JACKSON v. DEPLATCHETTJACKSON v. DEPLATCHETT
At the time he filed his Complaint, Plaintiff Jamell Jackson (“Jackson” or “Plaintiff“), was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion“). Proceeding pro se, he brings this civil rights action under
Deplatchett has moved to dismiss the Complaint under
II. Background
A. Factual Allegations
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and its attached exhibits and are accepted as true for purposes of Deplatchett‘s motion. During Jackson‘s incarceration at SCI-Albion, Deplatchett served as the unit manager of the E-A housing block. Jackson alleges that on an unspecified morning between January and March 2024, Deplatchett opened his cell door while he was using the toilet, stared at him, and made degrading remarks about his body. He further alleges that she left the door open so that other inmates could see him unclothed and that she laughed as she walked away. Jackson describes the incident as a single occurrence of voyeurism. He does not allege any physical contact.
Jackson submitted complaints under the Prison Rape Elimination Act, but no corrective action followed. He later declined to attend a parole staffing session at which Deplatchett would be present. Deplatchett threatened to interfere with his parole and other staff transferred him to a different housing assignment. The Pennsylvania Parole Board denied Jackson parole in April 2024 and again in
B. Procedural History
The Court granted Jackson leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and his Complaint was docketed on October 24, 2025. ECF Nos. 7, 8. The Court denied Jackson‘s separately filed motion for a preliminary injunction by order dated January 26, 2026. ECF No. 22. Deplatchett moved to dismiss the Complaint on January 23, 2026. ECF No. 19. The Court ordered Jackson to file a response by February 17, 2026. ECF No. 23. And when he failed to respond, the Court issued an order to show cause directing him to explain his noncompliance or, in the alternative, to respond by a further extended deadline. ECF No. 27. Jackson has filed nothing further.
III. Standard of Review
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible when the pleaded facts permit the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The Court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but it disregards legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a claim supported only by conclusory statements. Id.; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Because Jackson proceeds pro se, the Court construes his submissions liberally and holds them to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Liberal construction does not, however, relieve a pro se plaintiff of the obligation to plead facts sufficient to state a cognizable claim. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013).
B. Failure to Prosecute
A district court may dismiss an action, sua sponte, when a plaintiff fails to prosecute it or to comply with the court‘s orders.
IV. Dismissal Is Warranted for Failure to Prosecute
Because Jackson has not responded to the motion despite the Court‘s order directing a response and order to show cause, the Court first considers whether the action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Poulis factors, on balance, support dismissal.
The first factor supports dismissal. Jackson proceeds pro se, so the failure to respond and to comply with the Court‘s orders is attributable to him alone. The second factor also favors dismissal. Jackson‘s inaction has stalled the litigation entirely and deprived Deplatchett of any opportunity to resolve the claims against her, and a plaintiff‘s refusal to advance his own case works prejudice by leaving the defendant to shoulder an open, unresolved matter. The third and fourth factors are satisfied as well: Jackson has ignored two successive orders, including one that expressly warned of dismissal, and his sustained silence in the face of that warning reflects willful abandonment rather than mere inadvertence.
The fifth factor likewise supports dismissal. Jackson proceeds in forma pauperis, so monetary sanctions would be ineffective, and because he has severed all communication with the Court, there is no reason to expect that any sanction short of dismissal would prompt his compliance. As to the sixth factor, and for the reasons infra., Jackson‘s claims lack merit under the governing standard. The Poulis factors thus weigh in favor of dismissal.
V. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim
Setting aside Jackson‘s failure to prosecute, each claim fails as a matter of law.
A. Official-Capacity Claims Are Barred.
To the extent Jackson sues Deplatchett in her official capacity for damages, the claim is barred. A suit against a state official in her official capacity is treated as a suit against the Commonwealth, which is not a “person” subject to suit for damages under
B. Fourth Amendment
Jackson‘s Fourth Amendment claim does not arise from a search of his cell but from Deplatchett‘s alleged viewing of his unclothed body. The distinction matters. A
That right is a narrow one, however. Harold v. McCray, 2018 WL 324716, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018) (citing Parkell, 833 F.3d at 325). Put simply, an isolated or momentary exposure of an inmate to view, including view by an officer of the opposite sex, does not offend the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Jones v. Lawry, 2019 WL 2482361, at *7 (W.D. Mich. June 14, 2019) (“In contrast, accidental viewing of a prisoner‘s naked body by a prison guard of the opposite sex is not a constitutional violation.“); see also Bracey v. Price, 2012 WL 6015727, at *17 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2012) (“Occasional viewing of inmates while showering or using toilet facilities has been held to be appropriately within the parameters of maintaining institutional security and therefore, constitutional.“); Ferrell v. Rusnak, 2020 WL 1472906, at *2, (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020) (“[T]here is no law suggesting an isolated incident of such exposure, without more, amounts to a violation of the Constitution.“).
Jackson alleges a single episode. Even accepting that Deplatchett opened his door and viewed him while he used the toilet, and even crediting his allegation that she made degrading remarks, a lone incident of this kind does not state a Fourth
C. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from sexual abuse at the hands of prison officials. Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473-75 (3d Cir. 2018). A claim of that kind has an objective and a subjective component. The objective component asks whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently serious, that is, incompatible with contemporary standards of decency, and courts consider the scope of the conduct, whether it served any legitimate penological purpose, and whether it caused injury. Id.; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Here, the Plaintiff‘s allegations do not clear the objective threshold. He alleges no physical contact of any kind. Verbal harassment, including lewd, offensive, or degrading remarks unaccompanied by physical contact, does not by itself amount to cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Perez v. Harry, 2026 WL 27578, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2026). The remaining conduct Jackson describes, a single instance of staring and momentary exposure to the view of others, may be unprofessional, but a lone episode of that character does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation under Ricks. See id. To the extent Jackson grounds this claim in the Prison Rape Elimination Act, that statute does not create a private right of action. Bowens v. Emps. of the Dep‘t of Corr., 2016 WL 3269580, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2016), aff‘d,
D. First Amendment Retaliation
To state a retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, that an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness was taken against him, and that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in that action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). The filing of a grievance is protected conduct, and the Court assumes Jackson‘s PREA complaint also qualifies.
The claim still fails on causation and personal involvement. A defendant is liable under
The alleged housing transfer, standing alone, is not an adverse action of constitutional dimension. “[I]t is also well established that mere transfer to a less desirable cell does not constitute an adverse action for the purposes of a retaliation
E. Fourteenth Amendment
Jackson‘s due process claim will be dismissed because there is no federal constitutional liberty interest in parole, and Pennsylvania‘s parole scheme creates none. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing general principle that Pennsylvania‘s parole statute does not create a liberty interest in the right to be paroled). Because Jackson has no protected liberty interest in release on parole, his procedural due process claim fails. To the extent he asserts a substantive due process claim, a Pennsylvania inmate may challenge a parole denial only where the decision rested on constitutionally impermissible grounds; the Board‘s stated reasons here are
Jackson‘s equal protection claim fares no better. He identifies no similarly situated comparator and alleges neither membership in a protected class nor the kind of intentional, irrational differential treatment a “class of one” theory requires. The equal protection claim will be dismissed.
Finally, insofar as Jackson seeks a new parole hearing and release on parole, that relief lies at the core of habeas corpus and is not available in a
VI. Leave to Amend
Before dismissing a civil rights complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff, a court ordinarily must permit a curative amendment unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2002); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Amendment would be futile as to the official-capacity, due process, equal protection, and habeas-type claims, each of which fails as a matter of law regardless of any additional facts Jackson might allege. As to the remaining claims, Jackson‘s complete abandonment of the litigation, including his disregard of two orders and an express
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Deplatchett‘s motion to dismiss will be granted, and the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order will follow.
DATED this 28th day of August, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE