114 S.W. 136 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1908
Appellant was convicted of assault to murder, and his punishment assessed at two years confinement in the penitentiary.
See former opinion 48 Tex.Crim. Rep.,
Appellant insists in his motion for a new trial that the verdict of the jury is contrary to and not supported by the evidence. We do not agree with this contention. Assault to murder is and can be supported by either express or implied malice. Certainly, the jury were warranted in believing the State's case that, at least, the defendant had implied malice towards the conductor. It is true they were not acquainted prior to the time of this trouble, but that does not prevent the jury holding that, actuated by passion and without adequate cause, he shot at the conductor. The State's case shows that he got off the train voluntarily, while the defense shows that he was assaulted by the conductor and put off. The court presented this phase of the matter properly in his charge, as we will show in another portion of the opinion.
Appellant complains that the court erred in giving the following charge: "If you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, in the County of Bowie and State of Texas, on or about the time charged in the indictment, with a deadly weapon, did unlawfully assault the said D.D. Cannon as charged, but you further believe at the time of making such assault the defendant's mind was under the influence of sudden passion, known as anger, rage, resentment or terror, sufficient to render it incapable of cool reflection, and that this condition of mind was produced by an adequate cause, then you will find the defendant guilty of an aggravated assault." Appellant says this charge was erroneous, because same places upon the defendant the burden of proving facts which would reduce the character of the assault from an assault to murder to an aggravated assault, and requires the jury to find these facts beyond a reasonable doubt before they could convict him of an aggravated assault, when, under the law, the defendant was entitled to the benefit of such doubt. This criticism is not correct. It does not shift the burden of proof, but is a stereotyped charge that has been approved by this court.
The third complaint is that the court erred in charging the jury, *608 as follows: "If you believe from the evidence that the defendant shot a pistol at D.D. Cannon, but you further believe, or have a reasonable doubt, that he was so far from said Cannon that the ball would not reach him, then this would not be an assault, and you will find the defendant not guilty." This charge is correct. Appellant insists, however, that the burden was upon the State to show that at the time defendant fired said shot he was close enough to said Cannon to be in carrying distance of said pistol; and said charge shifted the burden upon the defendant to prove the contrary. We hold that appellant is in error in his contention. The charge very properly, in substance, tells the jury that if they have a reasonable doubt as to whether he was close enough to shoot him, to find defendant not guilty.
The fourth complaint is leveled at the following charge: "I also charge you that if you believe, or have a reasonable doubt, that defendant shot said pistol with no intention to hit or shoot said D.D. Cannon, then you will find the defendant not guilty." This charge is correct, and does not shift the burden of proof as contended by appellant. Similar criticisms are leveled at other charges of the court. We do not deem it necessary to copy all of them, but suffice it to say, the charge of the court is a proper presentation of the law applicable to the facts of this case, and we hold that the evidence amply supports the verdict.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Ramsey, Judge, absent.
[Motion for rehearing overruled. — Reporter.]