53 Iowa 399 | Iowa | 1880
I. The original petition made the Des Moines & Fort Dodge Eailroad Company alone a defendant, and alleged that plaintiffs purchased a car load of wheat of Ken-worthy & Deaton, of Dallas Center, and paid them thereon $159.45, leaving a balance due of $233. Kenworthy & Deaton delivered the wheat to the railroad company for transportation to Des Moines. The grain was brought in a car to Des Moines, and plaintiffs paid the freight to the railroad company, but it refused to deliver them the wheat or permit them to remove it. They ash to recover against the railroad company the value of the wheat at $1.00 per bushel, and the amount paid for the freight.
Kenworthy & Deaton intervene in the action, and allege that the wheat was sold to plaintiffs at the price of $1.20 per bushel, plaintiffs to pay the freight; that they demanded payment, and upon failure of plaintiffs to comply with the demand the intervenors directed the railroad company to hold the grain. The plaintiffs refusing still to mate payment for the wheat, the intervenors caused it to be sold, after notifying plaintiffs, and applied the proceeds on the claim against plaintiffs. A balance is due them they allege, and they ask judgment therefor.
In an amended petition plaintiffs allege that the intervenors agreed to furnish good “No. 2” wheat at the price of $1.20 per bushel, the freight to be paid by them; that the wheat upon inspection after it reached Des Moines proved to be of a lower grade, and for that reason they refused to pay for it at the contract price. Plaintiffs in the amended petition waive their claim for the value of the wheat, and ask judgment for their damages, being the amount jJaid by them to the intervenors and the railroad company. Substantially the same allegations are made in the answer to the petition of the intervenors, and a like judgment is asked against them. The court directed the jury to return special findings upon questions submitted to them, which with the answers are as follows:
“1. Did Kenworthy & Deaton agree that the wheat sold Jack & Toner should be “No. 2” wheat? A. No.
“ 2. Did Kenworthy & Deaton agree that the wheat sold Jack & Toner should be good milling wheat? A. Yes.
“ 3. ' Did Kenworthy & Deaton agree that the wheat sold Jack & Toner should be of any particular quality? . A. Yes.
“4. Did Jack examine the wheat in question before he*401 purchased the same, or did he purchase the same upon his own judgment? A. No.
“ 5. Did Kenworthy & Deaton make any representations as to the quality of the wheat at the time they sold the same to Jack & Toner? A. Yes.
“6. "Was any credit to be given Jack & Toner by Ken-worthy & Deaton upon the purchase of said wheat? A. No.
“ 7. Did Jack & Toner pay the freight on the wheat to the railroad company, and if so, how much did they pay? A. Yes. $18.83.”
Thereupon plaintiffs amended their petition alleging that the intervenors sold and agreed to deliver to them “good 'milling wheat,” that the wheat was not of that quality, and that plaintiffs refused to receive it as such on the contract, and notified Kenworthy & Deaton to that effect. The amendment also alleges the payment of a part of the purchase-money for the wheat and the freight as alleged in the original petition. Judgment is asked against the railroad company and the intervenors. No objections were made in the court below or in this court to the pleadings.
Counsel insist that the findings of the jury, to the effect that Kenworthy & Deaton agreed that the grain sold was “ good milling wheat,” are not supported by the testimony. Upon this point there was conflict; .it cannot be pretended that the findings of the jury are wholly without testimony; they must, therefore, stand.
IY. A motion for a new trial, based upon newly discovered evidence, was overruled. It was supported by the affidavit of one of the intervenors, Deaton, showing that one of the plaintiffs at the time of the purchase informed him that he had purchased of Kenworthy a car load of whe.at, and that it would not grade “No. 3.” The trial occurred more than two years after the sale. It is not shown that .in the exercise of diligence the testimony could not have, been produced at the trial. Indeed, as the testimony proposed to be introduced upon the - new trial was of one of the parties to the action, we will presume, in the absence of the clearest showing, that the omission to introduce the evidence was through his own negligence. A new trial, therefore, was jmoperly refused.
Modified and Affirmed.