168 Pa. Super. 511 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1951
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The Board denied appellant’s claim because he was “a member of an organization . . . participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work”, as provided by the Unemployment Compensation Law, §402(d), 43 P.S. §802.
It is true that the Acts quoted, note 1, supra, taken together, forbade appellant as an assistant mine foreman from engaging in a strike, and to that extent he could not perform a duty resting upon members of the Union. But his paramount obligation to the Commonwealth did not cancel his membership in the Union, not any more than a civil service employe who is forbidden to engage in partisan political activities loses his membership in his political party. The legislative mandate went no further than to prohibit his striking and, if he chose to acknowledge another loyalty he could only partially serve,
Fundamentally, the case comes to this: Appellant became unemployed because his union ordered a strike and he is bound by its action even though he did not actually consent to it and could not personally participate in it. In Prentice Unemployment Compensation Case, 161 Pa. Superior 630, 637, 56 A. 2d 295, Judge Dithrich tersely stated the controlling principle: “. . . a person cannot claim the advantages of his voluntary acts, in this case joining the union, without at the same time assuming responsibility for their natural and probable consequences.” See also Curcio Unemployment Compensation Case, 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 385, 68 A. 2d 393.
Decision affirmed.
Act of 1943: “Every mine foreman, assistant mine foreman or fire boss, . . . shall represent the Commonwealth in the coal mine or colliery in which he is employed and be deemed to be an officer of the Commonwealth in enforcing the . . . Mining Laws and performing his duties thereunder. . . .”
Act of 1947: “No public employe shall strike and no person exercising any authority, supervision or direction ¡oyer any public employe shall have the power to authorize, approve or consent to. a strike by one or more public employes.”
Appellant does not claim that had he resigned from the Union after his promotion he could not have rejoined it after he again became a rank and file miner.
If the United Mine Workers followed conventional union practice, a portion of appellant’s dues were used to finance the strike. To that extent he supported a strike in which he could not participate.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
I would reverse the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The testimony discloses that claimant (1) never attended union meetings; (2) that he was not permitted to attend union meetings; (3) that he had no voice in the conduct of the affairs of the union; and (4) that he did not participate in any benefits of the union. The Board found as a fact that claimant was “. . . not permitted to participate in the benefits of membership”. Under the terms of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement in effect in the employ