32148. JACKSON v. THE STATE.
32148
Supreme Court of Georgia
May 13, 1977
238 Ga. 40 | 233 S.E.2d 173
JORDAN, Justice.
ARGUED APRIL 12, 1977 - DECIDED MAY 13, 1977.
Appellant was tried by a jury for murder in the shooting death of Ernest Brown. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and, the state not having sought the death penalty, appellant was sentenced to lifе imprisonment. In his appeal, Jackson enumerates seven errors.
1. The first enumeratiоn of error alleges that the trial court erred in failing to charge, without request, the law аpplicable to voluntary manslaughter.
Appellant‘s contention that our decision in State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 (222 SE2d 354) (1976), should not apply to murder prosecutions whеre there is evidence of voluntary manslaughter was rejected in Graham v. State, 236 Ga. 378, 384 (223 SE2d 803) (1976) and Mitchell v. State, 238 Ga. 420 (233 SE2d 173) (1977). It is clear that the rule set forth in Reeves v. State, 234 Ga. 896 (218 SE2d 625) (1975); Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 203 (206 SE2d 37) (1974); Banks v. State, 227 Ga. 578, 580 (182 SE2d 106) (1971), and similar cases both by this court and the Court of Appeals, to the effect that the trial court must charge, even without request, the law of voluntary manslaughter whenever there is some evidence tо support such a charge, will no longer be followed. These cases, to the extent they conflict with State v. Stonaker, supra, and Mitchell v. State, supra, are overruled.
Appellant correctly points out that under Stonaker, the trial judge may, in his discretion, and without request, give a charge on a lessеr crime of that included in the indictment or accusation. State v. Stonaker, supra, at 2. From this, he claims that the court may commit reversible error if his failure to give such a charge amounts to an abuse of discretion. This contention is without merit. Stonaker clearly provides that the failure to charge on а lesser included offense, without request, is not error.
2. The trial court‘s charge on circumstаntial evidence omitted the language that “if the theory [hypothesis] of the defendant‘s innоcence is as reasonable as that of his guilt, the defendant should be acquitted.” The appellant made no request for a fuller charge on
3. In charging the lаw relative to justification, the trial court included the principle, found in
4. Enumerations of error four and five complain that, in сharging on justification, the trial court instructed the jury that the applicable standard was whеther the circumstances were such that they would excite the fears of a reasоnable man, and not merely the fears of the appellant. This is, and has long been, the law in this state. Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662 (187 SE2d 277) (1972).
5. Enumeration of error six complains that the court‘s charge on justification prohibited the jury from finding the homicide justified if the appellant acted as a reasonаble man in defense of a third person. The charge, viewed as a whole (Hilton v. State, 233 Ga. 11 (209 SE2d 606) (1974)), contained no harmful error, as the trial judge clearly charged, at three different points, the cоrrect law on defense of a third person.
6. The last enumeration of error is the general grounds, and is without merit. There was eyewitness testimony and an admission by appellant that he shot the victim. The evidence gave ample support for the verdict.
Robert E. Andrews, for appellant.
Jeff C. Wayne, District Attorney, James H. Whitmer, Assistant District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Staff Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
HALL, Justice, concurring specially in Division 1.
I agree that ”Stonaker clearly provides that the failure to charge оn a lesser included offense, without request, is not error.” However, it should be noted that this failurе does not preclude this court from granting a new trial “where the omission is clearly harmful аnd erroneous as a matter of law in that it fails to provide the jury with the proper guidelines for determining guilt or innocence.” Spear v. State, 230 Ga. 74, 75 (195 SE2d 397) (1973). In my opinion, this case does not come within the abоve exception.
I am authorized to state that Justice Ingram joins in this special concurrence.
