49 Ga. App. 345 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
The special presentment in this case is based
J. H. Sanford, sworn for the State, testified in substance that the accident occurred on the Lindale public road; that the car in which the defendant was riding was traveling in the direction of Rome at a speed of about sixty miles an hour, with the right-hand wheels about a foot off the pavement on the right side of the road; that while Young was “walking off the pavement on the dirt” in the direction of Lindale, the defendant struck .Young with defendant’s automobile and “knocked him clean up in the air and over the automobile” and broke his leg; and that after striking Young the defendant “did not stop, but, if anything, increased his speed.” Claude Sanford, sworn for the State, testified substantially as did the witness J. H. Sanford, except that he estimated the speed of the defendant’s automobile at about fifty miles an hour, thought that Young was walking on the pavement when he was struck, and merely stated that Young was “turned around” when the automobile hit him. Grady Harris, sworn for the State, testified in substance that the defendant was traveling about fifty miles an hour; that Young “was on the east side of the pavement when Mr. Jackson struck him;” and that the defendant did not stop the car when he hit Young. George Walker, sworn for the State, testified in substance that he was in the car with the defendant at the time of .the accident; that Young “was going towards Lindale, and we were going towards Rome;” that Young “was on the left side of the road in the direction in which he was going, and we were on the right side of the road in the direction in which we were going;” that the defendant was driving “some two feet from the outer edge of the concrete pavement,” and that when the automobile
The defendant introduced no evidence, but stated to the jury in substance what his companion George Walker swore, except that he stated that he did not know that his automobile struck Young; that when he had driven about a quarter of a mile beyond Young, Walker told him that "he believed that I hit the man, and I told him I guessed not;” and that when he heard that a warrant had been sworn out for him he went to Rome, surrendered to the deputy sheriff, and gave bond.
The evidence certainly warranted the jury in concluding that the defendant had violated the statute, and we hold that there is no merit in the general grounds of the motion for a new trial.
In special ground 1 it is urged that the court erred in charging the jury as follows: “Under this statute the only two questions for this jury to determine are as to whether or not the defendant in this case struck K. M. Young, and, if you find that he did, then as to whether or not he had knowledge that he struck him and with that knowledge failed to stop. If you find those facts true, then it would be your duty to convict the defendant.” It is insisted that the foregoing charge improperly restricted the jury to a consideration of only two issues, when there were other issues in the case, such as whether or not the offense was committed in Eloyd county, and whether or not the Lindale road was a public road. It is quite true that the presentment and the plea of not guilty put the State upon proof of every material allegation in
Special ground 2 avers that the following charge is erroneous: “I charge you that the word ‘immediately’ in the statute does not contemplate that after having struck a person on the highway, he should leave the scene, and thereafter, — at any time thereafter,— return and give the required information; that would not come within the contemplation of the statute as to the meaning of the word ‘immediately.’” The gist of the assignment of error is that
It is averred in special ground 3 that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury as follows: “If the defendant did not know that he struck Mr. Young with an automobile until after Mr. Young was hit, and then, when some distance from the place where Mr. Young was hit unknown to the defendant, then for the first time a third person told him he had hit some one, under such circumstances the defendant would not be guilty, and you would acquit the defendant.” A casual reading of the statute hereinbefore quoted satisfies us that the charge is not a correct statement of law. Furthermore, the following broad and favorable charge was given the jury: “If you find that the defendant did strike Mr. Young, but that he had no knowledge of having struck him, then it would be your duty to acquit the defendant.” We hold that the court properly refused to give the requested charge.
Special ground 4 complains that the court refused to charge: “If the defendant, in a reasonable time after the said Young was hit, surrendered to the sheriff and made himself known as the driver of the automobile, then you will acquit the defendant.” Surely the fact that a defendant surrenders to the sheriff after he hears that
In regard to special ground 5, wherein it is averred that the court erred in refusing to charge that "the law does not require the instant stopping of an automobile upon striking a person upon a public road, but if, soon after, the defendant makes himself known to the driver of the automobile, he complies with the law,” we deem it only necessary to say that this is not a correct statement of the law and does not fit the facts of this case.
Special ground 6 complains that the court refused to charge: "If the defendant made his name known soon after the said Young was hit, and stopped soon thereafter, is all that is required.” This charge is not the law, and, if it were, it is not applicable to the facts of this case.
Judgment affirmed.