1 Wend. 388 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1828
It appears to me, that the material question to be considered in this case is, whether, in order to constitute a forfeiture, there must be both a refusal to pay the debts, and proof that the grantor was put to costs, trouble or expense. The remaining questions are not attended with difficulty. In the first place, here was a debt claimed to be due from the grantor, which was disputed and payment refused. It cannot be the fair construction of the covenant, to deny the right of questioning the justice of the demand; consequently, the grantee had a right to insist that the demand be established. The parties selected the forum, and submitted to arbitrators. They adjudged the note to be a valid existing demand, to the amount of $650. After this was done, the grantee, according to the plain intent of the covenant, ought to have paid ; for it was no longer competent to deny the validity of the debt. It was not pretended that payment was then, or at any subsequent period made. If this had been relied on, it was the duty of the grantee, or those who represented him, to have established the fact; but they have not done so. Here, then, so far as depended on a refusal or neglect to pay, the condition was broken. The lessor had, then, his election, either to insist on a forfeiture, (provided non-payment merely was a sufficient ground,) or to waive that remedy until an attempt was made to compel payment, against the grantee by process of law, founded on the award. The latter was elected, and judgment recovered. No execution appears to have been issued. Why there were no further proceedings after judgment, is not stated : nor is it material; for the neglect or refusal to pay, which existed at the time the award was made, continued when the judgment was rendered. The lessor, then, elected to pursue the other remedy, which is the present action. The grantee of the father having conveyed to the defendant, the suit is necessarily against him. If enough has been shewn to eiltitle the lessor to recover, had the first grantee 'continued in possession, it is sufficient as against the defendant. He succeeded to the rights of his grantor, and no more. He represents him ; and for the purpose of this suit, stands in his place. In law, there is a privity of estate
Having thus disposed of the minor questions, I. will briefly consider the legal effect and operation of the covenant inserted in the deed. It will be perceived, that according to the view taken, there has been a neglect or refusal to pay, and consequently the question is narrowed down to this: whether it was also necessary to have shewn the further fact, that the grantor had been put to costs, trouble or expense 2 If this be indispensable, there has been no forfeiture; for it is not alleged, that a demand of any kind was ever made on the father. In courts of law, it is a well settled rule in the construction of covenants of this description, to lean against that interpretation which creates a forfeiture, if admissible from the words of the instrument. To give effect to this rule, the whole instrument must be considered, as well as the particular clause relied on. On looking at the deed, it is evident the grantor intended that the grantee should hold the estate, if he paid the debts and supported the grantor in the manner stipulated. On the supposition that the word “ and” is to be understood as a copulative, and not a disjunctive, then it follows, that in addition to the neglect or refusal to pay, tire grantor must have been put to costs, trouble and expense. This part of the condition was probably inserted, to guard against the anxiety and vexation that a law suit might occasion to a person enfeebled by age and infirmities. .If it be so, this part seems to apply to the grantor personally, and for his protection merely, and therefore ceased to operate after his death. His representatives do not, appear to be within
But if I am in error as to the construction given, then the question arises, whether the word “ and” is not used in the sense of “ or,” thus putting the forfeiture on either of these grounds, viz. refusal to pay, or being put to costs, or in not affording a maintenance. It is well settled at the present day, although for a long time a vexata queslio in England, that the grammatical sense is not to be adhered to, either in a will or deed, where a contrary intent is apparent. The case of Jackson v. Blanchan, (6 Johns. R. 54,) where the authorities are reviewed, seems to be decisive on this point. The case arose on a will, but the authorities cited shew that the principle applies equally to deeds. In Wright v. Kemp, (3 D. & E. 470,) the question came up on a surrender of copyhold premises. Lord Kenyon observed, that in deeds,
In this view of the subject, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.