155 Iowa 592 | Iowa | 1912
Plaintiff had a contract with defendant city for the construction of a sewer. Under the terms of the contract work was to be completed on or before September 1, 1908. Payment was to be in assessment certificates to the extent that the city had power to assess against abutting property, and the remainder was to be in city warrants drawn upon the sewer fund. Whenever sections of the work were completed to the satisfaction of the city engineer and board of public works, the city was to cause assessments to be made against the property liable to assessment.
The contract between the plaintiff and the city contains the following, among other, provisions:
And the party of the first part hereby agrees to receive the said certificates and warrants, if any be issued in case of deficiency, in full payment and compensation for all work and material furnished in the performance of this contract without recourse to the city of Des Moines, it being expressly understood that the duty and liability of said city of Des Moines to the party of the first part, or to any other person claiming under the assessment certificates herein provided for to said first party, or the person or persons entitled thereto, and in case of any deficiency between the contract price and the amount of the certificates issued, and warrants are issued because thereof, that the duty and liability of the city of Des Moines to the party
That by reason of the fault and neglect of the city of Des Moines, its officers, agents, servants and employees, as hereinbefore complained of, in the making, publisMng and posting of the faulty and defective plats, schedules and notices thereof and the unreasonable delay in delivering the certificates above mentioned to the plaintiff in payment for the construction of section “D” of the west end extension to the Ingersoll run sewer, as hereinbefore described, this plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of one ■hundred twenty-five dollars anld seventy-five cents (125.75). No pant of which has been paid and the amount of which, though often demanded by the plaintiff of the defendant, ■has been refused.
The second count of the petition has reference to another sewer constructed under a like contract and states that, on account of the negligence of the defendant in folloiVing statutory requirements, it did not succeed in making valid assessment certificates until March 15, 1909, whereas it should have made them not later than January 4, 1909. The same allegations of negligence and damages are made in this count as in count 1 and need not be repeated.
In an amendment t'o the petition and to each count thereof, plaintiff pleaded an ordinance of the defendant
Th demurrer challenges the right of the plaintiff to recover on these facts on the grounds (1) that the city is not liable for the reason that its acts were both legislative and judicial in character; (2) that no negligence is shown; (3) ■ that under the contract the city can not be made liable for interest. This demurrer was sustained and judgment was rendered against plaintiff for costs.
In undertaking to make these assessments, the city impliedly represents and agrees that it will do so in a reasonable time, and during this reasonable time the contractor is out of the use of his money and can not have interest'' thereon for’ the reason that interest can not be included in the assessment or reassessment. When the assessments are made and certificates -issued, they draw interest' from date -until paid under the statutes in force in this state. Now we have held that if the city, through negligence or' otherwise, fails to make and deliver valid assessments and assessment certificates to the contractor where under the terms of the contract he is to receive his pay in such assessments or assessment certificates, it (the city) is liable to the contractor and judgment may be rendered against it. Ft. Dodge v. City of Ft. Dodge, 115 Iowa, 568; Slutts v. Dana, 138 Iowa, 256. These cases dispose of the thought suggested for appellee that the city is not liable because its act is either legislative or judicial. Indeed .it scarcely need be said that its act is not of either character but wholly administrative. Field v. Barber Asphalt
II. The contracts between plaintiff and defendant also contained the following provisions not hitherto set forth :
The contract as- a whole clearly shows that it was the duty o-f the city to proceed with reasonable diligence in making assessments after it accepted the work, and, if liable personally for failure to make proper and valid assessments, there is no reason why it should not be held liable for negligent delay in making the assessments. In
When the contractor had performed his work according to his contract, he had no duty remaining to discharge, and then he had a right to rely upon the implied obligation of the city to use with due diligence its own agencies in procuring the means to satisfy his claims. It could nob have been supposed that he was not only to earn his compensation but also to set in motion and keep in operation the several agencies of the city government, over whom he had no control, to place in the hands of the city the funds necessary to enable it to pay its obligations. That was a power lodged in the hands of the city, and the clear intent of the contract was that it should exercise ifc diligently for the purpose of raising the funds necessary to pay for -the improvement. Eor an omission to do so it would become liable to pay such damages as. the contractor might suffer by reason of its neglect of duty.
In Commercial Bank v. City, 24 Or. 188 (33 Pac. 532 41 Am. St. Rep. 854), the court said:
When- the city orders- a local improvement, the duty devolves upon it to put the necessary machinery in motion to raise the funds to pay for it by assessments upon the property effected. This duty devolved upon the city when it ordered the improvement on Twelfth street, so that rvh'en the defendant entered into a contract for doing the work, ‘and the contractor stipulated to look for payment to the special fund to be raised by assessments, the obligation rested upon the city to prosecute in good faith and with reasonable diligence the means afforded to it, under its charter, to raise and collect the fund necessary to redeem its obligation. ... It has been repeatedly held that it is presently liable, if the failure of the city to raise the fund and -pay over the same to the contractor is due •to its own neglect or unreasonable delay. . . . The theory is that, when the municipality passes an ordinance
See, also, in support of this rule, McEwan v. City, 16 Wash. 212 (47 Pac. 433); Seifert v. City, 101 N. Y. 136 (4 N. E. 321, 54 Am. Rep. 664); Philadelphia Co. v. City, 19 Wash. 225 (52 Pac. 1063); Denny v. Spokane, 79 Fed. 719 (25 C. C. A. 164); Barber Co. v. City, 72 Fed. 336 (19 C. C. A. 139); Bowery Bank v. Mayor, 8 Hun, 224.
It follows that the judgment must be and it is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in harmony with this opinion. — Reversed and remanded.