1 Bur. 24 | Wis. | 1841
By an act of congress, entitled “ An act to continue in force certain acts for the adjustment of land claims in the Territory of Michigan,” approved February 21,1823, claims to certain lands therein referred to were confirmed. The acts referred to are an act of congress entitled “An act regulating grants of land in the Territory of Michigan,” approved March 3, 1807 ; an act approved April 23, 1812, entitled “ An act to authorize the granting of patents to land according to the surveys that have, been made, and to grant donation rights to certain claimants of land in the district of Detroit,” etc. ; also, an act entitled “An act to revive the powers of the commissioners for ascertaining and deciding on claims to land in the district of Detroit, and for settling the claims to land at Green Bay and Prairie du Chien, in the Territory of Michigan,” approved May 11, 1820. Land was granted, under these acts, to every person or persons in the actual possession, occupancy and improvement of the same in his, her or their own right, etc. By the third section of the said act of congress, approved February 21, 1823, the land, of which the lot in question is a part, was confirmed to the said Pierre Qrignon, as appears by the recital in the patent. Said third section is as follows: “ That patents shall and they are hereby directed' to be issued in the mode pointed out by law in other cases, to persons whose claims to land, town or village lots have been regularly filed with the commissioners appointed by an act entitled £ An act to revive the powers of the commissioners for ascertaining and deciding on claims to land in the district of Detroit, and for settling the claims to lands at Green Bay and Prairie du Chien, in the Territory of Michigan, passed on the eleventh day of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty,’ and whose claims are contained in the report transmitted to the secretary of the treasury, and which have been reported favorably on by said commissioners, and such persons are hereby confirmed in their claims,” etc.
The defendants gave in evidence the record of letters of administration on the estate of said Pierre (Orignon, deceased, granted by John Law, judge of probate, to Paul Griignon, on the 21st day of June, 1824; and also the record of the official bond given by said administrator, approved and filed by said judge of probate on the same day.
The defendants then offered in evidence the following, contained in a bools purporting to be minutes of the proceedings of the county court of Brown county. Mr. Childs, the clerk of the district court, having been- examined thereto, stated, that he received this book purporting to be the records of the county court of Brown county. The said county court having been abolished, and the records and papers of said court passed into the hands of the clerk of the district court of said county.
“At a session of the county court for the county of Brown, begun and held at the township of Grreen Bay, in the school-house, on Tuesday, the tenth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-six; present, the Hon. James Porlier, Chief, and John Law, Esq.,
“The petition of Paul Grignon, administrator of the estate of Pierre Grignon, late of the county of Brown, deceased, was filed by his attorney, H. S. Baird, praying for an order from the court to authorize him to dispose of the real estate of said Pierre. In consideration of the facts alleged in said petition, and for divers other good and sufficient reasons, it is ordered that he be empowered as aforesaid. Minutes read, corrected and signed, by order of the court.
“ Robert Irwin, Jr., Cleric. ”
The reading of which in evidence was objected to by plaintiffs, and admitted by the court.
The defendants next offered in evidence a bond and oath of said administrator, to make sale of said real estate according to the statute, dated and filed with the judge of probate, April 20, 1826; which was also objected to by plaintiffs, and admitted by the court.
The defendants next offered, and were allowed, to prove by H. S. Baird, Esq. (plaintiffs objecting thereto), that a notice of sale of said premises by said administrator was contained in a newspaper called the “ Michigan Herald,” in seven weekly numbers, commencing on the 16th day of March, 1826, and ending on the 26th day of April, in the same year, and a copy of said newspaper for each week containing said notice was produced and read. Witness was further allowed to state as follows: “I cannot state that I put up any notices of sale, but that I drew the notices I am positive. I think I drew five copies of the notice which has been read from the newspaper. I cannot say they were put up in the township. There was at that time but one township in the county. ”
John P. Arndt, Esq., another witness, testified that he saw a notice of sale of lands of Pierre Grignon, deceased, posted up in the township, and thinks it was at his house at Green Bay, in the fore part of the year 1826. All of which was objected to by plaintiffs.
Defendants then gave in evidence a deed from Augustin Grignon to John Jacob Astor and others, conveying the premises in question, dated November 5, 1834, and recorded, and followed that by a conveyance from said Astor and others to Linus Thompson, one of the defendants, for the lot in question, bearing date January 8, 1836.
It is unnecessary to notice the different reasons of the plaintiff’s counsel for objecting to the testimony on the part of the defendants, as they are embraced in the points put to the court and in the errors assigned.
The counsel for the lessors of the plaintiff requested the court to give to the jury the following instructions, and the jury were instructed by the court thereon, as follows:
1. That, if the jury believe from the evidence that the lessors of the plaintiff are heirs at law of Pierre Qrignon, deceased, or have shown a regular conveyance from the heirs at law to themselves of the premises in question, before the commencement of this suit, then the defendants can claim no title under the sale of the premises in question, made by Paul Grignon as administrator of the estate of Pierre Qrignon, deceased, by virtue of the order made by the county court of Brown county, on the 10th day of January, 1826, unless the jury are satisfied that the representation made by the administrator to the said court, to obtain the order or license of the said court for the sale of the said premises, was accompanied with a certificate from the judge of probate
2. That the said order or license of the said county court for the said sale, unless the said court had been furnished with the said certificate of the judge of probate, is null and void as against the heirs at law of Pierre Orignon, who have not acquiesced in the said sale, made by the administrator, under and by virtue of said order.
To the said two points the court answered as follows: Ás the county court had jurisdiction of this subject, we are to infer that these things were shown to said court.
3. That the said county court had no power or jurisdiction to make the said order of sale, without the said certificate of the said judge of probate.
To which the judge answered that the certificate of the judge of probate was not necessary to give the court jurisdiction ; it was required as evidence.
4. It must appear affirmatively to the jury that the said county court, at the time of making the said order for sale of said premises, had before them the said certificate of the said judge of probate, at the time of making the said order or granting the said license for the sale of the premises in question, or the said order of sale is void as against the heirs at law of Pierre Orignon, deceased, who had not acquiesced in the sale, and those claiming under them.
To which the court answered, that the judgment of the county court, having jurisdiction, is conclusive on this point.
To which the court answered, that the county court having jurisdiction of this subject its judgment is conclusive.
6. Unless the jury believe, from the evidence, that the said administrator, before the sale of the premises, gave thirty days’ public notice, by posting up notifications of such sale in the township where the lands lie, as well as where the said deceased last dwelt, and in the two next adjoining townships, or caused the printing of such notification for three successive weeks, in such gazette or newspaper as the court which authorized the sale ordered and directed, the sale was void as against the heirs of said deceased and those claiming under them.
To which the court instructed the jury : This is a fact for the jury, and you must find that the advertisement substantially complied with the law, or the sale is void.
7. That it must appear affirmatively that the administrator, before making sale of said premises, did, literally and strictly, comply with the provisions of said statute, in relation to posting up or publishing the said notice of sale, or the said sale was void as against the heirs of Pierre Qrignon, who have not acquiesced in the same.
To which the court directed the jury: That a substan
8. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that Peter B. Grignon, one of the lessors of the plaintiff, is one of the heirs at law of said deceased, and was a minor at the time of making the said order of sale, and at the time of said sale, a guardian should have been appointed to represent him, according to law, and if no such guardian was appointed, the said sale was void as to him and those claiming under him.
To which the court answered: It was necessary and proper that if a minor, he should be notified by guardian, but in this issue the presumption is that he was. This is a fact that he might controvert on an appeal.
9. Unless the defendants in this case have proven affirmatively to the jury, that the administrator of the deceased strictly complied with all the provisions of said statute, in obtaining the order for sale, and in making the said sale, that the defendants in this suit can acquire no title to the premises in question, under said sale, as against the lessors of the plaintiff, if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the lessors of the plaintiff are the heirs at law of said Pierre Grignon, deceased, or derived title from the heirs at law.
To which the court responded to the jury: The court charge the jury that they are bound to consider in this collateral issue that the judgment or order of the county court of Brown county, ordering the sale, was made upon sufficient and proper evidence, and that it had every thing requisite before it to authorize it to make the order for the sale, and that the judgment of that court is conclusive, until reversed.
The statute in force provided that, when the goods and chattels belonging to the estate of any deceased person shall not be sufficient to answer his just debts, upon representation thereof, and the same being made to appear to the supreme judicial court, or to the county court in the county where the deceased person last dwelt,
When it shall be necessary that he should be empowered to sell some part of the real estate for the payment of debts, and that the same shall be represented and made to appear to either of the aforesaid courts on petition and declaration filed and duly proved therein by the said executors or administrators, the said courts respectively may authorize and empower such executor or administrator to sell and convey the whole, or so much of the real estate as shall be most to the interest and benefit of the parties concerned therein, etc. The said executors or administrators shall first give bonds with sufficient sureties to the judge of probate, for the county where the deceased testator or intestate last dwelt and his estate was inventoried, that he will observe the rules and directions of law for the sale of real estate by executors and administrators.
The questions to be decided by this court may be reduced to the following:
1. Had Pierre Grignon, at the time of his death, such an interest in the lands in controversy as was the subject of sale by his administrator for the payment of his just debts ?
2. Had the county court of Brown county jurisdiction of the subject-matter so far as to order the sale of a decedent’s lands for the payment of debts ? If so, should the sale made in this case be disturbed in this collateral suit, if it does not appear that all the facts and evidence required by the statute were laid before the county court; that previous notice to all concerned had been given, and that the record of the court had been made up as directed by statute ?
3. Did the court err in its instructions and charge to the jury \
4. Should the plaintiffs recover by virtue of the patent to Pierre Grignon ?
The patent sets forth that the tract of-land, of which the lot of land in dispute is part, was confirmed to Pierre Grignon by the act of congress above referred to, on the 21st day of February, 1823, and the proof is that he died
But the statute was only directory, for the purpose of preventing errors, and it would be against all precedent to declare all the proceedings of that court void because their records were not made out in proper form, examined and attested by the judge, more particularly, fourteen years after the proceedings took place, and after the court has gone out of existence and the property passed
This case is similar to the case of McPherson v. Cunliff, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 426. Here it appears, by the license, to have been represented to the county court by the administrator, that the personal estate of the decedent was insufficient to pay all his just debts, but that the estate will be insolvent, when for the causes aforesaid, and for divers other good and sufficient reasons, the' court thereunto moving, they authorize and empower the administrator to dispose of all the estate of the deceased in the lands therein mentioned. There is no mention made of, or reference to the certificate of the judge of probate, or whether the heirs appeared and consented to the sale, or that notice had been given to them. The law of Pennsylvania provides, “that no orphan’s court shall
The case of Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, refers to the above cases in 11 Serg. & Rawle, and in 11 Mass. See also 4 Cranch. 328; 4 Wheat. 506; 1 Pet. 340; 5 id. 370; 6 id. 729; 1 Yates, 118; 2 Serg. & Rawle, 377; 2 Cranch, 458; 2 Ch. Rep. 405; 3 Serg. & Rawle, 234. Sale held good where it was made by one administrator while there were two in office. 7 Serg. & Rawle, 166. In 1 Conn. 7, Tkumbtixi,, J., says : “A judgment, decree or sentence, or order, passed by a competent jurisdiction, which
The only charge of the district court appears in the answers annexed to the different points presented on behalf of the lessors of the plaintiff. These answers on points of law appear, in the main, to correspond with the doctrines above advanced on the conclusiveness of the order and license of the county court, and the presumptions that should be raised in favor of the purchaser to quiet titles. The point respecting the advertisement of the sale by the administrator was properly left to the jury as a matter of fact, with instructions that a substantial compliance with the statute was sufficient. There was but one township in the county of Brown, and consequently it was impossible for the administrator to comply, literally, with the requisites of the statute in that particular. It could not be expected that a purchaser, after such a lapse of time, should have the duty imposed on him of proving that advertisements were properly put up. It cannot be that the title of a fair purchaser should depend on such perishable testimony. If -it were so, heirs would gain in all instances, by procrastinating their suit until witnesses should die, or be removed beyond the reach of the purchaser.
The question, should the lessors of the plaintiff recover by virtue of the patent to Pierre Grignon f remains to be considered. It will be borne in mind that this land was confirmed to Pierre Grignon by act of congress, on the 21st day of February, 1823, and that by the same act a patent was directed to be issued to him for the same in the usual manner; and that he died on the 4th day of
Note.—The cause was removed to the supreme court of the United States by writ of error, and was argued by Mr. Choate for the plaintiff in error, and Messrs Lord and Crittenden for the defendants in error in 1844, where the judgment of the supreme court of Wisconsin was affirmed. Grignon’s Lessee v. Astor et al., 2 How. 319; and the more important propositions discussed in the opinions delivered in this case were recently re-affirmed in Comstock v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 396.
The case of Grignon’s Lessee v. Astor has became, and been for many years, a leading case in the State and Federal courts upon the effect which is to be given to sales of real estate by administrators and guardians under decrees of probate and county courts, and it has been thought material to report the facts of the case more fully than heretofore. That portion of the opinion which gives a statement and history of the case was prepared by judge Miller, before whom the cause was tried in the district court.
The county court of Brown county, it will be seen, was a court of general but not unlimited jurisdiction, and was organized under the statute of Michigan of 1820, and it was provided by section 7 of that act, “ that a court shall be established in every county of this Territory to consist of one chief justice and two associate justices, any two of whom shall form a quorum; and the said court shall have original jurisdiction in all civil cases where the sum demanded or matter in dispute is not within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace and does not exceed the sum of $1,000; and appellate jurisdiction from any judgment or decision rendered or given by justices of the peace, in their respective counties, in cases authorized by law; and furthermore that the said courts shall have cognizance of all crimes and offenses, the punishment whereof is not capital, concurrent with the supreme court, and shall have the same power to issue remedial or other process (writs of error and mandamus excepted) as the supreme court have. And either of the justices of said court in vacation shall, on good cause shown, have power to allow writs of supersedeas and also to grant writs of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.” Other sections of the same act provided for the appointment of clerks of the county courts, and that a seal should be used by such courts, etc., and contained sundry provisions, regulating practice in the supreme and several county courts. Laws of Mich. 1820, 313-327.
By the act of 1818, Laws of Michigan 1820,17, probate courts were established, but a sale of the real estate of any person deceased could be had only in the cases and in the manner pointed out by the act of 1818 (Laws of Michigan 1820, 37); and application for an order of sale was required to be made to the supreme court or to the county court in the county where the deceased person last dwelt.
The probate court had no power in any case‘to order a sale of the real estate of the deceased. In many of the States the power of ordering such sales is vested in the probate court, as was the case during the territorial existence of Wisconsin; and after the State organization probate jurisdiction was conferred upon and vested in the several county courts of the State.
A considerable diversity of opinion has existed and found its way into the judicial decisions of the States, as to whether such probate and county courts are courts of inferior and limited jurisdiction, so that their acts and decrees can be supported only where their jurisdiction is affirmatively shown, and whether the presumptions which were allowed in support of the record of the county court of Brown county in the cáse of Grignon’s Lessee v. Astor, by the Wisconsin court and the supreme court of the United States, can be indulged in to support their proceedings.
The recent case of Comstock v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 396, shows that the supreme court of the United States applies the rule it adopted in Grignon’s Lesseev. Astor to the proceedings of all probate and county courts acting upon any subject of which by law they could have jurisdiction.
This question in this State has, in a great degree, lost its practical importance as by chapter 127, Laws of 1861, the proceedings of such courts are placed upon'the same foundation as to the presumptions which are to be made in their favor, as the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction. Blodgett v. Hitt, Sup. Ct. of Wis. June term, 1871.
Upon this question, see also Sitzman v. Pacquette, 13 Wis. 291; Frederick v. Pacquette, 19 id. 541; Gibbs v. Shaw, 17 id. 197; Wanzer v. Howland, 10 id. 8; Rape v. Heaton, 9 id. 328, and cases cited in these decisions.