186 So. 747 | La. Ct. App. | 1939
The principal suit was brought by Rhoda Jackson in forma pauperis. The defendants were Joseph Hart, in whose premises the plaintiff alleged that she had sustained injuries, and London
Lancashire Indemnity Company of America, which was alleged to be the liability insurance carrier of the said Hart. Before the suit was tried, a compromise was effected and the amount agreed upon, $75, was paid to the plaintiff. Since the suit had been filed under the so-called "pauper act", the usual fees of the Clerk of the First City Court and of the Constable of that court had not been paid as they became due, nor were they paid when the compromise settlement was effected. Therefore, Anthony Herrle, Clerk, and James Dempsey, Constable of said court, filed these rules praying that the plaintiff and the two defendants in the principal suit be condemned solidarily to pay the said costs because of the provision in Section 3 of Act No.
We note, in passing, that this section was not affected by Act No.
Rhoda Jackson filed no appearance in answer to the rules, but the London Lancashire Indemnity Company of America filed returns in which, by exception of no cause or right of action, it challenged the constitutionality of the provision of the statute to which we have referred and, in the same returns, as required by the rules of the First City Court, it filed answer in which it averred that the compromise settlement for the sum of $75 had been made and that it had paid the said amount and had received from the said Rhoda Jackson a written agreement to the effect that she would undertake the discontinuance of the suit.
We find in the record no return to either of the said rules filed by Joseph Hart.
The exception is grounded on the contention that that part of Section 3 of Act No.
The provision of the act which is under attack has already been set forth herein.
It will at once be noted that the title indicates that the sole object of the statute is to give certain rights to pauper litigants and to fix conditions under which those rights may be exercised. There is no word or syllable or hint that any obligation is placed upon the opposing party; there is no suggestion that the act contains any limitation upon the right of any such opposing party to compromise, which right to compromise unrestrictedly is well recognized in the Civil Code in Art. 3071 et seq. If the "pauper act" did not contain the provision concerning the opposing party, the question of the liability for costs would be settled by Art. 491 of the Code of Practice, which provides that "The plaintiff may, in every stage of the suit previous to judgment being rendered, discontinue the suit on paying the costs." Therefore, if the defendants here were not properly put on notice by the title of the "pauper act" that they could not compromise without becoming liable for the payment of costs, they would have been justified in assuming that the plaintiff, in order to discontinue the suit, should be required to pay the costs.
Of course, it often has been said that the constitutional requirement does not mean that the object of a statute must be set forth in detail in the title and that the title need be an index of the provisions of the body of the statute; and it must be recognized that the provision, as it appears in Section 16 of Article 3 of the Constitution of 1921, contains a change in the wording which now requires only *749 that the title need "indicate" the object of the statute, whereas in all of the previous constitutions it was required that the title must "express" the object. Nevertheless, even the Constitution of 1921 shows the purpose of the framers thereof that the title of every statute must be broad enough at least to include, by inference or reference, everything sought to be accomplished by the body of the act; in other words, that any person reading the title should be put on notice of the possibility that his rights may be affected by the statute itself.
There are numerous cases involving these provisions of the various constitutions of this state and we see no necessity that we quote at great length from any of them because each was decided under the particular facts involved. Each case presents a different situation and the body of each statute must be compared with the title in order to determine whether that title is indicative of the provisions of the statute.
But there are a few cases to which we deem it advisable to refer. Counsel for movers point with confidence to the case of Grinage v. Times-Democrat Publishing Company,
"Regulating the collection of costs is a term broad and comprehensive enough to cover the requirement of security for costs, and as defendant may incur obligation for costs and pay out money for costs in the preparation of its defense, it is not without the pale of the title of the act when the body thereof authorizes the exaction from plaintiffs of a bond for the costs it may expend.
"The bond, even though exacted at the instance of defendant, enures, at last, to the benefit of the clerk and sheriff, and is, therefore, pertinent and germane to the subject with which the act deals, to-wit: — the costs of those officials. See Hope et al. v. City of New Orleans [
We do not think that the same may be said about the title under attack here. There is nothing whatever in the title — which refers only to the rights of pauper litigants — to indicate that the obligations of opposing litigants are in any way affected.
In Southern Hide Company v. Best et al.,
In Wm. M. Barrett, Inc. v. First National Bank of Shreveport,
But we do not think that that decision is applicable, for we cannot believe that a litigant reading the title of the "pauper act", which refers only to the pauper, *750 would be put on notice that he himself might be made liable for such costs.
Counsel for movers also cite Peoples Homestead Savings Association v. Masling,
In Mason v. New Orleans Terminal Company,
Here the title of the act is very limited and indicates that it affects only one particular class of litigants, whereas in the body it is sought to affect another group entirely. We think the title is fatally defective in that it in no way "indicates" that opposing litigants are in any way affected by the said statute.
We see no necessity that we discuss the other contentions made.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgments appealed from be and they are hereby annulled, avoided and reversed, and that the rules of Anthony Herrle, Clerk of the First City Court of New Orleans, and James Dempsey, Constable of the First City Court of New Orleans, be and they are dismissed at their cost.
*751Reversed.