Jackson v. StateJackson v. State
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- Corbin
Aрpellant Andre Lamont Jackson appeals the judgment of the Pulaski County Circuit Court convicting him of first-degree murder and terroristiс act and sentencing him to a total of thirty years’ imprisonment. Appellant raises one point for reversal concеrning the sufficiency of the evidence on the count of terroristic act. This case was certified to us from the Arkansas Court of Appeals, pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(d), as it presents an issue of first impression requiring our interpretation of
The record reflects that on June 5, 1996, Orion Harris and his cousin Ian Houston were sitting in Harris’s car at the intersection of 12th and University Streets in Little Rock. Harris was driving and Houston was in the front passenger’s seat. Next to them, in the left turning lane, was a black Toyota 4-Runner. Three of the four occupants in the Toyota, including Appellant, had been smoking “sherm,” a term used to describe cigarettes dipped in PCP. When the turning lane’s fight turned green, the Toyota proceeded to turn, but thеn stopped. A man, later identified as Appellant, stepped out of the Toyota, walked to the rear of Harris’s vehiсle, and started shooting. Harris hit the gas and tried to get away from him. Before they were able to get through the intersection, however, Houston was shot in the chest, and he later died.
During the trial, the State presented undisputed evidence that Houston was unarmed and that neither he nor Harris made any moves inside the car that would indicate that they were armed. At the close of the еvidence, Appellant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crime of terroristic act because the State had failed to prove that he was not engaged in the commission of a lawful act at the time of the shooting. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
(a) For the purposes of this section, a pеrson commits a terroristic act when, while not in the commission of a lawful act:
(1) He shoots at or in any manner projects an object with the purpose to cause injury to persons or property at a conveyance which is being opеrated or which is occupied by passengers [.] [Emphasis added.]
Appellant asserts that there are two elements under this sеction that the State was required to prove against him: (1) that he shot at a car occupied by passengers and (2) that hе was not in the commission of a lawful act at the time. The State contends that the phrase “while not in the commission of a lawful act” amounts to a defense to the offense, excluding those persons, such as police officers, who act with sоme legal justification. We agree with the State.
In Fendley v. State, 314 Ark. 435, 863 S.W.2d 284 (1993), this court reviewed a similar criminal provision in
(a) Unless so authorized by and subject to such conditions as prescribed by the Governor, or his designee, or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the United States Treasury Department, or other bureau or office designated by the Treasury Department, no person shall possess or own any firearm who has bеen:
(1) Convicted of a felony [.]
Fendley argued that under that section, the State had to prove not only that he was a convicted felon and that he had possession of a firearm, but also that he was not authorized to possess such firearm. This court disagreed, holding:
The “authоrization” clause in subsection (a) of 5-73-103 creates a defense as defined by 5-1-111 (c)(3). Were that not so, we would have to hold that the General Assembly intended to require the State to prove a negative, that is, to prove a defendant has not beеn authorized, by one of the several official officers or office mentioned, to possess a firearm. That he had bеen authorized officially to possess a firearm would be “peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.”
Id. at 437, 863 S.W.2d at 285. This court held further that under the circumstances, it was fair to require the defendant to introduce evidence that he had authorization to possess a firearm, as “a request for and the granting of authority to possess a firearm are matters which should clearly be within Fendlеy’s knowledge but not necessarily within the State’s knowledge.” Id. at 438, 863 S.W.2d at 285.
More recently, in Renfro v. State, 331 Ark. 253, 962 S.W.2d 745 (1998), the appellant argued that under
In this respect, a defense is defined as any matter involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant on which he can fairly be required tо introduce supporting evidence.Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-111 (c)(3) (Repl. 1993). The “written permission” required in§ 8-6-205(a)(4) creates a defense under § 5-l-111(c)(3), because such a matter was peculiarly within Rеnfro’s knowledge.
Id. at 259, 962 S.W.2d at 749 (citation omitted). We think the analysis employed in both Fendley and Renfro is dispositive of the issue here.
The phrase “while not in the commission of a lawful act” in