Jackson v. SmithJackson v. Smith
The Court of Claims properly found that defendant is not liable merely because the correction officer failed to keep claimant in his direct line of sight. Liability does not lie merely because the officer could not see claimant when claimant was attacked (see id. at 255 n 4, 256; Elnandes v State of New York, 11 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]). Absent a showing of dangerousness, “unremitting supervision” is unnecessary (Colon v State of New York, 209 AD2d 842, 844 [1994]; see 99 NY2d 247, 256 [2002], supra). Moreover, claimant‘s reliance on rules applicable to county jails (see
Peters, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs. [See 8 Misc 3d 1019(A), 2005 NY Slip Op 511191(U) (2005).]
Following his conviction in 1985, 1988 and 1991 of various felonies, for which indeterminate prison sentences were imposed, petitioner was released to parole supervision in 2000. In 2001, petitioner was convicted of robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree, for which he was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life. The sentencing commitment was silent as to the manner in which this sentence was to run against petitioner‘s prior unexpired sentences. His subsequent request that the 2001 sentence run concurrently with the preexisting unexpired sentences was rejected administratively, prompting petitioner to commence this proceeding pursuant to
We affirm.
Mercure, J.P., Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
CREW III, J.
Following his conviction in 1985, 1988 and 1991 of various felonies, for which indeterminate prison sentences were imposed, petitioner was released to parole supervision in 2000. In 2001, petitioner was convicted of robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree, for which he was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life. The sentencing commitment was silent as to the manner in which this sentence was to run against petitioner‘s prior unexpired sentences. His subsequent request that the 2001 sentence run concurrently with the preexisting unexpired sentences was rejected administratively, prompting petitioner to commence this proceeding pursuant to
We affirm.
Mercure, J.P., Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
CREW III, J.