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Jackson v. State
197 S.W.3d 468
Ark.
2004
Check Treatment

*1 erroneous, we da’s is not affirm. court parental rights clearly decision is reversed on for review. appeals’ petition

Anarian Chad STATE of Arkansas JACKSON CR 03-800 197 S.W.3d 468 Court of Arkansas

Supreme 4, 2004 delivered November Opinion denied December [Rehearing 9, 2004.] *3 Larkowski, Larkowski, B. and & Jeremy Lowrey; Hampton by: Jerry for appellant. Beebe, Gen., Holt,

Mike Gen., Kent G. Ass’t by: Att’y Att’y appellee. Robert L. Brown, Anarian Chad Justice. from his

Jackson, conviction for mur- der and his sentence of life We affirm conviction imprisonment. and sentence. The facts from at trial are gleaned these. On testimony 5, 2001, a witness observed Charles

January he was shot Raynor to death in his front Little Rock. same witness had yard behind, two men observed victim from at which approach time fell to the When he Raynor tried ground. get up, Raynor Examiner, Dr. William Medical The State’s Chief shot

was again. killed Sturner, gunshot was at trial that Raynor testified to the head. wound Bush, who trial, from Chris

Also at the State presented and murder murder for Raynor’s to first-degree had already pled guilty that Bush testified a sentence of years’imprisonment. had received forty about “was talking him Raynor had told previously Jackson about [Jackson],” and “things little and stuff’ saying girls [Jackson] murder, of the stated that the day did not like it. Bush Jackson friend, Mark,” a “Little driven around by were being he and Jackson that he Bush testified in his front yard. when saw Raynor standing they him, caliber .40 and that carrying revolver with had a .357 Jackson semi-automatic gun. around Little Mark to told park Bush testified house, out of then and that Bush got comer from side of the house car, walked down the along went alley, first said that started shooting Bush where standing. Raynor back to the car. five times and then ran he himself shot about and that and came running finished shooting He further testified him, he had the found admitted that when the behind him. Bush him, he had which was used to kill caliber Raynor .40 gun house.” from a obtained “dope Todd from Officer also The State presented

Hurd, the Little Rock Police detective with a gang-intelligence as both a was classified who testified that Department, the terms in front of jury He defined and “banger.” “slinger” as follows: *4 to, term, referred commonly asit’s is a street or “slanger”

“Slinger” on the streets. deals They’re slinging dope is a who person dope. — that is a member a is a that’sreferred gang And “banger” person will; shoot- rivalriesif you to as into reallybeing gang referred at, members. and other gang conflict with other having gangs ing Posse, also was a leader of the West Side He further stated that Jackson Rock, Piru, and that a in Little Raynor as the West Side known gang Hustlers, another in Monroe gang was a member of the Street Posse, that as a leader of the West Side area. He said Little Rock over the main authority younger gang would be figure Jackson Bush, members, have been below who would like Chris Jackson hierarchy. gang’s Lab firearms-and-tool- Crime State Ronald Andrejack, were examiner, that four .40-caliber casings, mark testified death, found at the scene of were all fired from the Raynor’s .40-caliber that was retrieved and that a piece weapon copper from a .38-caliber bullet taken from could jacket Raynor’s body have been fired not the .357 but .40-caliber by Magnum, pistol that fired the casings.

Two other witnesses for the State were treated as hostile wit- nesses. Markevious and Rodrick testified that King Pennington they did not remember statements to Detective Stuart Sullivan of the giving Little Rock Police When testified were unable they they Department. statements, to remember their the State and obtained from sought circuit court the to introduce into evidence permission transcripts both witnesses’ before a federal grand jury. King’s testimony affirmed a statement he had to Detective Sullivan which he given named the members of the West Posse and Side discussed times when to other members and to him and directed them gave guns gang Jackson to seek out members of the Monroe Street Hustlers. Pennington’s affirmed his statement to Detective Sullivan that grand-jury testimony had rewarded Bush for him a car. shooting Raynor by giving Griffin, cousin, Takesha first was also called to the State and was treated as a hostile testify by witness. She denied that she a statement involve- gave police regarding Jackson’s ment in death. stated She that she was on crack Raynor’s at high the time of the statement and that she was at the Little Rock kept Police for five or six Department She added that she days. or do willing to leave the say anything Her department. before the federal was also introduced grand into jury evidence. The then State called Detective Eric Knowles of the Little Rock Police who took Ms. Department, Griffin’s statement. He oath, testified that her statement was taken under which was administered An audio deputy prosecutor. Ms. tape Griffin’s statement was admitted into evidence and for the played statement, In that Ms. jury. Griffin testified that admitted Bush, because killing Raynor had tried Raynor supposedly kill at least four times. She further stated that she had heard on the street that had wanted the same Raynor girl. addition, she told the detective that told her he had “a .44” that Bush had “the .357” at the time of the shooting.1 *5 throughout Ms. Griffin refers to a gun caliber, “.44” but of the rest State’s case the is referred to as a “.40” caliber. under testified that Ms. Griffin was not

Detective Knowles free to leave and that she at the time of her statement arrest time. Detective the entire friendly very cooperative appeared White, Police who was also of the Little Rock Department, John statement, that he at the time of Ms. Griffin’s testified present withdrawal at the time of her no of observed drug symptoms testified that after Detective Sullivan statement. Finally, Mirandized, he admitted to in the West guy” being “top of murder and sentenced as Side Posse. was convicted in this noted already opinion. I. Gang Expert on that the as his first argues, point appeal, prosecu- Hurd, tor’s introduction of from Officer Todd testimony than a character amounted to no more purported gang expert, that the fails to meet assassination. He claims testimony specifically Pharmaceuticals, standards of Daubert Merrell Dow reliability Inc., 509 U.S. 579 and that its violated his (1993), admissibility to due and a fair trial. He contends that the State rights process been from an should have required present expert or other and education that sociological training comparable would some assurance of both unbiased and well- provide conclusions, after valid tech- grounded employing data-gathering Hurd’s further maintains Officer niques. Jackson have been excluded as was based on rumor and should hearsay character evidence that highly improper, prejudicial compromised of the fact He concludes that his Sixth jury’s finding. reliability and Fourteenth Amendment were violated. rights a. Standard Review

In Brunson v. 79 S.W.3d 304 this (2002), court summarized its standard of review for qualification experts: Whether a witness asan in a fieldis a qualifies expert particular discretion,

matter within the trial court’s and we will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of discretion. Rule 702 of ArkansasRules on Evidence entitled reads: “Testimony Experts” scientific,technical, “If or other will assistthe specializedknowledge trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine fact issue, skill, a witness as an qualified expert by knowledge, experi- ence, education, thereto in the form of an may testify training,

303 saidthat if some reasonablebasis or otherwise.”We have opinion that the has of the knowledge subject exists witness demonstrating that of the evidenceis admissibleas beyond ordinaryknowledge, expert testimony. 309,

349 Ark. at 79 S.W.3d at 309 citations (internal omitted). b. underDaubert and Kumho Tire Reliability maintains that while this court has ad- previously dressed the under the of admissibility gang-expert rubrics of relevance and such evidence has never been prejudice, evaluated this court for its under Daubert. by reliability is correct that this court has not evaluated previously a under Daubert. In Farm Bureau Mut. gang Ins. expert’s reliability Foote, Co. v. 341 Ark. 14 S.W.3d 512 we (2000), adopted United States in Court Daubert and the holding Supreme concluded, to be conducted a trial court. We in inquiry by Daubert, accordance with trial when judge, presented evidence, scientific must decide if the proffer expert initially behind the evidence is valid and can reasoning be scientifically to the facts of the case. We noted several criteria to be used applied that decision. judge making This later court observed that Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702’s to all requirements apply equally types expert testimony and not to scientific to Kumho Tire simply expert testimony, citing Carmichael, Co., Ltd. v. 526 U.S. 137 See (1999). Coca-ColaBottling Gill, Tire, Co. 100 S.W.3d 715 (2003). Kumho the United States Court concluded that the trial court’s Supreme Daubert, general under “gatekeeping” obligation, prescribed to all when applies of that expert testimony assessing reliability The Court added that in testimony. trial assessing reliability, discretion, court at its consider the Daubert factors to the may, extent relevant. The standard of review would be abuse of discre- tion. case,

In the instant we conclude that it was not necessary the circuit court to in a Daubertor Kumho Tire of the engage analysis outlined in particular questions relating reliability brief.2 As the Ninth Circuit Court of observed in a similar Appeals following questions outlines the brief: the Daubert case testimony by police gang expert, involving kind of which is factors are to this simply inapplicable and the based ón knowledge garnered by experiences F.3d 1160 (9th 2000). See UnitedStatesv. Cir. Hankey, expert. we with Kumho Tirethat whether agree Accordingly, within trial court relies on the factors outlined in Daubertis specific *7 of the case. the circuit court’s discretion and on facts depends us, In the case the circuit court did not the Daubert before employ criteria, but Hurd testified that he had been in the Officer working unit of the Little Rock Police since gang intelligence Department He 1995 and had interviewed over 300 members. personally gang that he had documented and added personally gang tattooing and familiar with the locations of the graffiti personally gangs a and their rivalries. He had also been in qualified gang expert other courts of law. Because Officer Hurd’s testimony pre in mised his over upon personal experiences dealing gangs number of it differs from which rests years, testimony expert foundation. that the circuit on scientific We conclude purely did court not abuse its discretion in to conduct a Daubert failing to determine the Hurd’s Officer analysis reliability testimony. Moreover, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the was reliable based on Officer Hurd’s testimony knowledge and experiences.

c. Nature Prejudicial further, however, and that even if Officer goes urges reliable, Hurd’s render his knowledge experience testimony should not have been because it consisted testimony permitted character, and inadmissible evidence hearsay regarding Jackson’s as it related to his reference to as a particularly “slinger” and a He maintains that this violated his “banger.” testimony right (and been) 1. Whether a or ... tested”; can be has “theory technique subjected 2. Whether it “has review been peer publication”; high in Whether, 3. there is a “known or respect particular potential technique, controlling rate of error” and whether there are “standards technique’s operation”; “ ” enjoys general

4. Whether ‘a within a theory technique acceptance’ “ ‘relevant scientific community. [’ ”] and Fourteenth under the Sixth a fair and trial to Amendments. impartial by jury Indeed, was tainted at the he claims that his trial references. outset “banger” “slinger” court has testimony This recognized utility previously aby gang expert. Johninson of such testi- that where the relevance we observed (1994), demonstrated, the member- on has been mony expert and conduct of street gangs particular ship, organization, purposes, that, court went further be admissible. said this may Having defendant’s and affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the Johninson from a We noted that gang proffered testimony broad overview of the urban expert. “[t]he subculture that the gang prospective direct, witness . . . had no reference to expert provided particular the victim and his associate.” 317 Ark. at 878 S.W.2d at 731. Hence, the reason we concluded the was not gang relevant in that instance was it made no reference to the parties that case. crimes,

This court has observed that evidence of other motive, or acts be admissible to wrongs, may prove opportunity, *8 intent, or absence of preparation, knowledge, identity, plan, State, 180, See, mistake or accident. Andersonv. 357 Ark. 163 e.g., S.W.3d 333 alsoArk. R. Evid. (2004). See admission 404(b). of evidence under is Rule committed to rejection 404(b) court, sound discretion of the trial and this court will not reverse absent of manifest abuse of that discretion. id.As this See showing State, 455, court saidin Morrisv. 358 Ark. 193 243 S.W.3d recently (2004), circumstance that ties a defendant to the crime or raises any motive for the crime is relevant and possible independently admissible as evidence. The fact that the two at issue had gangs been in a females, and had been “back and forth” over strong rivalry going Hurd,

as testified to Officer relevant seems to certainly Nevertheless, motive in Officer Hurd’s killing Raynor. was a and a undoubt- “slinger” “banger” was harmful to is whether this edly question, though, Jackson. unfair nature of his prejudice outweighs probative testimony. 403; State, 62, SeeArk. R. Evid. v. Branstetter 57 S.W.3d 105 (2001). Other have reached different results jurisdictions compa- 544,

rable situations. See State v. 146 N.H. A.2d 776 715 Agotte, (2001) in arson that defendant had re- (testimony prosecution fire with insinuations in that defendant ported prior argument stated the fire was used to establish and deemed prior propensity

306 Ellis, 1108, v. 315 Ill. 3d

extremely prejudicial); People App. N.E.2d 736 (2000) defendant was member (evidence gang relevant to show common or motive where design, purpose, victim was rival member and was shot death while gang selling Torres, 149, State v. 47 Conn. 702 A.2d 142 drugs); App. (1997) defendant (evidence was member and leader of was relevant gang in his trial for death of conspiracy-to-cómmit-murder shooting member; rival did not gang prejudice value); outweigh probative Mason, 715, v. 274 Ill. 3d 653 N.E.2d 1371 People App. (1995) defendant was a and a (testimony regent regent responsible inflamed selling drugs defendant hiding weapons jury against and was 329, Commonwealth irrelevant); v. 416 Pa. Scarfo, Super. 611 A.2d 242 (1992) comments to the (repeated by prosecutor jury Mafia, that defendants were “made” members of the which meant had been involved in was not they killings, merely testimony establish motive but so tainted the that it could not render a jury verdict; fair this was reversible error); Perryman Ct. (Tex. 1990) that defendant was an App. (expert testimony in a trial was experienced rapist rape inflammatory prejudicial and this clearly outweighed any value); v. Wash probative People 127 Ill. 3d ington, N.E.2d 1285 App. (1984) (investiga tor’s comment to trial court at that defendant sentencing hearing was a leader based on information an gang from unnamed infor mant was and unreliable and hearsay warranted a new sentencing hearing).

We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to allow Officer Hurd to was a testify “slinger” Nonetheless, and a we also “banger.” conclude that duplicate presented federal jury through grand-jury established that transcripts was indeed a clearly is, someone “banger,” involved in testified gang killings. King before the federal that in the grand jury year gave orders to West Side multiple Posse members to shoot gang *9 members of the Monroe Street Hustlers. testified Pennington before the federal that grand awarded for jury head points Jackson members, shots of rival ordered four gang two shootings, gave rewards to two members for gang car to shootings, including Bush. Markevious also testified before federal King grand jury that was the leader of West Side Posse and that King Jackson started cocaine for the at selling fourteen. Takesha gang age Griffin testified before the federal that called himself grand jury Jackson Posse, to a by and in answer question the West Side the leader of involved was gang of the jury, agreed a member grand admitted into were testimony this grand-jury Transcripts drugs. evidence. one of the addition, testified that guns Bush Chris All house.” Posse from a West Side “dope came used in the killing Todd Hurd’s description evidence is cumulative of this aas “slinger.” Jackson error occasioned by hold that we any

Accordingly, as Hurd’s reference of Officer court’s allowance circuit Jackson a reasonable rendered harmless beyond banger slinger See, v. Gaines testimony. e.g., the admission of doubt subsequent results State, (2000) (no prejudice 340 Ark. 8 S.W.3d cumulative); admitted merely evidence erroneously where 436 (1999) (under v. Criddle the rule is when 18 (1967), 386 U.S. California, Chapman involved, is over but evidence of issue is guilt constitutional can declare constitutional the error we slight, whelming a reasonable doubt). it is harmless error harmlessso as beyond long II. Grand-JuryTranscript Pennington claims, admission of next that the as his point, Jackson trial vio- at the testimony jury Rodrick grand-jury Pennington’s 802, as well as the Evidence 801 and Arkansas Rules of lated of the United of the Sixth Amendment Clause Confrontation there was no that this is because He maintains States Constitution. about laid for foundation Pennington’s knowledge underlying result, and, his hearsay activities gang further contends under Rule 802. and inadmissible both statements were highly prejudicial, Pennington’s grand-jury because references to other shootings of their unsubstantiated gang rewarded Bush him and for the claim that set in motion by with a car for Raynor. shooting based on did not The State object responds was already until after grand-jury testimony Pennington’s hearsay make did not into evidence. It further asserts admitted that the evidence at issue was secondary below any argument reasons, the State For these the first as he does now on appeal. hearsay, and, in did not at claims that object opportunity Thus, addition, on for appeal. has grounds objection changed is not maintains his preserved appellate the State argument that the further submits grand-jury review. State evidence. admitted as substantive was properly *10 308

a. Preservation that

We conclude the issue is for our hearsay preserved review. At the close of Pen- State’s redirect examination to admit sought nington, prosecutor Pennington’s grand-jury and that he stated would substitute a redacted of it. copy counsel defense redacted giving Pennington’s Upon grand-jury 12, 2002, on the of December morning prosecutor that did noted while he not believe defense had counsel any content, to its it to him for review as the objections provided “[w]e directed, I Court and so it’s to him to make his guess objections up that, to that.” The circuit court “He do can agreed, saying: co-counsel can assisthim he’s while on those might focusing things sure to make that we as we can be get on all those.” specific later, not rest, It was until some time when State was about to that defense made a counsel hearsay objection Pennington’s time, At that defense counsel raised the grand-jury testimony. on objection Rodrick Defense “outstandinghearsay Pennington.” counsel that State had failed to establish a foundation argued for certain statements made in before the Pennington’s testimony federal circuit court overruled the grand jury. objection.

Our review of the record demonstrates that the circuit court on certainly entertaining redacted planned objections version of the its grand-jury admis testimony following original sion. Because it counsel in a appears objected timely fashion the concurrence of the trial after judge prosecutor version, State’s redacted we receiving conclude issue is for review. preserved further to the State issue on the objects hearsay

basis has his on changed argument appeal. According State, to the no was made at objection trial. It secondary hearsay is that an cannot his elementary appellant on change argument and that he limited to the and nature of the appeal scope made below. See Hunter v. argument We S.W.2d (1997). has disagree changed It to this court that argument. maintained both at appears trial and now on that no foundation was laid as to how appeal the information Pennington about to which he got testi fied, even uses he the terms classic though hearsay secondary Hence, conclude hearsay we the issue was interchangeably. pre served. *11 merits, Evidence 801(d)(1) Arkansas Rule of to the

Turning is that not hearsay: one of statement defines type Not A statement not hear- Are is (d) Hearsay. StatementsWhich if: say the trial Witness.The declaranttestifiesat

(1) PriorStatementby the to subject concerning or and is cross-examination hearing statement, with testimony inconsistent his (i) and the statement and, and if criminal was under oath proceeding, given offeredin a trial, other of at a or pegury hearing, the subject penalty (ii) in a or consistent or proceeding, disposition [deposition], or charge his and is offered to rebut an express implied testimony motive, him recent fabrication or influence or of against improper of a after (iii) or one of identification made person perceivinghim[.] Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). us, In the testified case before at Pennington Jackson’s

trial and was to cross-examination counsel subject by Jackson’s his statements. his concerning grand-jury Clearly, grand-jury trial, was inconsistent with at testimony Jackson’s trial, because at the he denied ever statement giving he officers of events which had having knowledge any previ discussed with those same officers. Because his ously grand-jury belied his lack of of events and because it knowledge under and was at oath of given subject penalty perjury another and because to cross- proceeding Pennington subject trial, examination at we that his hold testi grand-jury Jackson’s did not as under 801(d)(1). Rule mony hearsay qualify III. Clause Confrontation next out-of-court statements that urges and Markevious made to the as well Pennington King grand jury, the statements made Ms. and her Griffin to grand jury trial, sworn statement to the all which were admitted at police, lacked indicia of and failed to fall within any reliability to the rule that made would have their admis- exception hearsay He this court to over- sibility constitutionally urges permissible. State, v. turn its decision in prior Jones based on the United States Court’s decision (1984), Supreme v. He that there is no 521 U.S. (1999). argues Lilly Virginia, distinction between the statements under and admissible Jones under Arkansas Rule of Evidence those found 801(d)(1) He unreliable further maintains goes inherently Lilly. while Griffin Markevious Ms. were avail- Pennington, King, cross-examination, able for is not examination meaningful when the declarants are now no professing knowledge events to statement alluded. asserts that prior is clear and that without the statements in prejudice question, there was no corroboration of Bush’s accomplice testimony. is not well-taken. In argument supra, Jones this court examined argument of one transcript Jones’s the State’s witness’s was not admissible. In that prior testimony case, and Dennis Williams were with bur- *12 charged jointly Jones and Williams was tried and glary convicted aggravated robbery. first, and he testified at own his trial. When called to at testify State, trial the he refused to by The against testify Jones’s Jones. circuit State court the to introduce the of permitted transcript Williams’s earlier On testimony. argued Will- appeal, Jones iams’s was inadmissible. court testimony This prior disagreed affirmed the of the circuit court. ruling We noted since the Evidence, General had the Rules of Assembly Uniform adopted “such sworn statements are now admissible as substantive prior 311, evidence in criminal 283 cases.” Ark. at 675 S.W.2d at 826. We further observed that Rule the to 801(d)(1) declarant required trial, be was, to at subject cross-examination the later as Williams and that his be inconsistent with his earlier testimony. The court then noted its with the view taken agreement by federal courts that the trial court has considerable discretion in whether is “inconsistent” with determining state- prior ments, and that is not limited to inconsistency diametrically- answers, answers, “but be found in opposed evasive may inability recall, silence, to Id., or of 675 S.W.2d at 827 changes position.” Russell, United States v. 712 F.2d (quoting (8th 1256 Cir. 1983)). This court does not overrule cases a lightly applies strong in favor of the of its presumption See, decisions. validity prior e.g., State, Echols Further, v. 125 S.W.3d 153 (2003). a matter of this court has it said that is to public policy, necessary its a decisions unless or uphold will prior great injury injustice result. See id. We have it also made clear that it is the appellant’s burden to show this court’s refusal a to overrule decision prior will result State, great great See Stiversv. injustice injury. case, Ark. 118 S.W.3d 558 In the (2003). instant v. the court to overrule supra, light requests Jones decision in supra. Court’s Lilly Virginia, United States Supreme so, case is distinguishable. to do because We decline Lilly under the an accused’s rights discussed Court Lilly, Mark, trial, a his brother Clause. During Lilly’s Confrontation to in the was called by crimes charged, testify participant his Fifth Amendment Mark invoked Commonwealth Virginia. trial, and the at Common- self-incrimination privilege against Mark had made to into statements wealth offered evidence admitted, arrest. were and Lilly his The statements following conviction, Court affirmed convicted. Virginia Supreme unavail- “that were declarations of an Mark’s statements holding interest; that the statements’ reliability able witness against penal therefore, evidence; fell that they was established other at 122. an to the rule.” U.S. within exception Virginia hearsay further that where the Court ruled hearsay Virginia Supreme as to come within an has sufficient so guarantees reliability rule, Clause is satisfied. Confrontation exception hearsay It The United States Court announced disagreed. Supreme fact, we that the “decisive make explicit today, criminal are confessions that defendant accomplices’ inculpate rule as that not within rooted firmly hearsay exception has been defined in our Clause Confrontation jurispru- concept Id. at 134. that to be dence.” The Court alluded to its prior holding Clause, under used admissible the Confrontation evidence hearsay virtue convict defendant “must indicia of possess reliability by *13 trustworthiness, of inherent not to evidence its reference other by at trial.” Id. at 138 Idaho v. U.S. Wright, (quoting The Court the Commonwealth’s (1990)). rejected specifically basis of had been was Mark proffered reliability, informed of his Miranda and that Mark knew he was rights himself to criminal if he himself. exposing liability perjured the Court said: “It is clear that neither words that Mark abundantly the he nor in which was spoke any setting questioned provides for that his comments basis concluding petitioner’s guilt regarding to were so reliable that there no need to them subject trial at 139. adversarial in a Id. The Court testing setting.” that the of untested to concluded admission Mark’s statement under the officers violated Confrontation rights police Lilly’s Clause. At issue case is

Again, Lilly easily distinguishable. to there was an unsworn statement that was officers given police case, while Mark was in In the instant each custody. of the and, thus, witnesses’ oath under grand-jury given addition, had the indicia of under required Ms. reliability Lilly. Griffin’s statement to officers was also under oath. given Moreover, cross-examine was able to the State’s witnesses Jackson trial. his fact that the witnesses claimed during to have Despite to, no of the events memory testified was able previously Jackson Hence, them. confront his under Confrontation rights reasons, not Clause were For these we decline impaired. invitation to overturn supra. Jones IV Model Instructions Accomplice next advances that the circuit court argument Jackson erred in his phe instructions rejecting proposed limiting relating of Bush as an He designation asserts that when accomplice. Bush, circuit court so thus designated corroborative requiring evidence, with designation, AMI Crim. 2d together made liable strictly actions Bush. Jackson concludes the failure to give instruction proposed limiting resulted in a of his deprivation fundamental to trial right by jury. proffered instruction: following

The designation of Bush Chris as an is an accomplice evidentiary ruling and does only not relieve any way your you responsi- bility determine whether the State independently has proved beyond reasonabledoubt that Anarian was an accomplice Chris Bush. That instruction was refused proffered circuit court. was, however, follows, instructed as jury accord AMI Crim. 2d 401: case, In this the State does not contend Anarian Chad acted alone in the commissionof the offenseof Murder in the FirstDegree. A person for the criminallyresponsible conduct of another he when is an person in the accomplice commissionof the offense. *14 An who accompliceis one in directly participates commis- who,

sion an offense or with the purpose or promoting of an facilitating commission offense:

313 the other Solicits, person or coerces (sic),encourages aides offense; or commit in aid, the other

Aids, person to aid or attempts agrees the offense. committing planning conduct,or a to his with respect with

A acts purpose person in conduct thereof, to engage consciousobject it is his result when such a result. to cause of that nature or instruction, of this given second sentence claimsthat it is the which was an that Bush accomplice, the declaration together is incorrect. actions. That liable for Bush’s renders strictly instruction the model is misreading It appears unclear. is somewhat admittedly, argument although, given, 2d 401 to of AMI Crim. second sentence reads the He apparently the conduct of is criminally responsible say: [Bush] “[Jackson] of the offense.” the commission in when is an accomplice [Bush] however, be read: us, the sentence should It clear to is for the conduct is criminally responsible [Bush] “[Jackson] the of- to the commission of is an accomplice when [Jackson] fense.” 401, 2d 2d AMI Crim. to AMI Crim.

In addition that if the finds jury part, given, provides, committed, did not a crime was while being was only present act, have no he not an We then accomplice. have a legal duty task to that it was its instructed doubt that the jury fully That determina- was an whether accomplice. determine the instructions virtue of given. not tion was preordained it clear that non-model has made This court perfectly finds the circuit court are to be when instructions given only jury the law or do do not state instructions accurately that the model See, at hand. on the e.g., instruction subject not contain necessary Here, State, 275 (1994). Ark. 887 S.W.2d Hill v. states the law. See Calloway model instruction accurately jury 571 (1997) (rejecting appellant’s Ark. that AMI instruction holding “mere proffered presence” the law of reflects 2d 401 accurately completely Crim. did not err that the circuit court We hold liability). accomplice instruction. rejecting proposed *15 V As the Fact Accomplice AccessoryAfter next that AMI Crim. 2d 401 defines accom- argues Jackson as “one who in the commission an plice directly of participates claims, offense” that this omits scienter He any requirement. moreover, the model instruction no time limitation on the places out in set the second half of the sentence in the requisite “purpose” model instruction. is

We It law in Arkansas and memori- disagree. boilerplate alized in our model to instruction that be an one has accomplice, to the in commission of the or offense with the participate directly offense, of the of the commission purpose facilitating promoting aid, solicit, or coerce its encourage, accomplishment. Jackson certain situations that are argues not relevant to this hypothetical case or first His a concerns situation where persuasive. hypothetical a driver of a car removes robbers from the scene without knowing that a had occurred. Those facts are robbery far afield from the case at hand. second scenario concerns a who arrives person after a murder and assists the crime scene. That cleaning up also is scenario not relevant to the case before us. presently

To this court has held a that model repeat, jury instruction shall be used unless the circuit court concludes it does not state law. Moore See accurately Ark. 882 S.W.2d 667 (1994). Because has to failed demonstrate model law, instructions do not given state the accurately the circuit court did not err in as it did. instructing jury

VI. Seizureand Improper Statements Suppressionof For his final contends that the circuit point, court erred in that his initial detention was a ruling seizure permissible reasonable supported by criminal suspicion This activity. so, maintains, he where especially officers did not know police who was at the time he was asserts that his stopped. constituted a detention and that both the stop show of authority and the threat of force a led to a He seizure. maintains drug dog circumstances, that these with the clear intent of together him, detain led him to believe that he was not free to sum, leave. In he claims that he had reasonable expectation and that there must be privacy facts rise to an articulable give or reasonable of criminal conduct for a suspicion permissible stop He concludes that because the transpire. his case stop seizure, an constituted unconstitutional his subsequent interroga- tion be should excluded on this basis. statement, a motion the denial of suppress

In reviewing of review: standard has on the following this court relied motion to trial denial of a suppress court’s reviewing evidence, totality reviewbasedon we conduct denovo *16 circumstances, fact for clearerror of historical findings reviewing to reasonable give suspi thosefacts rise and whether determining cause, drawnby due to inferences weight cion or giving probable See to the trialcourt’sfindings. the and deference trialcourt proper 618, 110 State, Davisv. (2003); S.W.3d272 353Ark. v. Cummings State, 406, (2003). Ark. 94 S.W.3d 892 750, (2004). Romes court, the Detec- At the before circuit hearing suppression Little Police testified that tive of the Rock Kyle King Department the at the Bus he was interdiction Greyhound working squad that he was there with along Station. Detective stated King Treece, named Detective Mark was with drug dog who present he knew used the bus Rex. Detective testified that King Jackson see him and it was that would station that they “highly probable” off the bus there. Detective testified that when King got Jackson Rex, he and and saw Detective Treece and startled appeared added was seemed to Detective that hesitate. King initially Jackson side, his his but he the black at that as off carrying bag right stepped side, bus, he to his the real moved left putting bag “up high bag from The detective then as bag.” keep dog smelling this, his elaborated on that when carried stating bag up Jackson be if had it would have been about where would it high, bag The had a shoulder attached to it. detective further testified strap bus, he that as walked toward the bus station from Jackson and back at Treece Rex he turned looked Detective and before went inside the station. At that Detective stated that he decided King point, speak him, he identified

with He testified that approached Jackson. officer, as a and if himself showed his asked badge, Jackson him, could he to which “sure.” speak responded Jackson and, Detective testified that King very cooperative Jackson identification that he was Mc- upon request, presented “Brady stated, that At the detective he knew that McCoy Coy.” point, used an alias and that he knew the bus used by Jackson Jackson aware had several station. Detective was also King Jackson He warrants. testified felony outstanding prior identification, him did his he not giving recognize Jackson. Detective added that could King knowing possibly Jackson be based on information he had been he asked dangerous given, if he was in his carrying any drugs guns bag. According Jackson detective, to the then “no.” detective responded Jackson asked if he could the black search and agreed, bag. Jackson Detective testified that to search his own King began bag. Jackson The detective he said that after wanted to telling Jackson himself, search the on the bag put bag ground time, from it. detective stated that at this he away stepped tackled him under arrest.3 placed

Detective Treece also testified at the suppression hearing. He stated that he and were Rex outside the door of standing just the bus when came off the bus. He testified that them, startled when he saw he appeared off stepped bus, and went around the door of bag high, the bus. picked up station, Detective Treece testified that went into bus *17 he at back him and made glanced contact. detective eye stated further that Rex was not or when growling barking Jackson exited the bus. He stated that he was with Detective when he King asked for to search his and that until permission bag, Jackson was the on he did not know who was. ground, The circuit court denied the motion and ruled: suppression

I think fact given the that been off that they’d he was tipped and the behavior that coming the officers noted be would — sufficientgiven the those two given the things, tip-off coupled with the behavior the that and he held the way That would be bag. sufficientto seek under two cooperation rule two. And then point the false identification would be sufficient to further with an go at arrest that for point actually obstructing governmentaloperations — since were alerted to the name they already that to according their testimony, Brady this name that by was used McCoy being later drugs bag, Rex alerted to inside that is but not for pertinent purposes subject of the and in fact, was of a to court of present appeal, separate appeal appeals. See v. (2004). State, 86 39, 158 S.W.3d that court case, Ark.App. appeals the drugs. This court declined review that decision the court of suppressed by appeals. in the issue instant case is whether the and whether his stop improper subsequent about gang statement in the be should leadership suppressed. So, motion to suppress your seeking. were they that person willbe denied. and the statement evidence reconsideration, court the circuit for filed a motion motion as well. denied that he was confronted by plain- claims on appeal attack dog, had an one of whom apparent clothes policemen, asked him for but also ask not officers did simply questions, maintains, threat This, an created implicit he identification. he him the impression show of gave force and authority was, fact, he “seized.” to leave and not free the United (2002), 536 U.S. 194 v. In United States Drayton, officers enforcement Court observed States Supreme “[l]aw of unreason- the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition do not violate or in on the street individuals able seizures merely by approaching are them if they questions other places putting public at The Court said 536 U.S. 200. to listen.” willing “[e]ven have no basis officers suspecting law enforcement when individual, ask for identifica- may questions, they pose particular — do tion, they search consent to luggage provided and request means.” Id. at 201. coercive Impor- induce by not cooperation to terminate the feel free would a reasonable person tantly, “[i]f encounter, Id. has not been seized.” then he or she not all observed that court has personal This previously a “seizure” involves and citizens between conversation policemen See the Fourth Amendment. Thompson under of person Instead, that a we noted 450 (1990). officer, means of force occurs when physical “seizure” restrained liberty has in some way show of authority, said, held has also this court previously id. That being citizen. See officer’s in the there was nothing that where *18 for officer asked the that the appellant a belief police support Ark. R. criminal the course of a investigation, identification in v. See Meadows the P. 2.2 did not render permissible. Crim. stop 380, alsoArk. R. Crim. State, 636 See (1980). Ark. 602 S.W.2d to officer any person law enforcement (“A may request P. 2.2(a) or in the investigation or otherwise furnish information cooperate the The officer person of crime. may request prevention station, or to at a comply police questions, appear respond short, that our it In reasonable appears other request.”). any informa- officers may only request Rule 2.2(a) police requires an or tion in connection with of crime” “investigation prevention which to be more than the restrictive Court’s in appears holding UnitedStatesv. supra. Drayton, Meadows,

In officers at the were Little Rock police Airport several white males to be hope heroin. spotting reported transporting the and a observed

They appellant companion walking the his concourse. Meadows and friend walked the through past back, officers and “started aroused the officers’ looking at Ark. 602 S.W.2d at 637. One of the suspicion.” officers followed, the and to follow men while began being Meadows and his friend back “kept looking occasionally” Id., their at 637. After quickened. pace being ap- officer, and asked the Meadows him proached with identification. After police presented Meadows, came word back to releasing Meadows, the officers that was there warrant out for felony he was arrested and heroin was found One of the possession. Meadows, officers testified that he followed only because he looked back in a manner. This court then reversed the suspicious circuit court’s denial of the motion and held that Rule suppression was because the was 2.2(a) not of an inapposite stop investi- part of a crime. gation prevention case, In the instant startled hesitant appeared he

when switched his off the bus and got saw the He police dog. immediately to his other arm and lifted it bag He then high. up the entered bus station and turned to look back at officer police and the at the dog. officers were bus station with police for interdiction. was dog This not drug drug where police stop in the at person stopped simply standing wrong place State, time. See Stewart wrong 964 S.W.2d 793 Nor is it a case where (1998). officer not investi- police crime Here, at the time of the id. gating See officers stop. police were at the bm station to crime and investigate testified that specifically drug offenses. Detective interdiction King squad’s was to to slow down and purpose “attempt the flow of stop drugs our and to our through city going city.” They stopped Jackson and asked his I.D. part investigation cooperated. nervous demeanor and the fact that he shifted his from the were bag away dog reasons for drug objective officers to him and his identification stop under request 2.2, even Rule did not know at though they who point was. SeeArk. Code Ann. 16-81-203(1), (13) (1987). § sum, these facts this case from distinguish Meadowsv. supra.

319 be had to officers that with not We do agree Jackson and ask him in order to crime stop a him for specific investigating himself. that he identify not did identification that request We hold stop the extent To seizure.

constitute an impermissible Jackson this inconsistent is (2004), Ark. App. it. we overrule opinion, to conducted has been pursuant of the record

A search error has been and no reversible Rule 4-3 (h), Court Supreme found.

Affirmed.

Hannah, dissents. J., I Hannah, dissent. dis- I dissenting. respectfully

Jim Justice, error occasioned that with the holding “any majority’s agree to Hurd’s of Officer testimony court’s allowance the circuit by a harmless was rendered beyond slinger banger testimony.” doubt subsequent reasonable admissibility who, member consistent was a gang State sought prove members, member shot his rival traits of gang with the character gang Hurd, trait, on Officer character the State To show this put Raynor. behavior, the terms who first defines “slinger” an in gang expert Next, as a is classified slinger when asked whether “banger.” done both.” is both. He’s Hurd “Chad or a Officer replies: banger, concluded that Officer The circuit court Defense counsel objected. Hurd: that he knows of his own personal as an right testify expert

has because he’s been already from whatever the thing knowledge I’m as far as that goes, and a So banger. as both slinger qualified Now, into any I don’t want to get to overrule that... really going crimes. of the other

* * * the circuit court It recognized appears be crimes would other prejudicial concerning Jackson. crimes, other yet did not allow concerning circuit court as a Hurd’s classification of slinger did allow Officer it Further, refers to criminal activity. a classification banger, commit- had allowed Hurd to the circuit court testify *20 ted both allowed, of criminal Thus types Hurd is activity. virtue by terms, of his own definition of the to state that is a shooter Jackson dealer, and a in a case where is drug with charged shooting Jackson I cannot Raynor. simply agree that this majority’s holding admitted in testimony, court, error although circuit harmless a reasonable doubt. beyond The dismisses Officer Hurd’s majority as testimony merely cumulative because was to the “duplicate testimony presented jury federal through that grand-jury established transcripts that clearly is, was indeed a that someone ‘banger,’ involved in gang Jackson Most killings.” is the troubling rationale for majority’s concluding that Officer Hurd’s reference to as a “slinger” merely Jackson First, cumulative evidence. states: majority “Markevious King also testified before the federal that grand jury was the Jackson leader of the West Side Posse and that started cocaine King selling for the at gang fourteen.” age Apparently, concludes majority that since cocaine, were in the same King sold gang, King then it follows that also sold cocaine. The relevant is as testimony follows: King

Chad Jackson, also known as has been “Dirty,” WSP for three years is the leader.

In the Spring King into the jumped WSP. Q: How oldwere when you you first involved got withWestSide? twelve, A: Around about elevenor twelve.

Q: And were you involvedin sellingcocaineat that age? — A: fourteen, Not at that Around age. aboutlike that’swhen I I mean, startedsellingcocaine. does not that King testify addition, sold cocaine. In does not King the testify directed him to sell cocaine for gang. deems this majority cumulative, apparently assuming acts of one member be gang used may to establish that another member of the same has committed gang those same acts. Next, the states: “Takesha majority Griffin testified before the federal grand called jury himself the leader of Posse, West Side and in answer to a a member of the question by grand that the jury, agreed was involved gang drugs.” relevant is as follows: WSP, for everybody though, a leader in ... Was Chad Q: it? was a part called himself mean, because he that was I because yeah,

A: leader.

* * * other anything involved they do or are drugs, DoQ: they just the drugs? than Drugs.

A: *21 mem- of whether to the answers Griffin “yes” question does not state “do She bers of the West Side Posse drugs.” was a dealer. drug Bush testified states that “Chris Finally, majority from a West Side Posse in the came one of the used killing guns is as follows: house.’” The relevant ‘dope from, Chris? Q: gun Where did you get A: At the house we had. do mean?

Q: you What little house on 15th. A: We had a dope A house? Q: dope

A: Yeah. “we,” whose house was that? is “we”? When

Q: you say And who the litde in the hood. homeys A: me and Just West Side? Q: meaning All right,

A: Yeah. Did live there?

Q: actually someone

A: Yeah.

Q: What was his name? A: I can’t recall that name. He was a fiend. dope Q: So that was some just place y’all out. hung Yes, A: sir.

* * * Here, it that the has appears concluded that majority since Bush testified that one of the used in the guns came from a killing house” and since members of the “dope West Side Posse “hung house,” out” at the as a Posse, member of the “dope West Side was a dealer. The evidence drug mentioned is not cumulative to majority Hurd’s as a description “slinger.” Further, I do not believe that Officer Hurd’s “slinger” reference was relevant. The states that fact majority that the “[t]he two at issue had gangs been in a and had been strong rivalry going ‘back and forth’ over females . . . seems certainly relevant motive in killing Raynor.” fails to majority explain Jackson’s how status as a dealer is relevant drug motive Jackson’s if that killing motive was Raynor, related to their membership in rival and their gangs argument certain women. concerning *22 However, was not “slinger” relevant. it was highly do, What the State prejudicial. intended to Officer through Hurd’s was introduce testimony, evidence of bad char- acter to therewith, prove in the conformity commission of the crime. This court has allowed the State to do so. I would not.

I would reverse and remand.

Case Details

Case Name: Jackson v. State
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Nov 4, 2004
Citation: 197 S.W.3d 468
Docket Number: CR 03-800
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
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