9 Cow. 241 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1828
The deed of January 13th, 1790, the partition by Van Ingen and the Schuylers, and the adverse possession by the defendant, form the subjects of consideration.in disposing of this cause.
1. The deed of January 13th, 1790, was between the heirs or descendants of Joseph Duow of the first part, and the heirs of Barnardus Bratt, with Thomas L. Witbeck, of the second part. By that deed, the Douws conveyed all their interest in the patent to Bratts and Witbeck, except 3467 acres, which it is agreed they reserved. What was the interest of the Douws ? We must take the answer from the special verdict. It was Jonas Douw’s share; or in other words, it was one half of the Van Vechten share of the patent, 7239 acres, equal to the whole quantity which Van Vechten afterwards conveyed to three :, Bratt, Bries and Van Bure. Nothing appears of Jonas Douw or his descendants ever parting with any of their interest, till the
It was contended by the counsel for the defendant, that this deed was but a partition of the common interest of the parties, which they derived from Jonas Douw on the one hand, and Barnardus Bratt on the other. The inference is drawn from its purporting to be a mere partition deed, and other circumstances which perhaps give some plausibility to *the ground taken. But the proportions of ownership between the parties are not stated by the deed; whereas they are found by the verdict to be sufficiently large in the Douws, for giving what it is now claimed passed to the Bratts and Witbeck. The quantity conveyed depends on the share owned by the Douws at the time. The deed may have been, as supposed, a mere partition of Barnardus Bratt’s and Jonas Douw’s shares ; but till this is shown, either upon the face of the deed, or by the rights of the parties at the time, the supposition cannot be sanctioned. Such a course would be to abandon the case made out by the special verdict, and to overturn facts by conjecture. Though good as a partition, there cannot be a doubt that the deed is equally available as an original conveyance. It must receive its legal construction and operation, according to its language and subject matter. These are the only controlling circumstances before the court.
The Douws grant, bargain, sell, alien, release and confirm to the Bratts and Witbeck in fee, after a specific reservation, and upon a pecuniary consideration expressed, all the right, title, &c., of the former to the lands, &c. in Hosick patent. Here are the consideration to raise the use, the operative words, and a subject matter for a bargain and sale, or lease and release.
2. The partition upon which the defendant relies, professes to be made in pursuance of the act for partition of
In the case before the court, the partition was thus: “ To .Barnardus Bratt’s representatives,” (without naming them) “lot No. 1 in the first allotment, containing 82 acres, &c.;” and in the same form to Hendrick Bries’ and Barent Van Bure’s representatives; thus treating the representatives of each as common owners of equal shares.
The statute has no application, except to existing owners of equal shares. The manner of distribution and division
Again, if there was a subject matter, if here were those equal rights contemplated by the statute, who can be received as owners in severalty under such a partition ? Who are we to understand by the representatives of Bratt, Bries and Van Bure? The statute intended the proceeding as a substitute for a deed of partition. Who would take under a deed giving such a designation to the parties? It cannot be doubted that the law requires quite as great a degree of certainty in this summary ex parte proceeding, as it would demand from a deed of the parties. The word, representatives, has no technical meaning in the law. It may signify heirs or executors, or representative may mean one who is substituted for another in any business: but the word never signifies a grantee. It cannot, most certainly, be applied to any of the proprietors at the time of the partition, except the Bratts; and to reach them we must add the epithet real, to distinguish them from Barnardus Bratt’s
This view of the case entitles the lessors of the plaintiff to 17fff of the premises in question, unless their claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
3. The defendant has shown a clear adverse possession for 21 to 25 years before suit; a possession which would certainly toll the entry of all the world, except the lessors of the plaintiff, or other tenants in common with the defendant. But full possession by one tenant in common for many years, will not per se, constitute an adverse possession within the statute of limitations.
What then, in this view, is the case before the court ? Up to ] 800, the period of the partition, the defendant was confessedly a tenant in common. The partition then takes place; a public act, upon which the defendant claims to exclude his co-tenants, and hold in severalty. The partition was void; but it was not the less an act of adverse possession, an ouster of the co-tenants. Jackson v. Brink decides that a deed or paper, though void, may yet operate
Judgment for the defendant.
Adams on Eject. 4th ed. 134.
See Clapp v. Bromagham, post 530.
Cowen & Hill’s Notes to Phil. Ev. 488.
Humbert v. The Trinity Church, 24 Wen. 587. Dig. N. Y. Rep. by Hogan, tit. Adverse Possession.
Vid. La Frombois v. Jackson, 8 Cowen. 589.