On Fеbruary 28, 1933, customers of plaintiff delivered to it for collection a number of certificates, issued by the state of Mississippi. The state treasurer delivered to plaintiff a сheck for $97,612.50, drawn on defendant, in settlement of the certificates. On March 1, 1933, in the clearance between plaintiff and defendant, it appeared that defendant owed plaintiff $85,022.02. In settlement of this indebtedness, defendant issued jto plaintiff its check for the amount thereof on the head office of the Canal Bank & Trust Company, of Now Orlеans, La. This check was presented to the Canal Bank & Trust Company twice, first on March 2, and again on March 15, 1933; but payment was refused', and the check was protested fоr nonpayment.
On March 23, 1933, plaintiff brought the present suit against defendant, caused a writ of attachment to issue on the ground of the nonresidence of defendant, and under thе writ garnisheed funds to the credit of defendant on deposit in the Oanal Bank & Trust Company. Defendant’s assets were taken possession of later by the superintendent of banks of the state of Mississippi. The superintendent has been made a party to this suit.
An exception to the jurisdiction of the trial court was filed by defendant, on the ground that both plaintiff and defendant are domiciled in the state of Mississippi; that neither is engaged in doing business in this state; that the cause of action set forth in the suit arose entirely in the state оf Mississippi, and therefore that the courts of this, state are without jurisdiction of the case.
Two issues are presented, quite thoroughly, for consideration; one of thesе is whether a cause of action on a cheek arises at the place where the check, is payable and where payment is refused, or at the domiсile of the drawer, and the other is whether Act No. 220 of 1932 authorizes the issuance of an attachment against a nonresident corporation, not admitted to do business within the state, аnd not represented by an agent for the service of process, irrespective of the place where the cause of action arose, or the businеss was transacted.
The first question, propounded to us, is suggested by the cases of Hodges & Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
“In all suits instituted in any of the courts of this State in which the demand' is for a money judgment and the defendant is a nonresident of this State, or when the defendant is not domiciled in this State, whatever may be the nature, character or origin of the plaintiff’s claim, the plаintiff shall have the right to sue out a writ of attachment against the defendant’s property, whether the claim be for a sum certain or for an uncertain amount, and whether the claim be liquidated or unliquidated, upon making affidavit and giving bond as now required by law in suits against non-resident defendants, provided that the provisions of this Act shall not apply in cáses in which the defendant has a duly appointed agent in the State of Louisiana upon whom service of process may be made.”
The crucial clause in the foregoing act to be considered is the clause enacting that, “In all suits * * * in which the demand is for a money judgment and the defendant is a non-resident of this State, or when the defendant is not dоmiciled in this State, whatever may be the nature, character or origin of the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff shall have the right to sue out a writ of attachment. * 4c * »
This clause, we think, couched, as it is, in language which approaches being all-inclusive, gives a plaintiff a right to attach, in the courts of this state, on a claim or cause of action for money against a nonresident corporation, or against one not domiciled and not represented in this state by an agent for service of process.
The rule is that: “In giving construction to a statute, the courts are bound, if it be possible, to give effect to all its parts. No sentence, clause or word should be construed аs unmeaning and surplusage, if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.” Black on Interpretation, p. 83; State v. Fontenot,
The word “claim,” in the expression “whatever may be the nаture, character or origin of the plaintiff’s .claim,” means the facts giving rise to the demand, which show the right asserted, and may be said to be synonymous with '“cause of action.” Newberry v. Wilkinson (C. C.)
The word “nature,” occurring in the same expression in the clause “whatever maybe the nature,” etc., was, together with that clause, apparently taken from article 242 of the Code of Practice, touching the right to an attachment, where it is used with reference to the word “debt” instead of with reference to the broader word “claim,” used in the Act of 1932, and was construed under the Code as covering actions arising only ex contractu or quasi ex contractu, and not ex delicto. Barrow v. MсDonald,
The word “character,” as used in the expression “whatever may be the nature, character or origin of the plaintiff’s claim,” mеans the class or division to which the claim belongs, as for instance a claim arising from a contract or from a tort; the idea intended to be conveyed being that thе character of the claim is of no importance, in determining the right to attach.
The word “origin,” appearing in the clause, does not mean, in connection with thе word “claim,” as urged by defendant, the facts out of which.the action rises, for that would needlessly place the Legislature in the position of indulging in useless repetition, this meаning being already conveyed by the use of prior words, and especially by the use of the subsequent word “claim” with which the word “origin” is connected, but means the place оr locality where the cause of action arose; the idea being that it is immaterial where it arose in determining the right to attach.
It seems quite clear to us that the Lеgislature, not being satisfied with the law as it existed at the time of the rendition of the judgments in the Hodges and French Cases, supra, changed it. This change should, of course, be respеcted.
Since it is a matter of no importance whether the cause of action in this case be transitory or not or, in other words, whether or not it arose in anothеr state, or grew out of business transacted in another state, our conclusion is that the exception to the jurisdiction should be overruled.
The judgment appealed frоm is set aside, the exception to the jurisdiction is overruled, and the case is remanded to be tried according to law; defendant to pay the costs of this appeal, and the remaining costs to abide the final decision of the case.