Michael JACKSON v. KINARK CORPORATION, d/b/a CAMELOT HOTEL
84-104
Supreme Court of Arkansas
June 4, 1984
669 S.W.2d 898
Affirmed.
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, James W. Moore and Michael S. Moore, by: Michael S. Moore, for appellee.
GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice. In March, 1981, the appellant, Michael Jackson, wаs employed by the appellee to be a banquet server at the Camelot Hotel in Littlе Rock. Fourteen months later Jackson was discharged for refusing to take a polygraph tеst in connection with the disappearance of a television set at the hotel. Jackson brought this action for damages, both in contract and in tort, alleging that his discharge was wrongful and аbusive. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment on the contract claim, holding that the complaint did not state a cause of action because Jackson‘s employment was not for a definite term. See Petty v. Missouri & Ark. Ry. Co., 205 Ark. 990, 167 S.W.2d 895, cert. den. 320 U.S. 738 (1943); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902, 39 LRA 467 (1897). The plaintiff then took a nonsuit as to the tort claim and аppealed from the summary judgment dismissing the contract claim. The Court of Appeals transferred the case as presenting an issue of significant public interest.
Our decision in the Petty case, almost a century ago, followed the common-law rule that when a contract of employment does not bind the employee to serve for a specified time, the contract may be terminated at will by either party, even though the contract provides that the employee can be disсharged only for cause. There is then no cause of action for wrongful discharge, the emрloyee being entitled to compensation only for his period of actual service.
The appellant correctly points out that in a number of
We are unwilling to dispose of an important issue on what in this instance amounts to а demurrer to the complaint. In a case of this kind, as the decisions elsewhere demonstrate, the facts of each particular case are important, for the courts’ conclusions have varied with the fact situations. Here there is attached to the complaint a printed Employee Handbook which Jackson received and acknowledged. He asserts thаt it constitutes a definite contract of employment. This handbook describes in detail certain Conditions of Employment. Among them is an initial trial period of three months, with a possible implication that a new employee who completes that term, as Jackson did, can then be discharged only for cause. That the handbook is a contract on which Jackson relied is not refutеd by the motion for summary judgment, which was not accompanied by affidavits demonstrating that under the current trend of the law no genuine issue of fact exists. We will be in a position to fully consider that trend only after the facts in this case have been definitely determined. The tort claim, if renewed, may also be pertinent. In the circumstances summary judgment is not approriate, further proceedings being necessary to establish the facts.
The appellee‘s argument that the judgment should be affirmed under Rule 9, for want of a sufficient abstract of the record, cannot be sustained. The apрellant‘s abstract is deficient, but not flagrantly so. Rule 9 (e) (2). Five years ago we noted in a per curiam order that written exhibits in the record which can be abstracted in words must be so abstracted rather than being attached as exhibits to the brief. Compiler‘s note to Rule 9, Ark. Stat. Ann., Vol. 3 A (Repl. 1979). This apрellant has not abstracted the 25-page
Reversed and remanded.
ADKISSON, C.J., and HICKMAN, J., concur.
Darrell HICKMAN, Justice, concurring. I agree with the result reached but do not join in encouraging reconsideration of our cases which have settled the law regarding the termination of an employee who has no contract for a definite term.
ADKISSON, C.J., joins.