delivered the opinion of the court:
The claimant, Josef Piatek, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)), seeking
The following factual recitation is taken from the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing.
The 52-year-old claimant had worked for the Company as a bricklayer’s helper for approximately one year prior to his accident on June 10, 2002. His primary duty was to relay bricks, blocks and mortar to the bricklayers at the work site. He also assisted in constructing any scaffolding.
The claimant testified that, on June 10, 2002, he assisted other workers in the construction of a second-level scaffolding at a jobsite. According to the claimant, the horizontal rail on the scaffold, which was to serve as a safety gate, was tied with wire to the vertical rail because the horizontal rail was too long. Consequently, each time a load of bricks was delivered, the claimant was required to undo the wire so that the machine lift operator could place the load of bricks directly on the scaffold. The claimant was to receive each load and then refasten the horizontal rail with the wire.
The claimant stated that, as he began to work on the morning of June 10, 2002, the owner of the Company, Jan Staszael, passed by him and said: “If you can’t manage, you can go home.” The claimant testified that he did not understand the comment. Staszael testified that he reminded the claimant to pin the safety gate. According to Staszael, the claimant said that he would pin the gate, after which Staszael told him that if he did not pin the gate, he would be sent home. Staszael stated that, to his knowledge, all the safety gate fasteners were working on that day. He testified that it is the responsibility of the bricklayer’s helper to unfasten the gate when a load of bricks is delivered to the scaffold and refasten the bar after the load has been lifted into position. Staszael admitted that the Company has no written rules regarding scaffold construction or the use of a safety gate.
In the afternoon of June 10, 2002, at approximately 2 p.m., the claimant was on the scaffold, carrying a brick or block. He testified that he tripped over a brick and fell onto the horizontal rail which was acting as a safety gate. The barrier snapped off and the claimant fell approximately four meters to the ground below and landed on his left side.
The claimant was taken by ambulance to Christ Hospital and underwent surgery to repair a comminuted, open fracture of the distal radius of his left wrist. The claimant also suffered from a laceration with partial degloving of his mid left leg and a transverse contused laceration over the distal aspect of the volar area of his left foot.
Josef Gladowski testified that he was employed by the Company as a bricklayer. On the morning of the accident, he was assisted by the claimant on the scaffold and he heard Staszael remind the claimant to fasten the safety bar (horizontal rail) or he would be sent home. At the time of the claimant’s accident, Gladowski did not note if the safety gate was pinned or unpinned.
Pawel Sajdak testified that he was employed as a machine lift operator for the Company on June 10, 2002. Sajdak stated that he did not witness the claimant’s accident. However, he had reminded the claimant earlier that day to close the safety gate.
After his hospitalization, the claimant was treated by Dr. Viorel Raducan at the Parkview Musculoskeletal Clinic. When Dr. Raducan examined the claimant on October 3, 2002, he noted that his wrist fracture was healed, but his grasp and grip were weak. Aggressive occupational therapy was recommended. As to the claimant’s leg injury, Dr. Raducan noted evidence of sequela of the left ankle and prescribed physical therapy. He concluded that the claimant was unable to work.
On November 7, 2002, Dr. Raducan again noted that the claimant exhibited a weak grip and stiffness in his left wrist as well as short flexors of the fingers. He again recommended aggressive occupational therapy, and determined that the claimant was still unable to work.
On November 21, 2002, the claimant returned to Dr. Raducan with complaints of left shoulder pain and stiffness. Dr. Raducan observed that the claimant’s shoulder was tender anteriorly and it showed limitations in external rotation, internal rotation, and abduction. He opined that the claimant’s shoulder was injured at the same time he sustained the wrist injury, noting that “fractures of the wrist occur by falling hard or some kind of axial loading of the external upper extremity, which can very well propagate the shock from the wrist all the way into the shoulder.” Dr. Raducan recommended physical therapy for the claimant’s shoulder. The claimant testified that he had not complained of left shoulder pain prior to the November 21, 2002, examination because he had not attempted to lift his left arm until that time.
Dr. Raducan examined the claimant again on January 9, 2003, and found that the claimant’s left wrist range of motion was “almost functional,” with grip strength at 50% compared to the right side. The claimant’s glenohumeral joint was still very stiff, with “quite a bit” of deficit for internal rotation in the left shoulder. Dr. Raducan recommended physical and occupational therapy to improve range of motion of the glenohumeral joint, and opined that the claimant was unable to work.
When he examined the claimant at a follow-up exam on January 31, 2003, Dr. Raducan found less than 50% range of motion in the claimant’s left wrist, that his fingers were stiff, and that he could not make a fist. Range of motion in the claimant’s shoulder was functional, but was about 40% in the glenohumeral joint, and 60% in the scapular thoracic joint, with “quite a bit” of deficit of internal rotation. Dr. Raducan suggested a functional capacity evaluation (FCE).
The FCE was conducted on February 6, 2003, by Tom Kokocinski, a licensed physical therapist. Kokocinski found that the claimant demonstrated severe range of motion limitation, as well as weakness of his left shoulder, wrist, and fingers. Based upon objective tests, Kokocinski concluded that the claimant was able to lift 20 to 50 pounds occasionally, but could lift no more than 10 pounds over head level. Kokocinski opined that the claimant was unable to perform the essential functions of a bricklayer’s helper because the job required him to lift amounts in excess of 100 pounds. Kokocinski recommended that the claimant see an orthopedic surgeon for a consultation on his left shoulder
Dr. Raducan reviewed the claimant’s FCE on February 13, 2003. He found that one of the major limitations to the claimant’s work capacity was the limited range of motion in his left shoulder. He recommended shoulder manipulation under general anesthesia followed by aggressive range of motion physical therapy. He also advised the claimant to begin a work hardening program. Dr. Raducan issued an “off work” slip at that time.
At the arbitration hearing, the claimant testified that he was unable to carry anything in his left hand because he could not make a fist. He stated that the range of motion was reduced in his left wrist as compared to the right and that he could not lift his left arm or bend it toward his back. The claimant also complained of a pinching pain in his left leg when walking.
Staszael testified at the hearing that safety at a work site was important because the Company had been fined by OSHA the year before the claimant’s accident. Staszael stated that he had a second conversation with the claimant prior to the accident at which time he again reminded the claimant to pin the safety gate. According to Staszael, he had orally warned the claimant prior to his accident regarding fastening the safety bar, but admitted that he had never issued the claimant a written warning.
Following the hearing which was held pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2002)), the arbitrator denied the claimant benefits, finding that he failed to prove that he sustained accidental injuries on June 10, 2002, arising out of his employment because the claimant committed an act in violation of the Company’s safety rules which took him out of the scope of his employment.
The claimant filed a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision before the Industrial Commission. In a unanimous decision, the Commission reversed the arbitrator’s decision, finding that, “regardless of whether or not [the Company] had a safety rule and/or [the claimant] violated [the Company’s] safety rule,” the claimant sustained an accidental injury on June 10, 2002, arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commission awarded the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for 58 weeks and $39,094 for necessary medical expenses. The Commission also remanded the matter to the arbitrator for further proceedings pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial Comm’n,
The Company filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit court confirmed the decision and this appeal followed.
The Company first argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law in finding that the claimant’s injuries arose out of his employment because the claimant’s failure to fasten the safety gate was a violation of the Company’s rules, taking him out of the scope of his employment. The claimant maintains that because he was performing tasks for the benefit of the Company at the time of the accident, he was in the sphere of his employment and his injuries “arose out of his employment.” We agree with the claimant.
To be compensable under the Act, the injury complained of must be one “arising out of and in the course of the
The Company argues that, since the claimant failed to pin the safety bar, he violated a Company safety rule and, as a consequence, his injury did not arise out of his employment. The Company contends that the proximate cause of the claimant’s accident and resulting injuries was his violation of a safety rule. In support of its arguments in this regard, the Company relies upon the case of Saunders v. Industrial Comm’n,
In concluding that the claimant’s accident arose out of his employment, the Commission relied upon the supreme court’s decision in Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,
Contrary to the Company’s arguments, we find no conflict between the holding in Saunders and the holding in Chadwick. Saunders stands for the proposition that an employee’s injury does not arise out of his employment when the injury is the result of an activity prohibited by company rules and conducted solely as a personal convenience. Saunders,
“The rule is, that where the violation of a rule or order of the employer takes the employee entirely out of the sphere of his employment and he is injured while violating such rule or order it cannot be then said that the accident arose out of the employment, and in such a case no compensation can be recovered. If, however, in violating such a rule or order the employee does not put himself out of the sphere of his employment, so that it may be said he is not acting in the course of it, he is only guilty of negligence in violating such rule or order and recovery is not thereby barred. *** [I]t does not matter in the slightest degree how many orders the employee disobeys or how bad his conduct may have been if he was still acting in the sphere of his employment and in the course of it the accident arose out of it.” Republic,302 Ill. at 406 .
The decisive issue is whether the employee was, at the time of the accident, violating a rule while still in the scope of his employment, or whether the alleged rule violation took him outside its sphere. Heyman Distributing Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,
The Company next argues that the Commission’s “implied finding” that the claimant’s left shoulder condition is related to his June 10, 2002, injury is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of its argument in this regard, the Company notes that the claimant never complained of any left shoulder involvement until his visit to Dr. Raducan on November 21, 2002, months after his accident. The Company also criticizes the Commission for failing to make specific causation findings relating to the claimant’s left shoulder condition.
In its written decision, the Commission found:
“[Biased upon the medical records and the chain of events [the claimant] sustained a compensable accident on June 10, 2002, that is causally connected to his present condition of ill-being.”
The Commission noted that the claimant was seeking compensation for injuries to his left leg, arm, wrist and shoulder. The Commission also detailed medical evidence and testimony establishing that the claimant had sustained an accidental injury arising out of his employment as a bricklayer’s helper. Thus, it is clear that the Commission found the evidence sufficient to establish that the injury to the claimant’s left shoulder was causally connected to the June 10, 2002, accident. Although the Commission is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law (820
Whether a causal relationship exists between a claimant’s employment and his condition of ill-being is a question of fact to be resolved by the Commission. Certi-Serve, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n,
In this case, Dr. Raducan’s notes dated November 21, 2002, state that the claimant complained of left shoulder pain and stiffness. He noted that the claimant’s left shoulder was tender anteriorly and showed limitations in external rotation, internal rotation, and abduction. Dr. Raducan opined that the claimant’s shoulder was injured at the same time he sustained the wrist injury, noting that “fractures of the wrist occur by falling hard or some kind of axial loading of the external upper extremity, which can very well propagate the shock from the wrist all of the way into the shoulder.” The claimant testified at the hearing that he did not complain of left shoulder pain to Dr. Raducan until his November appointment because he had not attempted to lift his left arm until that time. Based upon the unrefuted medical evidence of record and the claimant’s testimony, which standing alone is sufficient to support an award of benefits (see Seiber v. Industrial Comm’n,
Finally, the Company contends that the Commission’s award of TTD benefits from June 11, 2002, through the date of the hearing on July 22, 2003, is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the claimant’s last “off work” note from Dr. Raducan was dated February 13, 2003, five months prior to the hearing.
An employee is temporarily totally disabled from the time that an injury incapacitates him from work until such time as he is as far recovered or restored as the permanent character of his injury will permit. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,
In Dr. Raducan’s notes dated February 13, 2003, he found that one of the major limitations of the claimant’s work capacity was the limited range of motion of his left shoulder. He suggested that the claimant undergo a surgical manipulation under general anesthesia, followed by aggressive range of motion physical therapy. Dr. Raducan also issued an “off work” slip at that time. At the July 22, 2003, hearing, the claimant testified that he was unable to close his left fist and that his left wrist hurt. He stated that he could not lift his left arm or bend it toward his back. The claimant also complained of a pinching pain in his left leg while walking.
Where the Commission’s decision is supported by competent evidence, its finding of fact is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Benson v. Industrial Comm’n,
Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court which confirmed the Commission’s decision and remand to the Commission for further proceedings.
Affirmed and remanded.
McCULLOUGH, EJ., and CAELUM, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLD- ■ ENHERSH, JJ., concur.
Notes
Effective January 1, 2005, the name of the Industrial Commission was changed to the “Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission.” However, because the Industrial Commission was named as such when the instant cause was originally filed, we will use this name for purposes of consistency.