This is an appeal from a summary judgment adjudicating priority of liens. The question presented is whether a federal tax lien is entitled to priority over a personal judgment which was obtained by the appellant against the taxpayer before the federal lien was recorded but which did not constitute a lien on the taxpayer’s personal property and which had not beеn levied upon at the time of recordation.
In March, 1963, J. P. Duncan filed suit in the District Court of Harrison County, Texas, against Sunset Drilling Company (thе taxpayer) and Cliff W. Trice for the sum of $24,767.28, interest, attorneys’ fees and other expenses, and for the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage upon certain cattle located in Harrison County which belonged to the taxpayer. Also named as defendants were Jack E. Fore and the United States, both of whom allegedly asserted liens upon the cattle covеred by the chattel mortgage.
Jack E. Fore had obtained a personal judgment on October 26, 1962, in the District Court of Harris County, Texas, for $44,495 against Sunset Drilling Company. An abstract of this judgment was filed in the office of the County Clerk for Harrison County on November 10, 1962.
The United States had made assessments totalling $30,961.92, notice of which was filed with the County Clerk of Harrison County on November 15, 1962. A second notice of fеderal tax lien, based upon different assessments, was filed on February 19, 1963.
On petition of the United States, the case was removed to the court below, and a receiver was appointed. The cattle were sold for $43,930, and after payment of thе receiver’s fee and expenses, there remained for distribution $40,857.92. Following removal of the suit, R. T. Walts, a farm hand for Sunset Drilling Company, filed a laborer’s lien for $900 allegedly expended in feeding and caring for the cattle.
All parties filed motions for summary judgment, аnd the District Court held that after the payment of court costs, the proceeds should be distributed in the following order: (1) the laborer’s lien of $900, (2) the claims of J. P. Duncan for $24,767.28 (plus interest), an attorney’s fee of $2,476.73, and $671.65 for feed purchased for the cattle covered by the chattel mortgage and (3) the tax liens of the United States. The court expressly held that Jack E. Fore had no *72 lien undеr Texas law by virtue of his judgment, and denied his motion for summary judgment.
Pursuant to a motion filed by J. P. Duncan, R. T. Walts and the United States, the judgment was later аmended to provide that Duncan’s lien for attorney’s fees was inferior to the tax liens of the United States but superior to all other liens, and that Walts’ lien for $900 was subordinate to the chattel mortgage lien and tax liens, but superior to the claim of Jack E. Fоre. The amended judgment did not affect the denial of Fore’s claim.
In his appeal, Jack E. Fore does not contest the District Court’s holding that J. P. Duncan and R. T. Walts were entitled to be paid ahead of him. The only issue involved in this appeal is whether the court erred in granting the tax liens of the United States priority over the claim of Jack E. Fore based upon his personal judgment in the state court.
Appellant had no lien under Texas law by virtue of his judgment. The filing and indexing of his judgment in the abstract of judgment records of Harrison County entitled him to a lien upon all of the real estate of the defendant Sunset situated in the county. It gave him no lien in the рersonal property of the defendant. From the record in the case he had no possessory lien, no attachment lien, no execution lien, no record lien of any kind. In fact, appellant claims no lien. He claims priority becausе his judgment against Sunset was rendered prior to the' filing of the Government’s tax lien.
Appellant’s claim is based upon a literal interpretation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323(a), which provides in part:
“(a) Invalidity of lien without notice.- — -Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), thе lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notiсe thereof has been filed by the Secretary or his delegate — ”
We do not believe appellant’s claim is sound. A money judgment, unsecured by any lien, is simply an adjudication, between plaintiff and defendant, that defendant owes plaintiff $X. Such a judgment plаintiff has no rank, superior or inferior, to other claimants. His only superior position is against his judgment debtor, against whom he has litigatеd. The law allows him to fix or establish liens by attachment or execution, which require affirmative action by plaintiff (appellant here), which was not done in this case.
We believe that “judgment creditor” as used in Section 6323(a) means a judgment lien creditor. This is by fаr the predominant view. Miller v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A.,
“We reject respondents’ contention that the ehoateness rule has no place when a mortgage under § 6323(a) is involved. The predeсessor to § 6323 was first enacted by Congress in 1912 in order to protect *73 mortgagees, purchasers and judgment creditors against a secret lien for assessed taxes and to postpone the effectiveness of the tax lien as against these interests until thе tax lien was filed. H.R.Rep.No.1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. The section dealt with the federal lien only and it did not purport to affect the time at which local liens were deemed to arise or to become choate or to subordinate the tax lien to tentativе, conditional or imperfect state liens. Rather, we believe Congress intended that if out of the whole spectrum of state-created liens, certain liens are to enjoy the preferred status granted by § 6323, they should at least have attained the degree of perfection required of other liens and be choate for the purposes of the federal rule.”
The judgment of the district court is correct and is Affirmed.