117 Ala. 348 | Ala. | 1897
The case is an appeal from a decree of the court-of chancery, sustaining demurrers and dismissing for want of equity, an original bill for relief, in which the appellant was the party complainant. The principal purpose of the bill is, to compel the sureties on successive bonds of a deceased county treasurer, to an accounting of the fine and forfeiture fund, the principal had received, and to the payment of such parts thereof as he had misappropriated. The misappropriation consisting in the application of the fund to the payment of claims which were not legally chargeable upon it, and in the payment more than once, and in the overpayment of other claims which in their nature and character were chargeable upon and payable from the fund.
The argument chiefly pressed by the counsel for the appellees, in support of the decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, rests upon the proposition that a county has not in and to the fine and forfeiture fund, such right and interest, as entitles it to sue a county treasurer for its misappropriation — that the right of suit or of action resides exclusively in the State, or in claimants of the fund to whose use the statutes appro
The general statute now devotes the fund' primarily, to the payment of the costs and fees attending the administration of the criminal law. The local statute prevailing in the county of Jackson, as will appear hereafter, in some particulars varies from the general statute, while it devotes the fund to like uses to which it is devoted by that statute ; but it works no change in the duty and liability of the county treasurer in respect to the fund, nor in the ownership of the fund.
The fund had passed into the county treasury; there was no other depositary of it, and upon the treasurer devolved the duty of keeping and disbursing it according to law. Consistently with the allegations of the bill, the misappropriation imputed to the treasurer had not diminished the fund to such an extent that it was insufficient to satisfy all outstanding claims upon it, if any such claims there were. And if such claims existed, a misappropriation, nor the waste or conversion of the fund by the treasurer would not have furnished the claimants a cause of action. The duties of the treasurer are prescribed and carefully enumerated by the statute, (Code of 1886, § 915; Code of 1896, § 1429.) The greater part of these duties are owing to the public, as represented by the county, and are readily separable and distinguishable from the duties imposed for the benefit of individuals, and owing them peculiarly. The duty to individuals, as it may be summarized, is the' payment from funds in the treasury of claims against the county, and of claims on the fine and forfeiture fund, on presentation, in the order and-upon the conditions of payment, the statutes may prescribe. A misappropriation, or the waste or conversion of funds coming to the possession of the- treasurer, would not avoid or excuse the neglect or non-performance of the duty, and is not the injury which entitles the individual having claims against the county, or claims upon the fine and forfeiture fund, to maintain suits because of the official delinquency — it is the non-payment of the claims on presentation, in the order and upon the terms and conditions of payment, the statutes may prescribe, funds haying come to the possession of the treasurer properly applicable in payment,- which constitutes the
The coxxstituents of the fuxxd are fines — the pecuniaiy punislxxnent of misdemeaixors, the mulcts or penalties ixnposed for contempts by courts or judicial officers, and the penalties ixxflicted oxx non-attending jurors in obedience to suxnxnons ; forfeitures — the adjudged breaches of recogxiizances of bail taken in criminal cases, and of recognizaxices of witnesses for the State, and the penalties adjudged against such witnesses for neglect to obey the mandates of subpcexxas issixed to and served xxpon them. Having these constituexits, distinguished, from all other public fuxids or revenues by the sources from which it is derived, the fund has existed from the earliest pexiod of legislatioxi.—Scruggs v. Underwood, 54 Ala. 186 ; State v. Coleman, 73 Ala. 550; Herr v. Seymour, 76 Ala. 273; Sessions v. Boykin, 78 Ala. 328. Issuing from violations of the criminal law7, and from the breaches of obligations and duties to the State, all of right, title and interest in
The fund, originally, was payable into the territorial treasury, not impressed with or devoted to any particular uses or purposes, subject, as were all'other-public funds or revenues, to legislative appropriation, and the territorial auditor of public accounts was authorized to maintain suits against delinquent officers charged with duty in respect to it. — Laws of Ala., 214, § 44; 216, § 56; 864, § 44; 365, §§ 1-6; 367, §§ 1-3. In 1815, an act was passed, as expressed on its face, “for the purpose of providing a fund to pay county expenses, ” declaring among other things, that thereafter, all fines and forfeitures should be paid into the treasury of the county in which they were incurred, “and not into the territorial treasury.” The clerks of the courts were required to make to the county treasurer, the reports and accounts of the fund, they had been required to make to-the territorial auditor of public accounts, and to pay him the money when collected, at the same time, and in the same manner, they had been required to make payment into the territorial treasury; and the county treasurer was authorized to maintain suits against officers delinquent in the performance of duty in regard to the fund. Laws of Ala., 672, § 3. Legislative power over public revenue, from whatever source derived, .no element of contract intervening, compelling a particular application or appropriation, is unrestrained by constitutional limitation. From the very nature of the fine and forfeiture fund, because of the sources from which" it is derived, it is particularly true that legislative dominion over it is absolute.—State v. Stone, 69 Ala. 206 ; Sessions v. Boykin, 78 Ala. 328 ; Harold v. Herrington, 95 Ala. 395. Originally, a fund payable only into the general public treasury, receivable only by the officers charged with duties in respect to the territorial government, the legislation to which we are referring, converted it into a county fund, payable into the county treasury, charging the county treasurer with the duty, and clothing him with the authority in respect to it, which devolved on the territorial auditor of public funds, while it pertained to tlie general, public treasury. And it must be observed that it passed
The Code of 1852 (§ 3619), declared : “All fines-and forfeitures in State cases, unless otherwise provided, go to the county in which the indictment was found, and judgment is entered for the State for the use of the county.” With changes of phraseology not now,material, this section has been incorporated into each subsequent revision and codification of the statutes, and is now the general law touching the fund and its ownership. — Revised Code, 1867, §3673; Code of 1876, §4458; Criminal Code, 1886, § 4894; Cr. Code of 1896, § 4714. The history of re-enacted statutes, having the same subject matter, aids materially in the interpretation and construction of the later enactment, and this may suffice as a reason for the rather extended reference to the preexisting statutes creating the fund and directing its destination and uses. The Code of 1852 was a revision and re-enactment of all former statutes introduced' into and forming part of it. And it has been said, that “it has long been a cardinal and controlling maxim, that where a law antecedently to a revision of the statutes is settled, either by clear expressions in the statutes, or adjudications on them, the mere change of phraseology shall not be deemed or' construed a change of the law, unless such phraseology evidently purport an intention in the legislature to work a change.”—Sedgwick Stat. & Const. Law (2d ed.), 365. The maxim has been applied in the construction of the Code. In Landford v. Dunklin, 71 Ala. 609, it was said : “The statute- as em: bodied in the Code, is. changed in phraseology. Words are omitted which were found in the former statute, but
In some of oiir decisions, in .construction of local statutes, and notably in the case of Brown v. Parris, 93 Ala. 314, to which we are now referred, it has been said, and very properly said, that the court of county commissioners has no authority or control over the fund. By which no more was intended, or could have been intended, than that the particular statute under consideration, divested them of all authority or control, by which they could deflect the fund from the particular uses to which the statute devoted it, appropriating it as they may appropriate the general funds or revenue of the county, nor were the claims on the fund subject to the audit and allowance of the court. This is now true of the fund as it exists under the,; general law, devoted to specific uses.
The particular question involved in Brown v. Parris, supra, was whether it was within legislative competency to revive claims against the fine and forfeiture fund of Marshall county, which were barred by the neglect to register them in accordance with a pre-existing statute. Legislative power over the fund, and its appropriation in legislative discretion, was declai*ed as it had been declared in former decisions, to some of which we have referred ; and it was declared that the revival of the claims did not contravene section 56 of Article IV of the constitution. The part of the decision now relied on, is expressed as follows: “The court of county commissioners has no control over the fines and forfeitures, or power to dispose of the fund though placed in the custody of the county treasurer for convenient disbursement pursuant to law. Section 4458 of Code of 1876 — section 4894 of the Code of 1886 — which declares :■ ‘All fines go to the county in which the, indictment was found or the prosecution commenced, unless otherwise expressly provided, and judgment therefor must be entered in the
The first cause of demurrer to the bill was not well taken. If it be conceded, the bill because of generality would have been demurrable, if it had averred no more than illegal payments from the fine and forfeiture fund to a particular amount — that the kind or character of the claims must have been averred — with sufficient clearness, the bill read in connection with the exhibits, shows the payments averred to have been illegal, were of the certificates of witnesses for the State ; to whom the certificates were issued and the amount of each certificate. The second, third, and sixth causes of demurrer may be considered together. The question they involve is, whether the treasurer had authority to pay claims which had not been entered on the book of the county treasurer, or to pay them otherwise than in the order in which they were entered. The question requires a construction of the fifth and sixth sections of the local statute (approved March 1, 1881), prevailing in Jackson county.
The fifth section requires the clerk of the circuit court, immediately after the term of the court, to “enter in a book kept by the treasurer, a certified list of all certificates issued by him during that term of the circuit court to witnesses for the State, by the clerk, and by the foreman of the grand jury, showing the order by date in which they were issued, to whom and for what amount, and for making the list, the clerk is entitled to a fee of two cents for each certificate, payable on the delivery of the list to the treasurer. The sixth section
The fourth cause of demurrer rests particularly upon the theory, that as it was the laches of the clerk of the circuit court, not to enter on the book of the treasurer the witness certificates he had issued, the complainant is estopped from asserting the invalidity of such certificates. It is a well settled doctrine, resting not on notions of mere prerogative, but upon -the weightiest
The fifth cause of demurrer proceeds upon the proposition that the statute so far as it requires registration of the certificates issuing to witnesses is directory. The proposition manifestly contravenes the construction of the statute which we have adopted, and would defeat the plain intent of the legislature. There is much discussion in the books as to directory and mandatory statutes, and it is difficult to reconcile all that has been said and decided. There is a general principle recognized by all the authorities which gives complexion to the statutory requirement of registration, and that is, .that statutory directions which are of the essence of the thing to be done are mandatory. — 23 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 153, 453.
We are of opinion the demurrers to the bill were not wel-1 taken, and should have been overruled.
The statute, (Code of 1886, § 265, Code of 1896, § 307), declares the bond of certain officers, including the county treasurer, “is a lien upon the property of the principal from the date of its execution.” In Dallas County v. Timberlake, 54 Ala. 403 ; Knighton v. Curry, 62 Ala. 404, and several subsequent cases, it is held that the lien is enforceable only in equity. The bill seeks to enforce a lien on certain described real estate of which the deceased treasurer was seized at the time of his second election and the execution of his bond, . This imparts equity to the bill, and renders erroneous the decree dismissing it for want of equity. Whether the bill is not demurrable because it
We have considered all questions presented by the record; and the result is the decree of the chancellor must be reversed and a decree rendered overruling the motion to dismiss the bill for want of equity, and the several demurrers, and remanding the cause for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion.
Reversed, rendered and remanded.