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181 F. App'x 372
4th Cir.
2006

Eddie Thomas JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Weston HOUCK, The Honorable, United States District Judge in his individual and non-judicial capacity; Timothy Dargan, Law Clerk in his individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-7769.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Decided: May 17, 2006.

480 F.3d 372

Submitted: Feb. 16, 2006.

F.3d at 172-73. In Blick, we distinguished the defendant‘s situation from the one presented in Attar and United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143 (4th Cir. 1995), where “the errors allegedly committed by the district courts were errors that the defendants could not have reasonably contemplated when the plea agreements were executed.” Blick, 408 F.3d at 172.

Woodbury agreed to forego his right to appeal the district court‘s determination of his career offender status, agreed to give up his right to appeal “whatever sentence is imposed, including any issues that relate to the establishment of the guideline range,” and reserved only the right to appeal a departure or a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum. Woodbury‘s claim that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career offender falls squarely within the scope of his waiver.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

DISMISSED.

Eddie Thomas Jackson, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Eddie Thomas Jackson appeals the district court‘s judgment adopting the magistrate judge‘s report and recommendation and summarily dismissing his civil rights complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court‘s opinion and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Jackson v. Houck, No. CA-05-1412-8-MBS (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2005). We are confident that Judge Houck himself determined that Jackson‘s Rule 60(b) motion was moot and simply directed his law clerk to have the judge‘s decision noted on the docket maintained in the case.

We also find both Judge Houck and his law clerk are immune from suit. With respect to Judge Houck, judicial immunity attaches even if the act in question was in excess of his authority. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). Likewise, law clerks like Dargan are also entitled to absolute judicial immunity “when assisting the judge in carrying out the former‘s judicial functions.” Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir.1991); see also Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988). Absolute immunity “applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel that are basic and integral part[s] of the judicial function.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C.Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). This formulation “enables the immunity to operate where the need for liability in damages is low and the need for a backstop to judicial immunity high.” Id. An action for damages against a clerk is “not necessary to control unconstitutional conduct in light of the numerous safeguards that are built into the judicial process, especially the correctability of error on appeal.”* Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

*
Insofar as Jackson may be claiming Judge Houck and Dargan were negligent, he is not entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 74-75 (4th Cir.1995).

Case Details

Case Name: Jackson v. Houck
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: May 17, 2006
Citations: 181 F. App'x 372; 05-7769
Docket Number: 05-7769
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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