J. R. v. JOSHUA PLESS
C.A. No. 27665
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
January 6, 2016
[Cite as J.R. v. Pless, 2016-Ohio-14.]
SCHAFER, Judge.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CV 2014 12 5494
Dated: January 6, 2016
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Joshua S. Pless, appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas granting the request of Appellee, J.R., for a civil stalking protection order. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Joshua Pless is a 27-year-old man residing in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. J.R. is the mother of A.R., a minor who was 16 years old at the time she met Pless in the fall of 2014. During the months of October, November, and early December of 2014, Pless and A.R. were involved in a romantic relationship and Pless has admitted to having sexual intercourse with A.R. on multiple occasions. However, Pless maintains that he thought A.R. was 18 years of age during the course of their relationship.
{¶3} After discovering that her minor daughter was romantically involved with an older man, J.R. petitioned for and received an ex parte protection order, protecting her and her
{¶4} Pless now appeals1 from the protection order and raises one assignment of error for this Court‘s review.
II.
Assignment of Error
An order was imposed against Appellant [that] was false, offensive, and a misrepresentation of what happened. In summary the court said there were sexually oriented offenses and Appellant posed a threat. No pattern was established for any such claims nor [was] solid evidence provided. Appellant has no record of violence or sexually oriented offenses.
{¶5} In his sole assignment of error, Pless argues that the trial court erred by finding that he either posed a danger to or committed a sexually oriented offense against either J.R. or A.R. Moreover, Pless contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him to adequately prepare for the hearing and not allowing him to ask probative questions on cross-examination. We disagree with each of Pless’ arguments.
{¶6}
{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Pless challenges the granting of the order based upon the trial court’s findings, but he does not challenge the scope of the order. Therefore, we
[t]he [reviewing] court * * * weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Eastley at ¶ 20. “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶8} In this case, J.R. filed her petition for a protection order under
{¶9} Pless challenges the trial court‘s finding that his actions constituted a “pattern of conduct.” He contends that the trial court‘s finding grossly misrepresents the true nature of his relationship with A.R. Moreover, Pless argues that he has never been charged with or convicted of a sexually oriented offense, so the trial court could not establish a “pattern of conduct.”
{¶10} Pless has failed to set forth any case law to support his assertion that his actions with regard to A.R. did not constitute a “pattern of conduct.” “An appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error on appeal and must provide legal arguments that substantiate the alleged error.” Rosen v. Chesler, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009419, 2009–Ohio–3163, ¶ 11. “If an
{¶11} We note that Pless has presented his argument before this Court pro se. With respect to pro se litigants, this Court has observed:
[P]ro se litigants should be granted reasonable leeway such that their motions and pleadings should be liberally construed so as to decide the issues on the merits, as opposed to technicalities. However, a pro se litigant is presumed to have knowledge of the law and correct legal procedures so that he remains subject to the same rules and procedures to which represented litigants are bound. He is not given greater rights than represented parties, and must bear the consequences of his mistakes. This Court, therefore, must hold [pro se appellants] to the same standard as any represented party.
(Internal citations omitted.) Sherlock v. Myers, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22071, 2004–Ohio–5178, ¶ 3.
{¶12} Even a liberal reading of Pless’ appellate brief does not reveal that he has presented any case law to support his assertion that his actions did not constitute a pattern of conduct. As such, we decline to address his argument. See
B. December 30, 2014 Hearing
{¶13} Pless also argues that he was not adequately prepared to proceed with the hearing before the magistrate on December 30, 2014. He also contends that the magistrate prohibited him from asking relevant questions of J.R. and A.R. on cross-examination. We disagree.
{¶14} The record indicates that Pless failed to either inform the magistrate that he was not prepared to proceed or request a continuance. Moreover, Pless also failed to object below to any of the issues he now raises on appeal relating to the December 30, 2014 hearing. In failing to do so, Pless forfeited any error in that regard. The failure to raise these matters before the trial
{¶15} Lastly, Pless’ appellate brief contains new information about A.R.‘s conduct both before and after the hearing that was not offered during the trial court proceedings. However, this Court may not consider evidence that was not presented to the trial court. State v. Heard, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26965, 2014-Ohio-371, ¶ 6, citing State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978) (explaining that a reviewing court is “limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.“).
{¶16} Pless’ assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶17} Pless’ sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
MOORE, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, P. J.
CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{¶18} I would affirm as J.R. proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Pless engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused mental distress. A.R. testified that her sexual relationship with Pless and his continued contact with her caused emotional distress. A.R. indicated she had difficulty at school, lacked focus, and could not sleep. She further indicated that she was significantly afraid of Pless. Moreover, even after the ex parte CPO was issued, Pless still attempted telephone contact with A.R. on multiple occasions.
APPEARANCES:
JOSHUA PLESS, pro se, Appellant.