Aрpellant sued Fred MIcMul-lan as principal, and the other appellees as sureties, to recover certain sums due for goods sold to MeMullan under a written contract. Appellees demurred to appellant’s petition, on the ground that same showed upon its face that the contract sued upon was in violation of the anti-trust láws of Texas and void. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the suit; hence this appeal.
The appellant is a foreign corporation,
*824
domiciled in Minnesota. The appellees are citizens of Texas. The contract recited that it was entered into in the state of Minnesota, but shows that it was performable in Comanche county, Okl. ' If said сontract had been performable in Texas, it would have been in violation of Texas laws and unenforceable. Contracts containing the same limitations, that is, confining appеllee to a prescribed area in doing business, have been repeatedly held by our courts to be violative of the anti-trust laws. See Caddell v. J. R. Watkins Medical Co. (Tex. Civ. App.)
But appellant’s contention is fully set out in its proposition, as follows:
“A petition seeking recovery oil a contract alleged to have been made in a state other than Texas, valid under the laws of the state where made, and to be performed outside of Texas, shows a good cause of actiоn, enforceable in Texas, and not subject to demurrer on the theory that such contract is in violation of the anti-trust laws of Texas.”
It is immaterial, we think, that the contract sued upon was Vаlid in Minnesota. It was performable in Oklahoma, and the general rule is that, unless a contrary intention of the parties appears, the validity of a contract is determined by the laws of the state where it is to be performed, and not by those of the state in which it was entered intо. Fidelity Mut. Life Association v. Harris,
Though we rest our opiniоn in affirming the judgment of the trial court upon the grounds above stated we make also the follоwing observations: Assuming that said contract was valid and enforceable under the laws of Oklahоma, and that appellants had so alleged, it is only by comity between the states that appellant could assert any right to have said contract enforced through the Texas сourts. There is a further well-established rule of law, stated by Judge Williams in Life Ass’n v. Harris, supra:
“As before noted, a court of one state will not apply to contracts brought before it the laws of аnother state, when such application is forbidden by the law to which the court owes obedience.”
And as stated in 5 Ruling Case Law, § 31, p. 946:
“Ordinarily, the lex fori will not permit the enforcement of a contract regardlеss of its validity where made or when to be performed, either where the contract in question is contrary to good morals, or where the state of the forum, or its citizens would be injured through thе enforcement by its courts of contracts of the kind in question; or where the contract violates the positive legislation of the state of the forum — that is, is contrary to its constitution or statutes; or where the contract violates the public policy of the state of thе forum.”
See also numerous authorities there cited.
In the instant case appellant is seeking to enforce against citizens of Texаs a contract which, had it either been made in Texas or been performable in Texаs, would have been in clear violation of its anti-trust laws. We are inclined to the view, therefore, that as a matter of public policy the courts of Texas should not be called upon as a matter of comity tó enfor'ce against its citizens contracts which in their nature are not only against its public policy, but in violation of its statutes, even though they be valid and enforceable either where made or where performable in another state. Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co. (Tex. Civ. App.)
We do not think the cases cited by the appellant wherеin interstate shipments of cattle were involved are applicable to the issues in this ' case, and have not discussed them.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.