135 Ga. 684 | Ga. | 1911
1. Under the facts of this ease, a statement of irrelevant evidence voluntarily made by a witness, and in regard to which, upon objection being made by counsel for the defendant, the solicitor-general said, in the hearing of the jury, “We have no objection to that going out,” no further ruling of the court being invoked by counsel for the accused, is not ground for a new trial merely because the court failed to reprimand the witness or to caution the jury against being influenced by the irrelevant testimony.
2. Where a husband find's his wife at night in company with a man, and the wife then and there discloses to the husband that she is guilty of acts of infidelity, and that the man in whose company she is is her paramour, and that she'intends to continue her acts of infidelity and lascivious intercourse with the man in whose company she is found, and the husband, in the heat of passion excited by the words and conduct of his wife', shoots and’ kills her; on the trial of the husband under in
(6) While the court’s charge upon the subject of justifiable homicide was inaccurate and' incomplete, it does not afford the defendant in this ease any ground for a new trial, inasmuch as neither under the evidence nor the statement of the accused was he entitled to a charge upon the subject of justifiable homicide, and the charge as given stated the law more favorably to him than he was entitled to have it stated.
3. The court did not err, as against the defendant, in charging the jury as follows: “The court charges you that if you believe that the deceased was the wife of the defendant, and that, he coming on her at night with another man, she made known to him her infidelity, or acted in such a manner or used such words as to cause him at that time to believe in her infidelity, and he, believing it, in a sudden heat of passion supposed to he irresistible, caused by it, killed his wife, then it would be for you to say whether or not that is such provocation as would reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter.” While the charge was not entirely accurate, the inaccuracy was not of such a nature as to afford cause for the grant of a new trial.
4. Where the court, in charging upon the subject of voluntary manslaughter, enumerated certain facts and circumstances which the defendant in his statement set forth in extenuation of the killing, and' submitted to' the jury the question as to whether these were' sufficient to justify the excitement of sudden heat of irresistible passion under the influence of which the accused contended that he had killed his wife, and there were no other facts and circumstances in the case sufficient to provoke such sudden heat of passion, the charge was not open to the criticism that “it restricted the jury to a consideration of one defense only contended for by the defendant, and excluded from their consideration any other equivalent circumstances to justify the excitement of passion supposed to he irresistible and to exclude all idea of deliberation or malice, either express or implied.”
5. failure to charge the law on the subject of the impeachment of witnesses is not á ground for a new trial, in the absence of a timely written request for such a charge.
Judgment affirmed.