted burglary,
and that the deten-
The Supreme
search.
Court noted that
to
permissible
thus
as incident
a
tion
not
“the fact that the officers did
believe
valid arrest.
probable
proceeded
there was
cause and
on
rule,
we
not consider
general
“As
do
Terry-stop
a consensual or
rationale would
appeal
on
arguments or theories
Roy-
justifying
foreclose the State from
proceedings
in the
below.”
not advanced
by proving probable
er's custody
1073,
Newman,
Wright v.
735 F.2d
1076 * *
507,
460
at
103
at
U.S.
S.Ct.
(8th Cir.1984)(citations omitted).
per
The
York,
(citing Peters
New
decided
1329
v.
respect
tinent record with
facts and
York,
40,
with
v.
392 U.S.
88
Sibron New
surrounding
ar
circumstances
Warren’s
1889,
(1968)).
S.Ct.
We are left then with the officers’
failure to read Warren the Miranda warn
HEANEY,
Judge,
Circuit
dissenting,
ings
and Breen’s denial Warren’s re
LAY,
Judge,
whom
Chief
quests
reading
to see counsel. The
of Mi
McMILLIAN,
ARNOLD and
Circuit
warnings
procedural safeguard
randa
is a
Judges, join.
right arising
rather than a
out of the fifth
Miranda,
amendment itself. See
I respectfully
majority
dissent. The
Thus,
1443
proba-
of
the establishment
the
about
v.
Cir.1965);
Marland
(3d
497
F.2d
proper
upon a
jury,
for the
cause is
Cir.1963).
ble
This
(10th
F.2d
Heyse,
law);
City
v.
the
Reeves
instruction about
in Linn
this Court
reaffirmed
rule was
(5th
Miss.,
Jackson,
608 F.2d
Cir.1976), in
(8th
Garcia,
F.2d
of
for arrest consti-
Cir.1979) (probable cause
stated:
we
which
jury could have
question as
jury
tutes
or where
dispute
in
facts are
the
Where
to arrest
had no cause
that officers
found
inferences,
subject
differеnt
they are
intoxication).
public
for
plaintiff
is for the
cause
probable
of
question
the
not
are
however,
Circuit,
the facts
in
dealt with
Deary,
where
The Third
jury;
majority
one
up by
the
susceptible
taken
precise
are
issue
disputed or
the
one
inference,
is
question
the
It
case.
wrote:
in this
reasonable
the court.
for
whether
required
of law
to decide
are here
[W]e
Deary’s case could
in
summary judgment
Id. at 861.
on the issue
granted
been
properly have
proba
determining whether
of
The task
is, taking
of
all
cause. That
probable
of
of
a matter
exists as
to arrest
cause
ble
resolving
allegations as true
Deary’s
than
is different
1983 actions
in section
law
favor,
whether
in her
all inferences
of a
in the context
determination
a similar
police
the
could
jury
find
reasonable
McKen
arrest.
a criminal
of
review
direct
reasonably be
could not have
(9th
Cir.
Lamb,
zie
City
the
Deary committed
lieved that
the
Kennedy, writing
1984). Justice
i.e.,
probable
not have
robbery,
did
Bank
Circuit, stated:
Ninth
Patzig
the
her arrest. Like
[v.
cause
situation,
are called
we
In the latter
case,
(3d Cir.1978)]
O’Neil,
to draw
fact and
law and
both
to review
circum
faced with substantial
too are
we
reason-
is and
to what
line as
the
would sustain
stantial evidence
* * *
contrast, in a
By
behavior.
able
alleged
probable cause:
finding of
under-
matters
the factual
action
§
resemblance
appearance
in
similarity
reasonablеness
of
judgment
lying the
Deary to
of
characteristics
physical
is a
probable cause
mean that
generally
surveil
pictured in
bank
suspect
* * *.
jury
for the
question
Deary’s
well
photographs, as
lance
omitted).
(citations
arresting
flight
of
from
appearance
existed
cause
arrest.
Thus,
finding
day
her
probable
of
if
“only
appropriate
of law
Nevertheless,
as a matter
evi-
despite considerable
offi-
find that
view,
could
which,
no reasonable
would lead
in our
dence
cause,
light
not have
did or did
cers
finding City
also,
Id.;
Lester v.
trial
see
say that
arrest.”
cannot
Patzig, we
Cir.1987)
him,
could
Chicago, 830
record before
on the
judge,
police
of whether
the issue
(question
summarily decide
disorderly con-
presence
plaintiff
extent that
to arrest
cause. To
jury);
depended
properly
submitted
duct was
or absence
Fontaine,
bank
Co.,
Deary to the
Transport
Inc.
resemblance
B.C.R.
or
Cir.1984)(“[Wjhether
taken at
(1st
photographs
surveillance
neces-
question
any
robbery,
case
given
cause exists
time
*8
jury
one for
facts
particular
a factual
depends
sarily
the
becomes
invariably
that
the fact
case,
question
Nor does
a
of that
determination.
and circumstances
resem-
fact.”);
characteristics
Deary’s
physical
the trier of
resolved
to be
the
robbed
who
of the woman
Officers,
that
Police
bled
Three
Deary v.
Un-named
those
that
Cir.1984) (ultimate
change our conclusion
(3d
bank
consideration.
jury
too, were
plaintiff
arrest
probable cause
fact of
Deary concedes
though
decide); Moreover, even
jury to
robbery
was
for bank
the officers
when
“jogging”
she
Brown,
that
was
Bilbrey v.
Bilbrey by
activity
her,
that
whether
per-
apprehended
Cir.1984)(if
reasonable
1462, flight
perception
gave the reasonable
might
different conclusions
reach
sons
is also a matter
must
left
thin,
male,
truder: a
twenties,
white
in his
judgment
jury
of the
to take into
wearing
account
light-colored
a
short-sleeved shirt.
together with such considerations as the Yet,
Leitner,
Dean
Chief of Police for the
speed
(run-
“jogging”
at which she was
Lincoln,
City of
testified at trial that this
ning),
demeanor,
her overall
and the oth- descriptiоn was not sufficient
in and of
aspects
appearance.
er
of her
itself to take an
custody
individual into
grant
To
judgment for the defendant
because “that
fit
would
hundreds of thou-
police
juncture, therefore,
officers at this
people.” (T. 164).
sands of
Although War-
would be to
the role
usurp
jury
which a
ren did not have the opportunity to develop
play
finding here,
must
in fact
deter-
this
questioning
trial,
line of
quite
—
it is
mining
the
fact
ultimate
possible that the factual circumstances sur-
cause or the lack of it.
rounding the attempted break-in would
Deary
jury
v. Three
lead a
Officers,
Unnamed Police
discount
reliability
the
(footnotes omitted).
If Officer ignore we important this consideration the officer handling police dog, consider all the testified presently facts as de- that he veloped did not feel light in the he could most favorable to War- Warren ren, solely I based believe a jury track. He reasonable could find stated that exhaust, that no car gasoline, any cause existed to arrest number of оther chemicals and burglary. the scent of another human being dog’s interfere ability First, police involved War- (T. 446). track. Thus, with further factual ren’s arrest and detention testified at trial development, jury a reasonably could con- did not objective have sufficient clude dog lost the scent of the facts on which to base intruder. Because per- there was another finding. Myers only testified she area, son in the general same could suspicion” “reasonable that Warren had also reasonably conclude that dog track attempted burglary that morning. Detec- was inconclusive as to Warren’s culpability. tive Breen similarly that, conceded at trial even after detaining questioning War- Finally, the majority points to the fact ren, police had no cause to that Warren attempted to leave the area police arrest him. If partici- when he police saw a officer. Warren ex- pating in the arrest could reach a conclu- plained at trial that he started to turn his sion different from of the majority car around because there were a lot of Court, this it demonstrates the need to police cars at the corner of 20th and C question submit the jury. Streets, and he wanted to avoid “the
Second,
description
(T. 15).
of the suspect mess.”
As stated in the Deary
*9
general
case,
too
to
objec-
constitute reliable
activity gave
whether this
the reason-
tive evidence. Warren matched the
perception
flight
vic- able
of
is a matter which
general
tim’s
description
alleged
of the
in- must be left to the judgment
jury.
on either
rest its decision
does not
whole,
majority
are not
a
as
taken
These
theories,
repeat my
I
not
will
legal
of these
A jury
inference.
only one
susceptible of
except to
panel opinion,
in the
discussion
that
conclusion
draw the
reasonably
could
it cor-
to
that
I continue
believe
say that
gen-
was too
of the intruder
description
the
in this
the
Circuit.
rectly states
law
unreliable, and the
too
eral,
track
dog
the
ambiguous to
too
the area
attempt to leave
however,
must,
comment on Neb.Stat.
I
of
objective evidence
interpre-
constitute
appellees’
29-427 and the
Rev. §
cause.1
of it.
tation
majority
opinion, the
B of its
perti-
provides
In section
in
29-427
Neb.Rev.Stat. §
whether
states,
must determine
thus
“We
part:
nent
objective-
arrest;
the facts available
officer;
de-
grounds for
Peace
to arrest
to
ly gave
accused;
rise
grounds. Any
of
tention
Assum-
burglary.”
attempted
for
making
having grounds
peace officer
objective
deciding,
this
that
ing, without
into cus-
may
the accused
take
an
clear
it remains
appropriate,
so,
is
detain
or, already having
standard
done
tody
sit as fact-
this Court
fails to
is not for
the
that it
accused
him further
clearly does.2
refuses
finder,
majority
satisfactorily, or
identify
as the
himself
citation,
officer
or when the
sign the
cаnnot nor
we
fact that
light of the
In
that
grounds to believe
reasonable
has
cause existed
say that
should
* * *
necessary
or-
(3)
is
such action
re-
law,
should
this Court
of
as a matter
investigative
legitimate
carry out
der to
by the
raised
the issue
to consider
fuse
* * *.
functions
on
in its brief
time
for the first
appellees
Nev.Rev.Stat. §
majority feels
If the
rehearing en banc.3
is-
that,
had no
they
the
if
argue
reach
even
compelled
Appellees
the
is remand
for at-
should
arrest Warren
sue,
most it
do
cause to
the
29-427(3) gave
directions
burglary,
court with
section
tempted
district
matter to the
parties
based
trial,
authority
time both
make an arrest
at which
them the
for a new
War-
present evi-
and to detain
opportunity
the traffic warrant
have an
on
would
sep-
the
regard to
court
with
questioning
The
then
issue.
district
ren for
on the
dence
Not
burglary.
attempted
the
issue to
arate crime
the
submit
should
contrary to
interpretation
the
an
only
it found
such
unless
instructions
appropriate
statute,
it
but
the
language of
jury ques-
plain
a
to create
insufficient
evidence
unconstitutional.
the statute
also renders
tion.
statute,
police officer
this
As
read
to reverse
I
Court
appellees asked this
The
if the
legally arrested
anyone
may
pretextu-
detain
issue of
panel decision
necessary to
it
reasonably believes
officer
immunity. As
qualified
al arrest and
Wulff,
Singleton v.
cases.”
of individual
support
by majority
are
as
cited
The cases
1.
L.Ed.
in which courts
inapposite,
are cases
as
justified
(federal
(1976)
appellate
court
2d
arrests. None
directly review criminal
had to
proper resolu
resolving
where
an issue
determinations
involved factual
the cases
doubt,
injustice
any
or where an
beyond
1983 suits.
tion is
appellate
in section
an
result).
Singleton,
Su
might otherwise
however,
Court,
this
preme Court chastised
majority con-
opinion, the
C of the
In section
when one
the merits
addressing
issue on
an
existed to warrant
cludes
develop or
opportunity to
no
party
burglary.
Warren’s arrest
level.
trial
position
the issue
on
its
defend
say
probable cause exists
majority
does
rule,
held,
general
a as
only
Court has
susceptiblе to
one
This
facts are
because the
on
arguments or theories
Thus,
not consider
can
we will
its conclusion
reasonable inference.
proceedings
advanced
appeal that were not
categorized
fact.
as
statement
be
below,
can be resolved
unless the issue
law,
has been
record
pertinent
matter
United States
Supreme Court of the
3. The
party had
opposing
developed,
fully
may
questions
of what
matter
”[t]he
stated
raised.
specific issue would
notice
the first time
up
resolved for
be taken
Newman,
Wright
discretion
primarily to the
appeal
left
is one
Cir.1984).
appeals,
exercised on
to be
courts
*10
investigate
person’s
further
that
role precisе
On the
by
shown
this
record,
the crime
which he
we think
arrested.
5(a)
It
effect Rule
is
for
to convert at least as of 4:00
grant police
power
does not
P.M. on the
to make a
tenor of the statute warrants
language
make an
legal arrest
crime when
questioning
arrest
there
with
provision
for that
to detain that person
is no
regard
(3)
crime. Neither the
nor the overall
such a
separate
cause to
sweep-
for
they were convicted.
tinued detention at the police station into
cause in respect of the crime for which
an unlawful
afternoon of
¤
[*]
appellants’ arrest,
arrest without
[*]
[*]
[*]
their con-
probable
[*]
An
arrest made on
ing interpretation.
cause can
bring a man lawfully into the hands of
Furthermore,
appellees'
interpreta
pоlice, but
not,
that detention does
ab-
tion would render Neb.Rev.Stat.
§
compliance
sent
5(a),
with Rule
continue
permitted
unconstitutional. Police are not
to be
purposes,
lawful for all
including
to hold
custody beyond
someone in
the time
the investigation
possible
of his
connec-
necessary
process
him
respect
with
tion with other crimes.
the crime of arrest for the sole purpose of
(footnotes
F.2d at 577-78
omitted); see
trying
person
to connect that
to another
Poole,
United States v.
crime. To do so is an unlawful seizure.
(D.C.Cir.1974) (Leventhal, J., concurring)
States,
See Adams United
cause,
trying to only,
other crimes
is to
connect them with effect
without
ment
made on the
arrested. To continue their custody
matters. Rule
to detain them under arrest for other
November 5 at the North Carolina Ave-
nue store.
arrest and
Here, the lawful
[*]
committed an
without
hold in
and,
it is an
presentment
essentially
[*]
detention rested
if not
There was no
charge
unnecessary
custody
5(a) provides
illegal
for
#
supported by
illegal;
basis for
the belief
the same as a new
detention.
#
delay shall be
its
investigation
solely
#
purpose
robbery on
appellants’
operative
present-
[*]
they
Adams v. United
nal).
(Burger,
I
sary.”
that the “delay” has become “unneces-
trate is for the purpose of investigation
of other
cially when it is
culpation of
investigation into his connection with the
process an accused
crime
printing and
even to make same limited preliminary
ably relate to time to administratively
Fed.R.Crim.P.
reached.
believe that
time
delay
for
J.,
necessary
crimes,
concurring) (emphasis in origi-
which he
Necessary
the one arrested.
other
presentment
holding
States,
5(a)
directed
then there is no doubt
steps
process
delay can reason-
crimes a stat- Where Amendment. Fourth
der constructions, un- of two susceptible is ute valid, while statute one of which der or of it is unconstitutional the other undеr Supreme Nebraska validity, the doubtful construction adopt the will Court Evans, validity. State gives the statute 788, 793 433, 338 N.W.2d
215 Neb. Neb.Rev.Stat version appellees’
As Amendment, I Fourth violates 29-427 § Supreme Court would the Nebraska believe limits inves- interpretation which adopt the po- where to situations detention
tigatory role investigate the detainee’s
lice need he arrested. for which
in the crime time neces- beyond the
Thus, any detention respect to the Warren with
sary process of investi- purpose for the warrant
traffic burglary justi- gating the Neb.Rev.Stat. under §
fiable seizure based an unlawful constitute
would of the sort suspicion reasonable solely on York, Dunaway v. New
prohibited in L.Ed.2d 824 Royer, and Florida (1983).4 L.Ed.2d 229 HENDERSON, Appellee,
Jerry Wayne LOCKHART, Arkansas Director
A.L. Correction, Department of
Appellant. 87-2427.
No. Appeals, States Court
United
Eighth Circuit. May
Submitted 10, 1989. Jan.
Decided have been should payment of bond. processing a procedure for 4. The normal beyond the was held that if instructed entails appear traffic violation for a who fails to him, deten- him, necessary process officer, then booking time taking correction him ato one. an tion was unlawful releasing promptly setting him bond
