26 N.Y.S. 27 | New York Court of Common Pleas | 1893
In answer to the action the defendant alleged a rightful discharge of the plaintiff, and whether the discharge were justified by his misconduct was the issue upon which, in fact and in law, the verdict was suspended. In terms, the court instructed the jury that, “unless you find that there was just and reasonable' cause for the defendant to rescind or cancel this contract by reason of the acts of the .plaintiff, the defendant is bound.” No exception was taken to this direction; and probably, by the weight of modern authority, where, as here, the imputed misconduct of the servant is not clearly and conclusively incompatible with his obligations to the master, the question of justification is properly for decision by the jury. Ellison v. Jones, (Sup.) 15 N. Y. Supp. 356; Manufacturing Co. v. Latz, 42 Ill. App. 230; Suttie v. Aloe, 39 Mo. App. 38; Bramwell, B., in Horton v. McMurtry, 5 Hurl. & N. 674; Turner v. Robinson, 5 Barn. & Adol. 789; Ridgway v. Market Co., 3 Adol. & E. 171; Read v. Dunsmore, 9 Car. & P. 588; Amor v. Fearon, 9 Adol. & E. 548; Mercer v. Whall, 5 Q. B. 447. And not only the legal quality, but.the fact of the plaintiff’s misconduct, was referred to the jury, upon evidence which, to say the least, would have well warranted a finding in favor of the defendant. In this aspect of the case it is obvious that any admission of incompetent evidence could hardly fail to be of prejudice to the appellant. By the contract upon which plaintiff sues he was employed absolutely for a period of five years, but within a few days after its execution the defendant endeavored to procure his assent to an engagement terminable on 30 days’ notice. This proposed new agreement was received in evidence, contrary to objection and exception by the appellant. In his printed argument the learned counsel for the respondent thus vindicates the ruling:
“This paper was introduced in evidence to show, with other testimony, that the defendant almost from the beginning of the contract was seeking some chance to terminate it, and that it was a part of a general scheme to get some pretext for getting rid of the plaintiff without being made liable for damages resulting from a breach of the contract. This was a part of the theory upon which the plaintiff tried this action, and for that purpose the paper was admissible in evidence.”
But “the motive of the master in discharging the servant is not the issue, nor is it material. The simple question is whether a legal cause existed for such discharge.” Wood, Mast. & Serv. 230. In Spotswood v. Barrow, 5 Exch. 110, the cause alleged in the plea for plaintiff’s discharge was disobedience of orders. At the trial it was proved that he had misappropriated money, but it did not appear that the defendants knew the fact when they dismissed him. Held, “that, the defendants having a justifiable cause