108 Ky. 374 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1900
Opinion of the court by
Affirming.
Appellant brought this action, seeking to recover of ap-pellee a balance claimed to be due as salary as city attorney. The agreed' facts are that appellant was elected by the city council November 17, 1897, to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation of J. A. Sullivan, and held on as such officer till the filing of this1 action. • Appellant had been elected to the office for a full term by the people before his election by the council to fill the vacancy. In June, 1897,, the city council of appellee had passed an ordinance that changed the compensation of the city attorney from fees and commissions to a fixed salary. After appellant qualified under the appointment ot the council, he was paid under the law as it existed before the change, in June', 1897, up till February, 1898. After February, 1898, appellant was paid the salary, and now claims in this action the difference between the salary and fees up till September 1, 1898, at which time, he claims, the new term.
Section 3509, Kentucky Statutes, provides that the city council may provide by ordinance for the election of a city attorney for the same term as the police judge. It is admitted that this was done. By section 3510, Kentucky Statutes, it is provided that the term of police judge shall be four years, with a proviso that the term of the judge then in office, elected in 1890, shall cease on August 31, 1894, and the judge elected in November, 1893, shall begin his term September 1, 1894, and continue until the November election, 1897, and until his successor is elected and qualified. This section is in accordance with section 167 of the Constitution. Since the adoption of the present Constitution, all officers elected by the people, except Governor and Lieutenant Governor, as we now remember, begin their term of office on the first Monday in January after their election in November, and that this date was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution is clear; and that it applies to all officers, where no other time is fixed, is, we think, manifest. To hold that a city council of one city of the fourth class may fix September 1st following the election in November, as appellant contends, would utterly destroy the uniformity of laws contemplated by the Constitution. If September 1st could be fixed, any other date might be fixed, and so there would be no uniformity among cities having the same charter. The express provision of section 167 of the Constitution, as well
Petition for rehearing filed by appellant and. overruled.