McCULLOCH, C. J. Appellant instituted this action in the circuit court of Conway County against N. E. Montgomery to recover the sum of $1,887.23, alleged to be due on contract for the purchase price of certain articles sold and delivered to the latter by appellant, and against appellees, W. L. Warren and J. J. Hall, as sureties on the contract of Montgomery with appellant. There was a recovery below in favor of appellant against Montgomery, from which judgment there has been no appeal.
Warren defended in the trial below on the ground that he was induced to sign the contract of suretyship by fraudulent misrepresentations of Montgomery, and the verdict of the jury was in his favor.
Hall defended on the ground that he did not sign the contract of suretyship, and that his name subscribed to the contract was a forgery. The court took the case from the jury as to the liability of Hall and an appeal has been prosecuted by appellant as to the judgments in favor of Warren and Hall,
(1) The testimony of Warren tended to show that he was induced to sign the contract of suretyship by false and fraudulent misrepresentations made to him by Montgomery, and the court instructed the jury that if the signature of Warren was procured by such fraudulent misrepresentations he was not bound by the contract. This was error. Montgomery was the principal in the contract with appellant, and Warren was one of the sureties. Regardless of the nature of the contract between appellant and Montgomery, whether it was one creating the relation of agency between them as to their transactions or whether it was a contract for the sale and delivery of merchandise, Montgomery was not the agent of appellant in the procurement of sureties in the performance of his contract with appellant. In procuring sureties Montgomery was necessarily acting for himself and not for appellant.
(2) It is also urged on behalf of appellee Warren, apparently for the first time here, that there had been a material change in the contract in that, according to the testimony adduced, the signature of one of the witnesses to his (Warren’s) signature to the contract was a forgery, or at least was unauthorized, and that this constituted a material alteration which discharged the sureties. It is undisputed that Warren signed the contract of suretyship in his own handwriting and the unauthorized addition of the name of a witness was not an alteration of the instrument itself. The signature of Warren to the contract needed no witness, for it was complete and valid without a witness and the unauthorized signature of the witness added nothing to it. This is discussed in view of the reversal of the judgment on the ground set forth above.
(3) Appellee Hall in his answer filed, jointly with the other defendants denied the execution of the contract, and the answer was -verified by the affidavit of Hall, being a verification on belief as provided by statute with reference to verification of pleadings. Kirby’s Digest, § 6120. On the trial of the cause, appellant introduced the contract, but there was no other testimony introduced either tending to support or dispute the genuineness of the writing so far as it concerned appellee Hall, and on the final submission of the case to the jury the court gave a peremptory instruction in Hall’s favor. Hall’s signature to the contract was by mark and was witnessed by the signatures of two persons whose name appeared written near the name of Hall. This was sufficient to make a prima facie signature under the statute. Kirby’s Digest, § 7799. We have a statute which reads as follows:
(4) “Where a writing purporting to have been executed by one of the parties is referred to in, and filed with, a pleading, it may be read as genuine against such party, unless he denies its genuineness by affidavit before the trial is begun.” Kirby’s Digest, § 3108.
(5-6) This statute was not complied with by appellee Hall, for it will be observed that an unqualified denial in the affidavit is required by the statute, whereas the affidavit in the verification of his answer was merely on belief. The purpose of the statute is to permit the party who files a written instrument with his pleadings to introduce it in evidence as genuine unless its genuineness is first denied under oath. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Smith, 82 Ark. 105. The answer of appellee Hall denying the genuineness of his signature to the contract was sufficient to put the question at issue before the jury and place the burden of proof on the plaintiff in the case to establish the cause of action, but the affidavit required by statute not being filed, appellant had the right to introduce the writing in evidence without other proof of its execution. If other testimony had been introduced attacking the genuineness of the signature, it would have still been a question for the jury to determine whether or not the instrument was genuine, with the burden still on appellant to establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the court »rred in withdrawing this issue from the jury.
The judgments in favor of Warren and Hall are, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.