61 Miss. 293 | Miss. | 1883
delivered the opinion of the court.
Murdock & Parchman, a mercantile firm, in the town of Okolona, being insolvent, by deed of general assignment transferred to one Black all their property, real and personal, with directions to sell the same, and with the proceeds pay off their debts, making some of their creditors preferred and others unpreferred. Among those preferred was the Okolona Savings Bank, which was their largest creditor. Several unpreferred creditors at once sued out attachments against the assignors upon the ground that the deed of assignment was fraudulent, and levied on the goods in the hands of the assignee, and had writs of garnishment served upon the Okolona Savings Bank, and upon Black, the assignee. Some of these attachment suits were upon traverse in the circuit court dismissed, but the attaching plaintiff recovered personal judgment against Murdock & Parchman for the several amounts due, and upon return of nulla bona again garnished the assignee and savings bank. One of the creditors, to wit, the Savings Bank of Mobile, in addition to suing out its attachment and garnishment writs, also filed a bill in the Chancery Court of Chickasaw County attaching the deed of assignment executed by Murdock & Parchman to Black, assignee, as fraudulent in law upon its face', and asking to have it executed. While these several suits were progressing, Black, the assignee, was actively proceeding to wind up the business, in accprdance with the provisions of the deed, by converting the property transferred to him into money. Seven hundred dollars of said proceeds he paid over to the Okolona Savings Bank, on the preferred debt held by it, and the balance of the proceeds, amounting to the sum of two thousand dollars, he deposited with said bank in his own name and to his credit as assignee. The savings bank,
1st. It is objected that all the creditors'’ of Murdock & Parchman should have been made parties, inasmuch as all had an interest in the fund deposited by the assignee. The point is not well taken. The assignee in whose name the deposit stood, and who was a trustee for all, was a party, and so also were all the persons who had garnished the fund; and this was enough.
2d. It is urged that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the trial of attachment suits, no matter how numerous, where the right of each creditor is several and independent, and where each, therefore, is entitled to the verdict of a jury on the facts of his particular case, and where the right of each is purely legal in its character. It was held in Bishop v. Rosenbaum, 58 Miss. 84, that the jurisdiction of equity existed in this class of cases at the instance of a claimant of property attached, who had given separate bonds to sundry attaching creditors, aggregating more than the total value of the property attached; but the decision was limited to a case where such bonds had been given, and the jurisdiction was sustained because of the giving of the bonds. The great weight of authority, however, carries the jurisdiction beyond this, and it may be considered as settled that for the purpose of preventing a multiplicity .of suits, a court of equity may draw to itself the ultimate decision of many actions at law, where the suits are by one against many or by many against one, all the cases depend upon a common state of facts and upon a common principle of law, which will govern and control the rights of all, although there be no community of right between the several parties and their demands arise at differ
3d. It is insisted that there is no equity in the bill, or, in other words, that there is no right in the bank to apply the funds deposited by the assignee to their own claims against Murdock & Parch-man. When a general deposit is made with a bank, the money received becomes the property of the bank, and the latter the debtor of the depositor. If, therefore, the depositor is already the debtor of the bank, the right of off-set springs up and the bank may at once appropriate the new deposit to the old debt, and may indeed be compelled so to apply it, if the depositor requires it. Morse on Banking 41.
This right, however, does not exist if the deposit is made for a special purpose or trust, and the bank knew or has good reason to suspect that such is the fact at the time of the reception. In such case the bank must be considered as having agreed to receive it subject to the purpose or trust, and hence when called upon to repay cannot repudiate the implied condition on which it was received. Morse on Banking 35 et seq.; Bank of United States v. Macalester, 9 Penn. St. 475. In the present case the bank received
Decree affirmed, and leave granted to answer within sixty days.