Jackson v. StateJackson v. State
Following a jury trial, David Jackson was found guilty of malice murder, aggravated assault, and various other offenses in connection with the stabbing death of John Norman Thomas.1 On appeal, Jackson contends that the trial court committed plain error by giving an incorrect jury instruction on self-defense, that the trial court erred in its recharge to the jury on voluntary manslaughter,
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict, the evidence presented at trial reveals that, on December 24, 2013, Jackson stabbed Thomas multiple times with a steak knife while he was with Thomas in the yard of a home in Warren County. A neighbor who was across the street from the stabbing saw Jackson, who seemed to be on his knees, moving his arm in a stabbing motion toward the ground. The witness then saw Jackson kick Thomas three or four times while Thomas was on the ground. The witness observed Jackson throw something in the bushes and then return to kick Thomas again. Jackson walked away from Thomas, leaving him dying in the yard. The neighbor called Jackson‘s girlfriend, Eula Evans, and told her to come and get Jackson. The neighbor then called 911, and she crossed the street, finding Thomas bleeding heavily in the yard.
An officer who responded to the scene attempted to communicate with Thomas, who was still alive at the time, but
Police found a black-handled steak knife with blood on it in the dirt driveway outside of the house where the stabbing had taken place, and no weapons were found on Thomas. Police also discovered drops of blood leading away from the scene and along the route that Jackson had walked after the stabbing. DNA testing later revealed that the blood drops leading away from the scene belonged to Jackson, and that two sets of blood profiles were present on the knife. The major blood profile on the sharp tip of the knife and the hilt of the knife where the blade joins the handle belonged to Thomas, and the only place on the knife where the major blood profile belonged to Jackson was on the handle.
Police saw Jackson at the same hospital where Thomas had been taken after the stabbing, as Jackson was there to be treated for a laceration to the side of his face, a small wound to his abdomen,
Although Jackson has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, it is our customary practice to review the sufficiency of the evidence in murder cases. See, e.g., Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63 (1) (823 SE2d 749) (2019). Having done so, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject Jackson‘s claim of self-defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Cotton v. State, 297 Ga. 257, 258 (1) (773 SE2d 242) (2015) (despite defendant‘s claim of self-defense, jury is “free to accept the evidence that [a] stabbing was not done in self-defense and to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense“)
2. Jackson contends that the trial court committed plain error2 by giving a pattern jury instruction on self-defense that included language stating that the defendant must not have acted “in the spirit of revenge” at the time that he was defending himself in order to properly claim self-defense. Compare
In order to satisfy the test for plain error,
[f]irst, there must be an error or defect — some sort of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant‘s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).
“[A] jury instruction must be adjusted to the evidence and embody a correct, applicable, and complete statement of law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878, 880
when comparing the current language of
OCGA § 16-3-21 with the previous statute that included the “spirit of revenge” language . . . “[i]n essence the old law and the new law have the same standard as to justification of homicide.” Brooks v. State, 227 Ga. 339, 342 (3) (180 SE2d 721) (1971). Therefore, the instruction at issue [that included the “spirit of revenge” language] is [still] a correct statement of the law.
Pena v. State, 297 Ga. 418, 425 (6) (b) (774 SE2d 652) (2015). Because the trial court did not clearly err by giving the self-defense charge in question, Jackson does not carry his burden of showing plain error.
3. Jackson also claims that the trial court plainly erred in its recharge to the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Jackson is incorrect.
The record reveals that, during its deliberations, the jury sent
JURY FOREPERSON: Voluntary, I‘m sorry. Yes, sir, voluntary.
COURT: Okay.
JURY FOREPERSON: But if I might, Judge, when you were charging us and telling us the law you mentioned voluntary manslaughter, and I heard you say the word revenge at that time, and none of us completely understood that. We should have asked you at that time, but —
COURT: Okay. That‘s all right. I just —
JURY FOREPERSON: I‘m sorry, I just want the voluntary manslaughter.
COURT: So your question is voluntary, then?
JURY FOREPERSON: I‘m sorry, yes.
The trial court then recharged the jury on both malice murder and voluntary manslaughter. After doing so, the following exchange occurred between the court and the jury foreperson:
COURT: Does that answer your question?
JURY FOREPERSON: Yes, sir.
4. Jackson asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to object to the trial court‘s jury charge on self-defense, (b) failing to call Jackson or his girlfriend, Evans, to testify on Jackson‘s behalf at trial, (c) failing to present evidence of Jackson‘s fear of Thomas, and (d) failing to present evidence of Thomas‘s reputation in the community. We disagree.
In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance, [Jackson] must prove both that his trial counsel‘s performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if not for the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong. Id. 697 (IV); Fuller v. State, 277 Ga. 505 (3) (591 SE2d 782) (2004). In reviewing the trial court‘s decision, “‘[w]e accept the trial court‘s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313) (2003).
(a) For the reasons stated in Division 2, supra, an objection to the trial court‘s charge on self-defense would have been meritless. Accordingly, trial counsel‘s failure to make such an objection does not amount to ineffective assistance. Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881, 884 (3) (c) (426 SE2d 886) (1993) (“Failure to make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance.“).
(b) Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he spoke to Evans and Jackson several times before trial and that he also reviewed Evans‘s statement to police. Having done so, trial counsel discovered that Evans did not witness the altercation between Jackson and Thomas and that she only went to meet Jackson after he was leaving the scene of the stabbing in order to take him to the hospital. Accordingly, trial counsel concluded that Evans‘s testimony would not have added anything particularly useful to the case, and he made a strategic decision not to call her as a witness.
[T]rial counsel‘s decision as to which defense witnesses to call
Jackson also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Jackson to testify in support of his claim of self-defense. However, the record reveals that Jackson‘s theory of self-defense was already presented to the jury in the form of his statement to police in which he claimed that he was defending himself from Thomas‘s attack at the time that he stabbed him. Thus, Jackson‘s testimony was not needed to establish self-defense.
To the extent that Jackson claims that his trial counsel somehow inadequately presented his self-defense claim by failing to
In any event, trial counsel left the ultimate decision to testify up to Jackson, and Jackson himself made an informed decision not to testify after consulting with trial counsel at the close of the State‘s case at trial. Because Jackson was fully informed of his right to testify, it cannot be said in this case that his failure to testify on his
(c) With respect to counsel‘s failure to present evidence of Jackson‘s alleged fear of Thomas, trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that Jackson never informed him that he harbored any sort of fear of Thomas before he was allegedly attacked, and counsel “cannot possibly have performed deficiently by having failed to present [evidence] of which [Jackson] had never made him aware.” (Citation omitted.) Lewis v. State, 294 Ga. 526, 529 (755 SE2d 156) (2014). Also, as noted in Division 4 (b), supra, Jackson chose not to testify when he had the opportunity to present evidence of his alleged fears through his own testimony.
(d) Similarly, when asked if he had been told anything about Thomas‘s reputation in the community, trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he had not. Trial counsel went on to testify that he was given the impression by Jackson and Evans that they “didn‘t really know [Thomas] personally . . . [and] just kind
5. Jackson also urges, in a separate enumeration, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial in light of all of the same alleged errors that he raises, and that we have rejected, in Divisions 1-4, supra. Thus, “[n]othing is raised [in this separate enumeration] that is not raised elsewhere in his brief, and this enumeration is without merit.” Wade v. State, 261 Ga. 105, 108 (11) (401 SE2d 701) (1991).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2019.
Murder. Warren Superior Court. Before Judge Hinesley.
Jane S. Dansie, for appellant.
William P. Doupé, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M. Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.