*1 husband, Lois D. Jackson Jackson, Appellants, John D. Division, and Corporation, Oldsmobile Motors General Appellees. Company, Oldsmobile Pryor 482. 1968.) April Term, (Jackson, January 31, Opinion filed 1969. Rehearing Denied March 1969.
Petition Rehearing June Disallowed 1969. Second Petition for Eulyse Merrill, Memphis, and Erich W. M. Smith, for appellants. Mem- M.
EugeNe Je., Louis Rutstein, Gbeeneb, Memphis, phis, BuchigNANi counsel; GbeeNer, & appellees. *2 Humpheeys delivered
Me. Justice Court. May, bought 1963, Plaintiff D. Jackson John Pryor Company,
Oldsmobile from automobile Oldsmobile I). placing in the wife, title thereto name his Lois approximately In November, Jackson. tAVo-and-a- parked Mrs. later, half Jackson automobile slightly sloping driveway, according her and, home to the allegation placed gear park declaration, position alighting and After set hand-brake. from leaving according allegation ear, it, suddenly declaration, the automobile rolled backwards driveway, striking injuring doAvn Jackson Mrs. her. Company Pryor sued Oldsmobile
Mr. and Mrs. Jackson Corporation, Motors Oldsmobile Division, G-eneral damages, personal injuries, loss services, the usual expenses. As in the and medical consortium, summarized assignments was based on Defend- error, the action negligence; warranty; ants’ law common misrepresentations of fact. Company pleaded
Pryor declaration, Oldsmobile to the against this Defendant need be no but the action noticed against it dismissed, further as suit and it is not appeal. involved in this Corporation, Motors Division,
General Oldsmobile because showed on its declaration, demurred bought May had face the automobile been had 1963, but suit commenced not been until *3 21,1966. November Judge heard, the was the Trial
When demurrer held year that the suit was barred one of the statute limita- which to run the sale, tions commenced time of the assignments May, 1963. The of error in this Court challenge holding. thorough Court is after satisfied, consideration
of the Plaintiffs-in-error’s contention, that this case holding Chief Justice ruled Green’s Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 140. it In that case was said:
“In to Use Cardin State, v. McClellan, of 616, 85 S.W. 269, 3 Ann.Cas. the court the said following general statement of the rule law the in Tennessee: general wrongful
‘As a rule, the of action for cause negligent act, whether or or willful, for the breach duty, immediately upon of a contract or accrues happening wrongful breach, act or the even though damage resulting may the actual therefrom not some occur until time afterwards. The statute begins upon therefore to run the occurrence complained act or breach and not time of, from the damage resulting therefrom.’ supra, State except the court noted an McClellan, general tion to rule that, when cause effect consequential, distinguished was based on as damages, involving from direct, an or act omission proved might have harmless, might upon accruing only be taken as occur- actual damage. many rence of the It is said that there were respectable exception sustaining authorities noted, carefully application but this court avoided of the rule exception, although application embodied such disposed would have case. The decision in State v. McClellan was rested on ground. If another repudiation does indicate a of the rule of exception, certainly unwillingness indicates an part on the this court to follow that rule. Undoubtedly weight authority is to the effect begins statute limitations to run wrongful action of this kind from the date act damage than rather from the date of caused.” *4 Chief Justice reasoning Green concludes his on this proposition with this observation: may hardships particular
“While arise in cases ruling, contrary ruling reason of this would litigation society repose promote inimical to the speculative to he too and too character uncertain of a encouraged,” malprac- to a observation was reference
While particularly applicable peculiarly action, it tice operating some an automobile case for where after damages brought action is for two-and-a-half alleged for a defect to the manufacturer have present during in the the whole of automobile been time. judg- assignments of error are overruled and is affirmed.
ment Trial Court Dyer, Chief Chattin Burnett, Justice, concur. Obeson, Justices,
On Rehear Petition Humphreys. Mr. Justice
Appellants petition suggesting rehear filed a have opinion Court “overlooked filed the fact plaintiff any holding its never at time had under has personal remedy injuries on that she suffered for the apparently 1965; November because Court has 23, personal plaintiff’s injuries cause of held plaintiff was barred before had upon injuries filed could which have suit.” assumption, specific inquiries several
On this are respond by explaining addressed to this Court. We what thought was evident. we Sherman, Albert based, Court’s declaration
specifically alleged although that, for dental contract negligent services breached was and unskillful operation, damage injury no or accrued day July therefrom, and it was not until first of personal injury plaintiff, 1932, that did result to the for which she could sue. spite citing Austin, of Bodne this, proposition
2 S.W.2d 62 A.L.R. 1410, for the injuries damages sought person, when the for are of whether the basis the suit is contract or tort, the suit one-year is barred statute of limitations, was held that the statute commenced to of run at the time original duty, breach of contract or later and that the injury consequence simply claimed was of that breach. ’ plaintiffs On basis, this suit was dismissed. present comparable
In the we have a case, situation. duty, according The breach contract or to the declara- May tion, occurred on when 16,1963, automobile was bought. injuries The sustained some two-and-a-half grew duty, later out breach of this contract or. consequential. and so were personal injury Bodne,
Under the suit had to be year though commenced within even one the cause of action was breách Albert, And under contract. even though injury the breach of contract resulted in no what- brought, soever at time—so that no suit could be recovery injuries consequen- can no there negligent tial to the basis action, breach of duty. or contract
In must mind, be borne in that the cause injury plaintiff allegedy not ease is It sustained. injury is fundamental fact of bare an does justify defendant. an award duty alleged of contract and this case respect of sale of an automobile. Under to a contract allegations breach occurred declaration, at that so the cause action accrued sale, time began run on it. limitations time and the statute *6 pointed Albert, out As Chief Green Justice Grafton period testing limi- to that of the the alternative this, time of the from tation occurrence injury the time contract than rather injury consequence, is a would create from which the there situation. For would intolerable under rule brought. suit not be never be a time could recognize rea- have followed We that some courts by plaintiffs-in-error, soning but this Court contended point rule out, not to this. And we has chosen do brought proved time, to has allows suit be unmanageable, Code so Uniform Commercial problem. deal See T.C.A. 47-2-725. undertakes with application and statute course, Of construction litiga- will of limitations determination future isit invoked. tion which say, authority it to and
Suffice under the Bodne Albert, to which add Hackworth Purina v. Raulston we Co., (the presenting 381 S.W.2d latter eloquent purpose most forceful statement yet written), original opinion of statutes limitation petition is reaffirmed and the to rehear is denied. Dyer, Chibe Cre- Burnett, Justice, Chattin son, Justices, concur.
ON Second Petition to Reheab Humphkeys. Mb. Justice petition
A assuming second to rehear filed, has been misunderstanding Court’s written relationship Lois D. Jackson automobile. This case. petition
The second to rehear is disallowed. BuRnett, Justice, and Cre- Chief Dyeb, Chatttn, son, Justices, concur.