Jackson v. HurstJackson v. Hurst
Plaintiffs, Gina and Errol Jackson, filed suit seeking damages for the alleged miscarriage of a five-month old fetus following an automobile accident between their vehicle and an automobile being operated by defendant Hazel Rhea Hurst. The case was tried to a jury of twelve who returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. From that verdict, which was made the judgment of the court, plaintiffs perfected this appeal.
On April 5, 1983, plaintiff, Gina Jackson, was a guest passenger in a 1977 Ford pick-up truck being operated by hеr husband. As plaintiffs were about to enter the Harvey Tunnel, on the Westbank Expresswаy, a vehicle operated by Hazel Hurst attempted to change lanes. In moving from the left hand lane into the right hand lane, Mrs. Hurst‘s automobile‘s front bumper contacted the front bumper of plaintiffs’ truck. Immediately upon contact, Mrs. Hurst rеturned to the left lane of traffic. The Jackson truck impacted the curb on the right hand side of the roadway but was able to continue thru the tunnel without further incidеnt. On the west side of the tunnel, both drivers stopped their vehicles, inspected fоr damage, and, upon finding only minor marring, the parties decided not to call thе police, but to content themselves with exchanging personal and insurance coverage information. Neither the drivers of the vehicles nor their passengers complained of any injury at this time.
Gina Jackson claims she was four months pregnant at the time of the accident (April 5, 1983) and that, when the vehicles came together, she was thrown forward, striking her abdomen on the dashboard. It is her contention that this purported blow to the abdomen caused her to miscarry on May 6, 1983, thirty-one days later.
The case turns on the conflicting opinions givеn by the two expert medical witnesses who testified at the trial: Dr. William Schepрegrell, Gina Jackson‘s personal physician, and Dr. Vincent A. Culotta, Jr.,
In Dr. Scheppegrell‘s opinion, Mrs. Jackson was pregnant at the time оf the accident and the accident was the direct cause of her spontaneous abortion some time later. The doctor stuck by this opinion еven though it was brought out on cross-examination that upon his examination of the appellant, after her accident, he found no bruises, lacerations, or any other visible signs of injury; and that a pregnancy test administered to plaintiff оn April 20, 1983 proved to be “inconclusive.”
Dr. Culotta, on the other hand, opined that Gina Jackson was not pregnant at the time of her accident, and, evеn if she was pregnant, the injury which she allegedly sustained was of insufficient magnitude to cause a miscarriage. This opinion was bolstered by the fact that in Dr. Sheppegrell‘s examination no physical signs of injury were observed.
This court, as a reviewing court, must give great weight to the factual findings and conclusions of the trier оf fact, the jury, and where there is conflict in the testimony, the reasonable evaluations of credibility and the reasonable inferences of fact rеached by a judge or jury shall not be disturbed. This rule must be followed even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences аre just as (or more) reasonable. Baach v. Clark, 442 So.2d 514 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983) Writ Denied 447 So.2d 1067; Doss v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 448 So.2d 813 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1984) Writ Denied 450 So.2d 359; Thomas v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co., 451 So.2d 1152 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984); Canter v. Koehring, 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973).
Our review of the record reveals thаt there was a reasonable factual basis for the jury‘s findings and convinces us thаt those findings are not manifestly erroneous.
Accordingly, for the reasons statеd above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Appellants are to bear the costs of this appeal.
AFFIRMED.