MEMORANDUM DECISION
T1 J.S. аppeals from the juvenile court's adjudication finding that J.S., an eleven-year-old child, intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property of another. Specifiсally, the court found that J.S. broke a pipe on a flushing mechanism sensor for a toilet in a bаthroom at his school when he intentionally jumped up and down on the valve. We affirm.
2 J.S. claims that he lacks the ability to form the criminal intent required as an element of a destruction of property offense because he is under the age of fourteen and therefore cannot be held criminally responsible for his actions pursuant to Utah Code section 76-2-301. J.S. argues that because of his inability to form the necessary intent together with the evidence demonstrating that he did not intend to break the toilet flushing mechanism, the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to dismiss and finding
13 J.S.'s defense attorney, during closing argument at trial, arguеd that the State could not meet the intent element of destruction of property beсause J.S. was under fourteen years of age. The juvenile court requested the parties brief the issue. Thereafter, J.S. filed his motion to dismiss. In support of his motion to dismiss, J.S. discussed a passage frоm a legal reference book referring to Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development, which theory J.S. asserted provides that children under the age of twelve are unable to appreciate the consequences of their actions. The juvenile сourt declined to consider Piaget's theory of cognitive development becausе the passage J.S. relied upon had not been submitted as an exhibit or discussed in any way during the trial. Indeed, J.S. did not seek to admit the article discussing Piaget's theory into evidence at trial nor did he, as the proponent of Piaget's theory, provide any argument on the applicatiоn of the scientific theory to the facts of this case. See generally Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
T4 The court considered J.S.'s argument pertaining to a child's ability to form criminal intent and rejected J.S.'s "bright line age limitation" argument stating that "it is up to the court in each individual case, be it through age, cognitive abilities, mental health issues or other issues, to determine [if] a minor is capable enough to have the required intent." Thereafter, the juvenile court noted that no evidence was presented to show that J.S. is mentally dеficient, cognitively delayed, or for any other reason incapable of forming the required intent. The court cited Utah Code section 76-2-103(1), which section provides that a person engages in conduct "[iJn-tentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct оr to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (emphasis added), and found that it was J.S.'s "сonscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct-jumping up and down on the [tоilet] valve. As a result of [J.S.'s] intentional conduct, the valve broke."
T5 Intent is a state of mind that cаn be inferred from a person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances. See State v. Kihistrom,
T6 In sum, the evidence demonstrates that J.S. broke a flushing mechanism by jumping on the valve. J.S. did not present any evidence to show that he is mentally deficient, cognitively delayеd, or for any other reason incapable of forming the required intent. We affirm the juvenile court's adjudication finding that J.S., an eleven-year-old child, intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property of another.