MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On June 3, 2011, the East End Drug Task Force (the “Task Force”), including defendant Police Officer Kenneth D. Ric-hert (“Richert”), executed a search warrant at 115 Broad Street, Greenport, New York, the residence (at that time) of plaintiff Julie Jackson (“Jackson”); her son, plaintiff Elijah Jackson (“Elijah”) (collec
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiffs allege that the “County Defendants” — Suffolk County (“the County”), the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office (“the District Attorney’s Office”), the Task Force, and Richert — and the “Southold Defendants” — the Town of Southold (“Southold”) and the Southold Police Department (“SPD”) — violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, false imprisonment, and unlawful search and seizure, and also violated their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Plaintiffs also seek to hold the County and Southold liable under Monell. Presently before the Court are the County Defendants’ and the Southold Defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. For the following reasons, the County Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part, and the Sout-hold Defendants’ motion is granted in its entirety.
In particular, the Court concludes that Jackson’s unlawful search claim against Richert (relating to the June 3, 2011 search) survives summary judgment, because there is a genuine issue of disputed fact as to whether the search was executed in an unreasonable manner, in terms of the alleged gratuitous and unnecessary destruction of property during the search. Although defendants argue that the damage was incidental to the lawful search, the Court concludes that this issue cannot be decided on summary judgment in this case given the factual disputes in the record concerning the nature and scope of the items damaged, as well as alleged threats during the search regarding the destruction of property and other circumstances surrounding the search. Moreover, when the evidence is construed most favorably to plaintiffs, there is sufficient evidence of Richert’s involvement with and/or coordination of the execution of the search to create a genuine factual dispute as to whether he was personally involved in the alleged destruction of property, or failed to intervene in the destruction of property by other officers. In addition, given these disputed issues of fact, qualified immunity on this claim cannot be decided at this june-
However, summary judgment is warranted on all the other claims. First, no independent substantive due process claim exists because the Fourth Amendment provides the source for a claim under Section 1983 for all of the alleged conduct. Second, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that there was, at a minimum, arguable probable cause to arrest Jackson under a theory of constructive possession for the drugs found during the search and, thus, the false arrest and imprisonment claim cannot survive summary judgment against Richert because he is entitled to qualified immunity. Third, plaintiffs point to no evidence that vitiated the probable cause during the prosecution and, thus, Richert is also entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim. Fourth, the malicious abuse of process claim cannot survive summary judgment because there is no evidence from which a rational jury could find a collateral objective by Richert and, in any event, Richert is entitled to qualified immunity. Fifth, the equal protection claim cannot survive summary judgment because, inter alia, there is insufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find that any racial or other discriminatory animus motivated Richert’s (or any other officer’s) actions. Finally, there is no evidence that a municipal policy, custom, or failure to train caused any injury and, thus, the municipal liability claims against the County and the Town of Southold cannot survive summary judgment.
I. Baokground
A. Facts
The following facts are taken from the parties’ depositions, declarations, exhibits, and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Capobianco v. City of New York,
1. The Task Force
The East End Drug Task Force is a multi-jurisdictional task force funded by the District Attorney’s Office. (Southold Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 1.) The parties dispute whether Richert, a SPD Officer, was under the Task Force’s exclusive control, command, and supervision while he was assigned to it from June 2010 to July 2013, such that Southold cannot be municipally liable in this case regardless of Richert’s potential liability.
According to the Southold Defendants, from on or about June 1, 2010, through August 1, 2011, Richert was supervised by and reported to Suffolk County Senior In'vestigator James McAllister (“McAllis-ter”), and James Rodden (“Rodden”) of the Task Force. (Id. ¶ 4.) From on or about August 1, 2011, through July 1, 2013, Richert was supervised by, and reported to, Suffolk County Senior Investigator Robert Flood, Rodden, and Senior Probation Officer Gil Maldonado (“Maldonado”) of the Task Force. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs argue that Richert, who they claim led'the searches at issue, was wearing an SPD badge, was paid by Southold, and was
2. The June 3, 2011 Search
On June 2, 2011, Richert obtained a search warrant on behalf of the Task Force for the Jacksons’ home at 115 Broad Street. {Id. ¶ 24.) Suffolk County Court Judge James Doyle issued the warrant, which, per an affidavit from Richert, stemmed from Jeffrey’s sales of cocaine to an undercover informant on two prior occasions. {Id. ¶¶ 25, 26; see June 3, 2011 Search Warrant, Southold Defs.’ Ex. K.) Judge Doyle found probable cause to search for cocaine, currency, books and records reflecting illicit drug transactions, drug paraphernalia, and indicia of knowing possession, ownership, and/or control of the contraband and premises. (Southold Defs.’56.1 ¶ 28.)
The Suffolk County Police Emergency Services (“SCPES”) and the Task Force, supervised by McAllister, executed the warrant on June 3, 2011. {Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) According to Richert, SCPES would “actually execute the search warrant, make the building or residence or whatever we have the warrant for the safe place,” and then Task Force officers would “do the search, actual searching.” (Richert Dep. at 19-20.) When asked whether he led the search, Richert stated that “[t]he bosses [McAllister, and Sinning for SPD] are in charge. I tell them what I think, I think we should do this or go here, you know, we keep the bosses abreast of what’s going on through the whole investigation.” {Id. at 38.) Then, the searching officers “usually divide up the house and have partners or groups of people search room by room.” {Id. at 39.) Because Richert procured the warrant, he assisted in coordinating the officers’ assignments. {See id. at 43.) He did not remember what rooms he searched. {Id.) During the search, officers found marijuana in the pocket of a jacket in a basement closet, illegal drugs in a wall clock, cash, a digital scale, a handgun holster, and a shotgun. (Southold Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 56.) Jeffrey also gave a written statement to Richert admitting that he had been dealing illegal drugs for two years and that any drugs found in the house during the search belonged to him. {Id. ¶ 57.) The Task Force arrested Jeffrey and charged him with drug possession with intent to sell. {Id. ¶ 59.) Plaintiffs were not arrested. {Id. ¶ 60.) Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that the Task Force unreasonably destroyed and handled property during the search, and made improper comments to Jackson.
After entering the residence to conduct the search, SCPES immediately handcuffed the Jacksons.
Richert testified that he would describe the officers’ conduct during the search as professional and consistent with the training he had received. (Richert Dep. at 43-44.) He testified that nothing was intentionally broken or destroyed (at least without a particular reason, such as when a drug-detecting dog mistakenly indicated that a cooler belonging to the Jacksons contained drugs, and officers ripped it open). (Id. at 44-45.) He did not remember anyone throwing food into the driveway, breaking glass, or scratching antique bowls. (Id. at 45-46.) He testified that he did not see anyone wearing Jeffrey’s motorcycle gear, did not wear Jeffrey’s clothing, did not rip up a mortgage application or throw mortgage papers on the floor, did not laugh after being told the Jacksons were applying for a mortgage, and did not suggest they would not qualify for a mortgage. (Southold Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 41-44.) According to Richett, he also did not believe that they were receiving Section 8 housing assistance, nor did he ask the Jacksons whether they were, or suggest that they were receiving such assistance.
Jackson, on the other hand, testified that officers, including Richert, “just started destroying things” during the search. (Jackson Dep. at 96.) She claims she saw officers moving Jeffrey’s clothes (id); put on his motorcycle jacket and a hat (id at 97); and take pictures of the person wearing the coat (id at 99-100).
(1) Her kitchen was “totally destroyed,” with cabinet doors broken, drawers removed and broken in half, and food strewn on the floor.
(2) Officers tore apart the living room, furniture was flipped upside down with the bottoms cut out, and a room divider was ripped in half.
(3) Jeffrey’s clothes were in a bathtub.
(4) In the finished basement, carpeting was ripped up, furniture was flipped upside down and cut open, a big screen TV was on the floor (undamaged), and doors were off their hinges.
(5) Ceramic bowls and other items were broken in half and thrown out in the driveway, and glass frames were broken.
(6) An unidentified officer saw Jackson’s mortgage application and told her, “Your mortgage will never happen anyway, that’s never gonna happen.” (Jackson .thought the officer said this because she is black, although the officer did not reference her race in any specific way.)
(Id. at 105, 116, 124-28, 138-39.)
Plaintiffs also assert that, on July 22, 2011, Jeffrey’s attorney wrote to SPD complaining about the search. (Opp’n, at 4.) This letter is not in evidence. Richert testified that he was told there was a complaint, but he “was never told exactly what happened or what it was over.” (Ric-hert Dep. at 60.) Sinning also was not aware of the particulars of such a complaint. (Sinning Dep. at 59-60, 67-68
3. The February 17, 2012 Search
After his release, Jeffery sold cocaine to an undercover informant on two more occasions before the February 2012 search. (Southold Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 61.) On February 15, 2012, Richert obtained a search warrant on behalf of the Task Force for the Jacksons’ home at 8100 Main Street. (Id. ¶ 62; see February 17, 2012 Search Warrant, Southold Defs. Ex. O.) The court found probable cause to search for cocaine, currency, books and records reflecting illicit drug transactions, drug paraphernalia, and indicia of knowing possession, ownership and/or control of the contraband and premises. (Southold Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 63-64.)
SCPES executed this warrant, and the officers reported to Flood and Maldonado. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Sinning was not present, and he was unfamiliar with the search. (Sinning Dep. at 60, 71-72.) Southampton Town Police Officer Steven Rios found marijuana and cocaine in the pocket of a jacket hanging in a closet in the dining room. (Southold Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 72, 74.) Jeffrey did not admit that the drugs belonged to him. (Id. ¶ 75.) The Task Force then arrested both Jackson and her husband.
The parties dispute the propriety of Jackson’s arrest. Plaintiffs assert that Richert testified that he knew nothing the officers would find would belong to Jackson. (E.g. Pis.’ 56.1 ¶ 74.) Richert, however, testified that he did not “believe” Jackson to be a suspect and that he did not believe he would find anything, as far as contraband, belonging to her in the house. (Richert Dep. at 83.) He also stated, “I believe it could have just as easily been hers as it could have been his. The first time I arrested him from the June search warrant he openly admitted that the drugs were his in the house and he did not openly, he would not say the drugs were his this time.” (Id. at 85.) Richert did not know whose jacket it was. (Id. at 74.)
4. Training
Richert and Sinning attended the Suffolk County Police Academy (“SCPA”), which trains officers on, inter alia, the proper method for executing search warrants; citizens’ constitutional rights (including those related to search and seizure); and diversity, sensitivity, and law enforcement’s relationship to minority communities. (Id. ¶¶ 77, 80-81, 84-85, 88-89.) Richert explained that Southold does not have its own search warrant or Emergency Services team, and he learned the basics of search warrants from the SCPA and SPD’s procedures while on the job. (See Richert Dep. at 18.) He received no official training from SPD about executing search warrants or racial sensitivity. (Id. at 19, 23.) The Task Force also provided no formal training on the initial execution of a search warrant (the activities by SCPES). (Id.) Instead, officers were assigned to a more seasoned individual and “you kind of stayed by their side until you found your way as to how to search, what you were allowed to do and how to handle yourself.” (Id. at 20.) Sinning testified . that he received training in legal aspects for search warrants from the District Attorney’s Office, took an advanced criminal investigation course, was trained in diver
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on January 23, 2013, and the amended complaint on April 11, 2013. The Southold Defendants answered on May 2, 2013, and the County Defendants answered on May 3, 2013. Defendants filed their respective motions for summary judgment on May 28, 2014; plaintiffs filed their opposition on July 1, 2014; and defendants filed their respective replies on July 14, 2014. The Court heard oral argument on September 3, 2014. On September 10, 2014, plaintiffs submitted a letter to address an issue the Court had raised at oral argument. The Court has fully considered the submissions of the parties.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for summary judgment is well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady,
Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party “‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Caldarola v. Calabrese,
III. Discussion
To prevail on a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws; (2) by a person acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James,
As an initial matter, a “substantive due process analysis is not available where a more specific constitutional standard is directly applicable.” Hickey v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 6506(GEL),
Moreover, “the use of vile and abusive language, no matter how abhorrent or reprehensible, cannot form the basis for a § 1983 claim.” Keyes v. City of
A. Unlawful Search on June 8, 2011
Defendants move for summary judgment on the unlawful search and seizure claim against them on the grounds that they had probable cause to search and that they lawfully executed the search. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Task Force had probable cause to search the home or that the warrant was valid, but argue that the manner and scope of the search was improper. Specifically, they contend that summary judgment is inappropriate because Jackson was left handcuffed in her
“The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies not only to prevent searches and seizures that would be unreasonable if conducted at all, but also to ensure reasonableness in the manner and scope of searches and seizures that are carried out, whether pursuant to a warrant or under ‘exigent circumstances.’ ” Ochoa v. City of W. Haven, No. 3:08-cv-00024(DJS),
First, even though Richert believed that Jackson was not a suspect, it was not unreasonable, in the interest of safety, for the officers to detain and handcuff her and Elijah during the search. “Officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Muehler v. Mena,
Second, with respect to the allegedly excessive property destruction, the Court recognizes that “[s]ome property damage caused during a lawful search is not per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Koller v. Hilderbrand,
Here, plaintiffs do not claim that the search was overly long or that the officers unreasonably prolonged it in the hopes of discovering contraband. There also is no evidence that the officers destroyed or damaged any of Elijah’s property, warranting summary judgment to defendants on his claim. Instead, the key question concerns Richert’s and the officers’ actions throughout the rest of the home. The photographs taken by plaintiffs show flipped and cut furniture, a disassembled coat rack, property strewn across the floor of the basement, damage to ceramic bowls and a bird feeder stand, damage to picture frames, a scratched end table, and marks to backs of leather furniture. Jackson identified the photographs, damage, and disarray depicted during her deposition. (See Jackson Dep. at 263-305.) Further, although Richert testified that the execution of the search was in line with his training and previous experiences, Jackson testified that he destroyed items in her home unnecessarily. Moreover, on the issue of personal involvement, Richert testified that he helped coordinate the search, even though he was not the primary supervisor.
Although the Court recognizes that searches for contraband generally are comprehensive and may necessarily entail some property destruction to find hidden contraband, “establishing as a matter of law that property damaged in the course of a search was the result of reasonable and nonmalieious police action presents a difficult task at the summary judgment stage.” Koller,
In sum, these factual disputes need to be resolved by a jury in this case in order to determine the reasonableness of the scope and manner of the execution of the search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment as to Jackson’s unlawful search claim against Richert relating to the June 3, 2011 search.
B. False Arrest and Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution
Defendants move for summary judgment on the false arrest and false imprisonment claims on the grounds that the police had probable cause to arrest Jackson. “Claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution, brought under § 1983 to vindicate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, are ‘substantially the same’ as claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution under state law.” Jocks v. Tavernier,
To prevail on a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1). the defendant intended to confine [her], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Broughton v. New York,
“In general, probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Weyant,
Even if a state actor deprives an individual of his constitutional rights, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields that government official from civil liability if his “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
“The availability of the defense depends on whether a reasonable officer could have believed his action to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information he possessed.” Weyant,
Arguable probable cause exists when a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well established law. It is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials — like other officials who act in ways they believe to be lawful— should not be held personally liable.
Cerrone v. Brown,
In the instant case, defendants argue that there was probable cause to arrest Jackson under a theory of constructive possession because of the following: (1) she resided at the house; (2) officers discovered drugs in a jacket pocket in a dining room closet; (3) the officers could not determine to whom the drugs belonged, and Jeffrey did not admit the drugs belonged to him; and (4) there was probable cause to believe that both Jackson and her husband had a sufficient level of control over the area where the narcotics were found. Jackson counters that Richert testified that he knew all of the evidence would relate to Jeffrey and that he believed nothing the officers would find in the house belonged to Jackson; after the first search, a written complaint was made about the search; and the officers made racist statements during the first search. Plaintiffs’ arguments are unconvincing.
Here, based upon the undisputed facts, Richert, at a minimum, had arguable probable cause to arrest Jackson and, thus, is entitled to qualified immunity. As a threshold matter, although plaintiff argues that Richert’s subjective motivations or beliefs undermine the probable cause for the arrest, it is well settled that the officers’ subjective motivation for the arrest is irrelevant to the probable cause determination. See Arkansas v. Sullivan,
The Court recognizes that some courts have suggested that probable cause may not exist based upon residency alone, if the contraband was inside clothing in a common area, rather than in plain view. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz,
Moreover, the cases where no probable cause has been found are factually distinguishable from the instant case. For example, in Ortiz, the gun was found inside the breast pocket of a man’s coat in a closed closet, but the defendant also admitted to the officers that the closet housed his possessions. Thus, the court determined that there would be no probable cause to arrest the defendant’s elderly aunt.
In addition, in the instant case, Richert had found drugs and a gun in a search of a prior residence shared by Jackson and Jeffrey less than a year earlier. That prior search gave Richert additional basis to believe that Jackson had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, contraband in common areas of the house. In Caraballo v. City of New York, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity in connection with a false arrest claim arising from arrest of residents of an apartment in which drugs were found. The Second Circuit explained:
The undisputed facts establish that plaintiffs were sleeping in a small apartment in which police found drugs on more than one occasion, including at the time of the arrest, and that [the officers] found suspected MDMA in a common area of that apartment. These circumstances were arguably sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that the plaintiffs were [sic] had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the suspected contraband, and thus to provide arguable probable cause for plaintiffs’ arrest and temporary imprisonment. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[i]f judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to
In short, although the right to be free from unlawful search and seizure was clearly established as a general proposition, it would not be clear to a reasonable officer, based upon language in both federal and state decisions on constructive possession discussed above, that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted by Richert in connection with the arrest of Jackson. In other words, based upon the undisputed facts, officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether probable cause existed to arrest Jackson on a theory of constructive possession. Thus, this Court cannot say, even assuming arguendo that Richert lacked probable cause, that the unlawfulness of his conduct was apparent in light of pre-existing law. See Anderson v. Creighton,
2. Malicious Prosecution
“Because there are no federal rules of decision for adjudicating § 1983 actions that are based upon claims of malicious prosecution, [courts] are required by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to turn to state law — in this case, New York state law- — for such rules.” Conway,
According to plaintiffs, the case against Jackson was dismissed in November 2012. In the instant case, only the final two elements are in dispute in connection with the motion. As to the third element, the 'Second Circuit has held,
Under New York law, even when probable cause is present at the time of arrest, evidence could later surface which would eliminate that probable cause.... In order for probable cause to dissipate, the groundless nature of the charges must be made apparent by the discoveryof some intervening fact.... The New York Court of Appeals has noted that the failure to make a further inquiry when a reasonable person would have done so may be evidence of lack of probable cause.
Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga,
In this case, there is no contention by the plaintiffs that any evidence came to light after the arrest of Jackson (i.e., during the commencement or continuation of the prosecution) that undermined the probable cause assessment that was made by Richert at the time of the arrest. Under such circumstances (i.e., no contention of new evidence between arrest and prosecution), for the same reasons that Richert is entitled to qualified immunity for the false arrest/imprisonment claims, he also is entitled to qualified immunity for the malicious prosecution claims. See, e.g., Roberts ex rel. Estate of Roberts v. Lapp,
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim.
C. Malicious Abuse of Process
In order to establish liability for malicious abuse of process under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish the claim’s elements under state law as well as the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Cook v. Sheldon,
Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted because, inter alia, plaintiffs did not plead what the “collateral objective” was nor adduce evidence of the same. The opposition does not address this claim. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any evidence in support of the abuse of process claim. Even assuming arguendo that the alleged collateral objective was to punish Jackson for her complaint, there is no evidence to support that conclusory contention.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to defendants on the abuse of process claim.
D. Equal Protection
In order to hold any defendant liable for intentional discrimination under Section 1983, plaintiffs must provide proof of the defendant’s discriminatory intent. See Reynolds v. Barrett,
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because there is no evidence of any selective application of state law against plaintiffs based on impermissible considerations or from bad faith. Plaintiffs do not address the merits of the equal protection arguments in their opposition, and there is no evidence that any actions were undertaken with purposeful discrimination, any selective treatment compared to any other similarly situated parties, any intent to punish, or any intent to inhibit the exercise of any constitutional rights. Moreover, the record is devoid of
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to defendants on the equal protection claim.
E. Municipal Liability
Plaintiffs also seek to hold the municipal defendants liable for any misconduct by the Task Force’s officers. As set forth below, the Court concludes that these claims cannot survive summary judgment.
The Supreme Court has explained that a municipal entity may be held liable under Section 1983 where a plaintiff demonstrates that the constitutional violation complained of was caused by a municipal “policy or custom.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of N.Y.C.,
With respect to the County and Southold, plaintiffs argue that they should be held liable because (1) Richert testified that he received no formal training on the execution of search warrants prior to or during his work with the Task Force; (2) there have been widespread allegations and reports of discriminatory policing by the County Defendants, leading to a settlement with the Department of Justice; (3) the Southold Defendants also controlled Richert’s actions, and any argument that there is no evidence of a discriminatory policy, custom, or failure to train by Southold is belied by the fact that Sinning was the subject of a lawsuit alleging mistreatment by a black citizen and yet did not receive training in response, and Richert did not recall receiving any training on racial issues, either.
“The failure to train or supervise [municipal] employees may constitute an official policy or custom if the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of those with whom the [municipal] employees interact.” Wray v. City of New York,
Turning to the case at bar, there is an absence of any evidence of an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom by either municipal defendant, or a failure to supervise or train, as it relates to the issues in this-case. Plaintiffs’ complaint and opposition merely contain vague and conclusory assertions that the County and Southold should have known that officers would encounter these situations, and that they did not adequately train officers to respond. These assertions, without any actual supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.
First, plaintiffs point to no actual policy or custom to execute more searches against black residents or any other residents in an unconstitutional manner, or any evidence from which such policy or custom could be inferred. Plaintiffs have not even alleged that officers acted in an unconstitutional manner during the second search. Second, Richert testified that he received formal training at the SCPA regarding the execution of search warrant and relationships with minority communities, and on-the-job training from SPD and the Task Force. Sinning received similar training. As noted supra, “ ‘a single incident is generally insufficient to demonstrate liability under a failure to train theory.’” Perez v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. 10-CV-2697 RRM RML,
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to the municipal defendants on the Monell claim.
IV. ConClusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants summary judgment to defendants on all claims except Jackson’s unlawful search claim against defendant Richert in connection with the June 3, 2011 search.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Plaintiffs did not contest the County Defendants’ argument that the Task Force is within the District Attorney’s Office, an administrative arm of the County that is not amenable to suit (County Defs.’ Mem., at 1-2 (citing Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t,
. Sinning assisted in searching Elijah’s bedroom. (Southold Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 14.) He did not destroy or damage any property during his search. {Id. ¶ 37.)
. As a threshold matter, Elijah did not testify that he suffered emotional or physical injuries because of the search. (See Southold Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 61.) Plaintiffs purport to dispute this fact because Carolyn Peabody, Elijah’s "treating therapist,” "will testify that he suffered emotional injuries.” (Pis.’ 56.1 ¶ 60.) Plaintiffs have not introduced her testimony into the record, and their unsupported assertion, therefore, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact, particularly in light of Elijah’s absence during the search. Elijah even testified that, after the search, he did not see any mental health professional or have any problems “in terms of fears, panics, nightmares, things of that nature.” (Elijah Dep. at 52-53.) When asked what the "emotional harm has been” to him from both searches, he stated, "Mostly just, just, I just really feel, felt bad for my mother for what she went through, there wasn't really, there wasn't really much that happened to me, I wasn't there.” (Id. at 95.) In any event, as discussed supra, the only portion of this claim that survives summary judgment is the purported damage to Jackson's property. There is no remaining claim as to the legality of the entry into the residence, or any claim that Elijah’s property was destroyed. Thus, given there is no evidence from which a rational jury could find that Elijah’s constitutional rights were violated, he can have no claim for emotional harm from the search.
. Section 8 provides rental subsidies to eligible applicants. See Subsidized Rental Opportunities, Suffolk County Government, http:// www.suffolkcountyny.gov/Departments/ EconomicDevelopmentandPlanning/Housing AffordableandWorkforce/Renters/Subsidized RentalOpportunities.
. Sinning also testified that he did not wear Jeffrey’s clothing, or mock Jeffrey, or dance during the search, or see anyone wear Jeffrey's clothing or motorcycle gear, or mock Jeffrey, dance, rip up a mortgage application, believe or suggest or ask whether the Jack-sons were receiving Section 8 assistance, or hear anyone ask Jackson if she was receiving Section 8 assistance. (Southold Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 45-54.)
. Suffolk County Deputy Sheriff Investigator Guy Valerioti ("Valerioti”), a member of the Task Force, photographed the search. (Sout-hold Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 15-16.) Defendants assert that all photographs were for the sole purpose of recording evidence and documenting the search. (Id. ¶ 17; see, e.g., Richert Dep. at 48 (testifying that, to his knowledge, no personal photographs were taken for purposes other than recording evidence or documenting what was done in the search).) Valerioti’s photographs, however, are not in evidence. Exhibit B to the County Defendants’ motion is pho'tographs taken by plaintiffs, which depict shattered ceramic bowls, overturned bricks, broken tables and doors, broken coat hangers, overturned and torn furniture, the opened cooler, strewn objects, and other items. (See also Jackson Dep. at 263-305.)
. Elijah was not handcuffed; instead, he was escorted from the premises ten minutes after SCPES entered, and his cousin picked him up. (Southold Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 66-67.) Elijah tías not claimed any emotional or physical injuries stemming from the search, none of his belongings were damaged, and he did not witness the search. (Id. ¶¶ 69-70.)
. Plaintiffs contend this fact is disputed because Sinning testified that he was the subject of a federal lawsuit alleging mistreatment of a black man, but did not receive any diversity training in response. (Pis.' 56.1 ¶¶ 87-91.) The testimony, however, does not reveal the outcome or circumstances of that lawsuit.
. In the alternative, the Court concludes that Richert is entitled to summary judgment on this claim on qualified immunity grounds. According to the Second Circuit, government actors may be shielded from liability for civil damages if their "conduct did not violate plaintiff's clearly established rights, or if it would have been objectively reasonable for the official .to believe that his conduct did not violate plaintiff's rights.” Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk,
. Jackson also testified that, during the search, Officer Richert kept demanding to know where the drugs were, and that the officers were "threatening me telling me that he’s going to bust up my TVs, put holes in the walls and a bunch of stuff.” (Jackson Dep. 114.) Jackson further testified that they said they were "gonna destroy everything I had.” (Id. at 115.)
. Summary judgment also is not appropriate on qualified immunity grounds because the factual disputes discussed above, regarding Richert's alleged conduct during the search and whether there was gratuitous and/or malicious property damage, are also relevant to the determination of whether it was objectively reasonable for him to believe his acts were lawful. See, e.g., Pooler v. Hempstead Police Dep’t,
. "The same holds true for the false imprisonment claims because, under New York law, the claim is identical to a false arrest claim....” Kilburn v. Vill. of Saranac Lake,
. The jacket was a Harley Davidson jacket, but the officer testified that he did not know whose jacket it was. In particular, he noted that he had seen both Jeffrey and Jackson on Jeffrey's motorcycle in the past. (Richert Dep. at 73-75.) Moreover, although Richert testified that (going into the search) he did not believe Jackson was a suspect and believed nothing the officers would find would be Jackson’s, he also explained that (after discovering the drugs) he believed that it could have just as easily been Jeffrey Jackson's jacket as Julie Jackson's jacket. (Id. at 85-86).
. In the alternative, the Court also concludes that Richert would be entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious abuse of process claims. As discussed supra, the uncontrovert-ed evidence demonstrates that, at the very least, "officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Jenkins v. City of New York,
. For example, in Canton, the Supreme Court hypothesized that a municipality's decision not to train its police • officers on the constitutional limits to the use of deadly force “could properly be characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional rights” because the need for such training is "so obvious.”
. To the extent that plaintiffs are seeking to base the Monell claim on the malicious prosecution or abuse of process claims, the Monell claim fails for the same reasons — that is, there is no evidence of a municipal policy or deliberate indifference to a need for training that could support a rational finding by a jury in favor of plaintiffs on those issues.
. Because the Court resolves the issue on these grounds, it does not address the Sout-hold Defendants’ argument that Richert was under the Task Force’s exclusive control and supervision.