Pеtitioner/Appellant Dr. Erwin Jackson filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court seeking to compel the circuit court to hold the “immediate hearing” mandated by section 102.168(7), Florida Statutes (2016). We granted the petition by order and explained that an opinion would follow. The day after our order issued, the trial court held a hearing and entered a final order in favor of Respondent/Appellee Scott Maddox. Jаckson immediately sought review of the order in this Court by a separate “emergency petition to invoke this court’s constitutional-writs power.” We treated the petition as a notice of appeal and, after receiving expedited briefing, entered another order vacating the trial court’s final order and remanding for further proceedings. We now write to further explain our actions in both casеs, which we have consolidated for purposes of this opinion.
I. Procedural History
Maddox was elected as a city commissioner for the City of Tallahassee on August 30, 2016. The Leon County Elections Canvassing Board certified his election on
The City of Tallahassee (the City) sought leave of the court and was permitted to intervene. Citing Subpart A, Section 13 of the City of Tallahassee’s Charter (City Charter), which provides that “[t]he commission shall be the judge of the election and qualification of its own members subject to review by the courts,” the City argued that the circuit court was not the proper forum to hear Jackson’s election contest, rather the City Commission provided the exclusive forum for resolving Maddox’s eligibility to hold office. The City and Maddox then moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to stay proceedings to allow the City to conduct its own proceeding to determine Maddox’s eligibility.
On October 27, the circuit court granted the City’s mоtion to stay, and agréed with the City that the question of whether Maddox was eligible to hold the office of city commissioner was reserved to the City Commission. The circuit court ordered the City to address Maddox’s eligibility for office in “a timely manner,” directing it to submit, by 5:00 p.m. on November 22, a report on whether Maddox was a resident of the City at the time he took the oath of office on November 21. Thereafter, Jackson sought emеrgency mandamus relief in this Court to compel the circuit court to conduct an immediate hearing as required by section 102.168(7).
II. Mandamus Proceeding
Jackson challenged Maddox’s election pursuant to section 102.168(1), Florida Statutes (2016), which provides that “the certification of election or nomination- of any person to office ... may be contested in the circuit court ... by any elector qualified to vote in the election rеlated to such candidacy....” Such a complaint must be filed within ten days after certification of the election results. § 102.168(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). Jackson filed a timely complaint, alleging one of the enumerated statutory grounds for contesting an election: “Ineligibility of the successful candidate for the nomination or office in dispute.” § 102,168(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016).
To establish ineligibility of a candidate to hold office, “a pleading must aver, and рroof must show, constitutional ineligibility—the failure to meet qualifications the constitution lays down.” Norman v. Ambler,
The City and Maddox argued that Jackson was not entitled to an immediate hearing because the City Charter established a “supplementary procedure” that operated in harmony with the Florida Elections Code and that designated the City Commission as the exclusive forum for the initial determination of the eligibility of a candidate to hold the office of city commissioner. The City and Maddox argued that the City Commission’s determination would then be subject to certiorari review in circuit court. Jackson argued that he was entitled to an immediate hearing in circuit court to resolve his challenge.
Based on our review of the Florida Election Code and the City of Tallahassee’s Charter, we hold that Jackson had a clear legal right to an immediate hearing under section 102.168, Florida Statutes, the trial court had a clear legal duty to conduct such hearing, and the trial court’s stay of the statutory proceeding in favor of a proceeding before the City Commission was error.
■ The Legislature has expressly preempted to the state matters involving state and local elections, with a limited exception for municipal elections. § 97.0115, Fla. Stat. (2016) (“All matters set forth in chapters 97-105 are preempted to the state, except as otherwise specifically authorized by state pr federal law. The conduct of municipal elections shall be governed by s. 100.3605.”). Section 100.3605 .provides:
The Florida Election Code, chapters 97-106, shall govern the conduct of a municipality’s election, in the absence of an applicable, special аct, charter, or ordinance provision. No charter or ordinance provision shall be adopted which conflicts with or exempts a municipality from any provision in the Florida Election Code that expressly applies to municipalities. ,
§ 100.3605(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). The City and Maddox argue that section 102.168 does not expressly apply to municipal elections, and in the alternative, that if it does apply, the City of Tаllahassee’s charter does not conflict with any provision of the Election Code; We reject these arguments for two reasons. '
First, the election contest statute, section 102.168, expressly applies to municipal elections. The plain language of the statute provides that, with the exception of challenges to the election of a member of either house'of the Legislature, all challenges to the election of any person to office may be brought in circuit court. § 102.168(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“Except as provided in s. '102.171,'"the certification of election or nomination of any person to office, or of the result on any question submitted'by referendum, may be contested in the circuit court ... by any1 elector qualified to vote in the election related to such candidacy, or by any taxpayer, respectively.”) (emphasis added). Further, by its express language, the statute applies to the election of local candidates. Section 102.168(4) provides that “[t]he canvassing
Second, the City of Tallahassee’s charter provision providing for the City Commission to judge the qualifications of its own members either is not applicable to a challenge to a candidate’s eligibility to hold office, or, if• applicable, impermissibly conflicts with section 102.168(7)’s requirement that the circuit court hold an “immediate hearing” once an election challenge is filed. Contrary to the City’s and Maddox’s arguments, the City of Tallahassee’s Charter contains no provision applicable to an election contest challenging the eligibility of a candidate for office. Rather, Section 13 states that the commission is the “judge of the election and qualification of its own members, subject to review by the courts.” (emphasis added). Florida courts have long recognized the distinction between the eligibility of a candidate to hold office and the qualification of a candidate to stand for election to office. See Norman,
Despite the plain language of the City Charter, the City urges this Court to construe the language in Section 13 referring to the City Commission’s review of a candidate’s “qualifications” to hold office to encompass chаllenges to a candidate’s eligibility to hold office. If we were to so construe the City Charter, we would hold that the charter provision improperly conflicts with section 102.168 by delaying the immediate hearing required by the statute. “The test of conflict between a local government enactment and state law is “whether one must violate one provision in order to comply with the other. Putting it another way, a confliсt exists when two legislative enactments “cannot co-exist.” ’ ” Sarasota All. for Fair Elections, Inc. v. Browning,
Because Jackson had a clear legal right to an immediate hearing pursuant to section 102.168 and no other available legal remedies, we concluded that he was entitled to mandamus relief. See Plymel v. Moore,
III. Appeal Proceeding
Our order granting Jackson’s mandamus petition issued shortly before 5:00 p.m. on November 9, 2016. The following morning, Jackson requested a hearing in the circuit court for the purpose of addressing “several scheduling and discovery issues.” A hearing was scheduled for 1:15 p.m. that day. Maddox and the City did not object to the matters Jackson noticed for the hearing nor did they indicate that any other issues should be addressed by the court. At the hearing, however, Maddox argued that the hearing should proceеd as a final evidentiary hearing. Jackson objected on several grounds: (1) the hearing had not been properly noticed as a final evidentiary hearing; (2) his discovery requests remained pending; and (3) the trial court had not ruled on several pending motions. In response, Maddox argued that discovery was not available under section 102.168. The trial court agreed and proceeded with a final evidentiary hearing. Because Jackson lacked notice, he was not prepared to offer any exhibits or testimony to support his allegations of Maddox’s eligibility to hold office. After hearing testimony from Maddox and Jackson, and accepting exhibits from Maddox, the trial court entered a final order in favor of Maddox. The court also appeared to enter a default judgment against the Leon County Elections Canvаssing Board, which had not entered an appearance. Jackson sought review of the final order by an emergency petition, arguing that the hearing- failed to comport with the requirements of due process. We treated Jackson’s petition as a notice of appeal and, for the reasons that follow, vacated the trial court’s final order in its entirety.
First, the trial court abused its discretion by cоnducting the final eviden-tiary hearing without proper notice, violating Jackson’s right to due process of law. We recognize that “specific parameters of the notice and the opportunity to be heard required by procedural due process are not evaluated by fixed rules of law.” Keys Citizens For Responsible Gov’t, Inc. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth,
Here, Jackson requested a hearing to discuss scheduling and discovery issues in light of this Court’s recent order granting his mandamus petition. In an email to opposing counsel, Jackson’s counsel again set out his belief that the hearing should resolve outstanding motions relаting to discovery and default, set a schedule for depositions, and determine a date for the final hearing. The notice of hearing did not specify that the hearing was to be the final evidentiary hearing, and it was not until the beginning of the hearing, after the trial court asked the parties if they had “talked about what we’re doing today,” that Maddox requested that the trial court
Further, the trial court’s conclusion that discovery was not available under section 102.168 was clear legal error. Although the statute is silent with regard to the availability of discovery, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all special statutory proceedings in thе circuit courts. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010. ed. cmt. (“By being applicable to all suits of a civil nature, the civil rules cover not only law and equity, tort and contract, but also special statutory proceeding under the various extraordinary writs which have been classified as civil in nature.”). A review of reported decisions involving section 102.168 elections challenges reveals that discovery is routinely conducted under the supervision of a trial court in such cases. See, e.g., Gore v. Harris,
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion and violated Jackson’s due process rights by failing to address several pre-trial motions before issuing a final order. Though several of Jackson’s discovery requests remained pending, the trial court improрerly refused to address the outstanding discovery requests at the evi-dentiary hearing. See Bldg. Educ. Corp. v. Ocean Bank,
Based on the numerous violations of Jackson’s due process rights, we vacated the trial court’s final order and remandеd for further proceedings in accordance with section 102.168, the Rules of Civil Procedure, and due process. We further directed the trial court to establish an expedited discovery schedule and to resolve unresolved discovery disputes, to rule on the outstanding motions, and, following discovery and proper notice to the parties, to conduct the hearing contemplated by section 102.168(7). Finally, we dеferred to the trial court to hear argument from the parties and determine whether Maddox would be able to take the oath of office, and what effect if any that determination would have on Jackson’s current cause of action.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, we held that Jackson was entitled mandamus relief because he had a clear legal right to an immediate hearing before the circuit court pursuаnt to section 102.168 to resolve his election contest and there were no other available legal remedies. After the trial court conducted a hearing and entered a final order, we vacated the trial, court’s order and remanded for further proceedings because the trial court denied due process by concluding that discovery was not available, by hearing the merits of Jackson’s election contest without proper notice to the parties, by failing to resolve Jackson’s pending discovery requests, and .by failing to rule on a number of unresolved motions.,