We allowed defendant's petition for review to address when plaintiff's cаuse of action under section 1983 accrued.
On review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. ORCP 47 C; Jones v. General Motors Corp. ,
In 1998, plaintiff was 15 years old and housed at an OYA facility where defendant was the superintendent. An OYA employee at the facility named Milligan, who served as a "group life coordinator" or "corrections officer" to plaintiff and other male youths at the facility, sexually abused plaintiff multiple times. The abuse occurred in the laundry room of the tent cottage to which plaintiff was assigned, an area unmonitored by security cameras. Milligan told plaintiff that no one would believe him if he reported the abuse. Milligan threatened to cut plaintiff's visitation time with family if he tried to report. Milligan also threatened to break plaintiff's neck if he screamed. Plaintiff did not report the abuse to anyone at OYA, and he was released back to his family in 1999.
Initially, plaintiff repressed thoughts and memories of the abuse. But in June 2012, media coverage of the sexual abuse scandal at Penn State University caused plaintiff to recall his own abuse by Milligan. Plaintiff disclosed the abuse to his wife and others for the first time and began searching the internet for information about Milligan. Plaintiff learned that, while still employed by OYA, Milligan had been arrested in 1999 for sexually abusing a boy and then soon after was arrested and charged with kidnapping, sexually abusing, and attempting to murder another boy.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia , that plaintiff's claim was time-barred by Oregon's two-year statute of limitations generally applicable to tort claims, ORS 12.110(1).
Plaintiff appealed, assigning error to the trial court's rejection of this court's precedent in favor of Ninth Circuit case law. Defendant did not dispute that Oregon trial courts are bound by this court's precedents; instead, defendant argued that the trial court did not err in light of the decision in Wallace . According to defendant, Wallace mandates an occurrence-based accrual rule that is "facially inconsistent"
II. ANALYSIS
On review, defendant contends that the Court of Aрpeals' reading of T. R. is inconsistent with Wallace . Defendant advances two alternate articulations of the post- Wallace accrual rule. First, defendant argues that Wallace announced a standard accrual rule focused on the occurrence of the injury: The limitations period for a section 1983 claim begins when the injury occurs, and the rule excepts only certain special types of torts, and plaintiff's claim does not fall within one of those exceptions. Alternatively, defendant argues that, even if the standard accrual rule incorporates a discovery requirement, that requirement extends to discovery of only the injury, not discovery of a particular defendant's causal role as well, as T. R. holds. Defendant asks us to overrule T. R. -or to clarify and limit its holding-in light of Wallace and to affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's section 1983 claim. As discussed below, we reject both of defendаnt's proposed accrual rules and reaffirm T. R. 's holding that a section 1983 claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and the defendant's role in causing the injury.
A. United States Supreme Court Case Law
Because federal law governs accrual for section 1983 claims, we begin our analysis by reviewing the two United States Supreme Court cases on the issue: Wallace and Manuel v. City of Joliet , --- U.S. ----,
Additionally, the Court stated that a "refinement" to that standard rule may be proper if the claim at issue is analogous to a tort that receives "distinctive treatment" under the common law.
More recently, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of accrual for a section 1983 action in Manuel . There, the
"In defining the contours and prerequisites of a § 1983 claim, including its rule of accrual, courts are to look first to the common law of torts. Sometimes, that review of common law will lead a court to adopt wholesale the rules that would apply in a suit involving the most analogous tort. But not always. Common-law principles are meant to guide rather than to control the definition of § 1983 claims, serving more as a source of inspired examples than of prefabricated components. In applying, selecting among, or adjusting common-law approaches, courts must closely attend to the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue."
Id. аt 920-21 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court re-emphasized that the rule of accrual is primarily based on the common law of torts, and it placed new emphasis on "the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue." The comments also indicated that the Court's approach to accrual of section 1983 claims is flexible, with common-law principles serving to "guide" rather than "control" the analysis.
Defendant posits that three additional Supreme Court cases weigh on our analysis and compel his first proposed reading of Wallace -that accrual occurs at the time of the injury unless an exception for a special tort applies. As explained below, however, we are unpersuaded that those cases carry the weight that defendant assigns them.
First, relying on Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. ,
"While it is theoretically possible for a statute to create a cause of action that accrues at one time for the purpose of calculating when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another time for the purpose of bringing suit, we will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indication in the statute."
Bay Area Laundry ,
Second, defendant relies on Gabelli v. SEC ,
Lastly, defendant relies on the concurring opinion in TRW Inc. v. Andrews , in which Justice Scalia argued that the "general federal rule" of accrual is not "that a federal statute of limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know that she was injured."
On the issue before us, we are bound by Supreme Court case law. See State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer ,
B. T. R. v. Boy Scouts of America
Turning to our own precedent, this court considered in T. R. the question of when accrual began for the plaintiff's section 1983 action against a city for a city police officer's sexual abuse of the plaintiff. Contrary to defendant's argument, T. R. 's holding that a section 1983 claim aсcrues when a reasonably prudent plaintiff perceives both the injury and the defendant's causal role is consistent with the Supreme Court's guidance in Wallace and Manuel .
This court explained in T. R. that "the accrual rule that applies to determine when plaintiff's section 1983 claim accrued is a 'discovery' accrual rule."
Although T. R. did not refer to Wallace , T. R. 's holding is consistent both with common-law tort principles and with Wallace and Manuel . Under the common law, accrual of a claim is functional: "The overriding discovery rule principle is that the statute begins to run when a person of reasonable diligence discovers or should have discovered facts that would show she has a reasonable claim, or facts that would lead a reasonable person to investigate further." Dan Dobbs,
"[T]he usual idea seems to be that the statute will not begin to run until
"(a) all the elements of the tort are present; and
"(b) the plaintiff discovers, or as a reasonable person should have discovered,
"(i) that she is injured; and
"(ii) that the defendant, or the defendant's product or instrumentality, had a causal role in the injury, or that there was enough chance that defendant was connected with the injury to require further investigation that in turn would have revealed the defendant's connection[.]"
Wallace and Manuel do not require a different accrual rule. Together, Wallace and Manuel demonstrate the Supreme Court's intent to provide basic guidance-rather than a rigid rule-for how to determine
We therefore reject defendant's argument that Wallace precludes any discovery rule and turn to his alternative reading of Wallace . Defendant proposes that the only permitted discovery rule is one that would provide for accrual of a section 1983 claim when the plaintiff discovers his or her injury. As indicated, the Supreme Court has not articulated the scope of a federal discovery rule. Although lower federal courts have no binding authority over this court, we augment our analysis by considering their varied articulations of the post- Wallace accrual rule.
C. Federal Appellate Case Law
Against the backdrop provided by Wallace -and, to a lesser extent, Manuel -almost all of the federal circuit courts have grappled with the issue of accrual in section 1983 actions. As the parties recognize, there is a range of viewpoints among those courts. We note at the outset that all the federal circuit courts to have addressed the accrual of section 1983 claims post- Wallace have used some form of the discovery rule. Defendant primarily draws support for his articulation of such a rule from the Ninth and Third Circuits. While there exists some federal appellate case law
We first consider the cases on which defendant primarily relies. Defendant argues that a Ninth Circuit Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case from 1984 supports his position that the discovery rule requires discovery of only the plaintiff's injury: Dyniewicz v. United States ,
More recent Ninth Circuit case law suggests that more may be required. In Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J ,
"We have interpreted the 'question *** [of] what *** we mean by injury' with some flexibility, and held that a 'claim accrues' not just when the plaintiff experiences the injury, but 'when the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the injury and the cause of the injury.' "
Bonneau ,
Defendant also relies on a pre- Wallace Third Circuit FTCA case: Zeleznik v. United States ,
The Third Circuit's apparent support for defendant's limited discovery rule, however, is curtailed by that court's more recent practice of applying the forum state's discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in post- Wallace section 1983 cases. For example, in Dique v. N.J. State Police ,
The Fourth Circuit's approаch is perhaps most aligned with defendant's limited discovery rule. According to that court, "[f]or most common-law torts, a plaintiff's cause of action accrues, and the limitations period commences, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury (hence, the 'standard rule')." Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office ,
But, as indicated, other courts, particularly the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, apply a discovery accrual rule like the one that we articulated in T. R. The Fifth Circuit applies an accrual rule almost identical to the one stаted in T. R. Before Wallace was decided, in Piotrowski v. City of Houston , the court considered the timeliness of the plaintiff's section 1983 claim against the city for
"Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured. A plaintiff's awareness encompasses two elements: (1) The existence of the injury; and (2) causation, that is, the connection between the injury and the defendant's actions."
The Seventh Circuit, too, requires discovery of more than the fact of the plaintiff's injury before a section 1983 claim accrues. In post- Wallace section 1983 cases, that court has consistently held that discovery of both the injury and its causation are required to trigger accrual. See, e.g. , Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Vill. of Oak Lawn ,
The Eleventh Circuit is in accord. Although the court has articulated an accrual rule couched in terms of discovery of "the injury," see, e.g. , McNair v. Allen ,
Additionally, the First and Sixth Circuits appear to embrace discovery rules that go beyond the plaintiff's discovery of only the fact of injury, although it is nоt as apparent whether their discovery rules cover discovery of the defendant's role in causing the injury, as do the rules in T. R. and in the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. Although the First Circuit has articulated a more limited discovery rule for section 1983 claims, focusing on discovery of the injury, it has not precluded the applicability of the general discovery rule if the plaintiff is unaware of facts needed to bring the claim. The court has
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit applies a discovery accrual rule that is potentially more expansive than discovery of only the fact of an injury. In Cooey v. Strickland ,
The remaining approaches used by three other federal appellate courts demonstrate the lack of any uniform understanding of the scope of the accrual rule to which Wallace points. For example, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that a section 1983 claim accrues when "the plaintiff has 'a complete and present cause of action,' that is, 'when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.' " Earle v. District of Columbia ,
Then there is the Second Circuit, which generally states that "an action accrues when the wrongful act or omission results in damages, and once the plаintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action[.]" McDonough v. Smith ,
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit has stated that, "[i]n general, [accrual] occurs when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action."
Consistently with its approach of tailoring the accrual inquiry to the claim at issue, when confronted with section 1983 claims alleging violation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit stated,
"those claims accrued when [the plaintiff] knew or had reason to know, separately for each of these [d]efendants *** to be liable, that they had acted with deliberate indifference to a known risk to [the plaintiff's] medical needs, and that his or her deliberate indifference resulted in a delay in treatment that caused [the plaintiff] substantial harm."
Vasquez v. Davis ,
Based on our reading of Wallace and Manuel , we consider a more expansive discovery rule, such as the one followed in T. R. and by courts in the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, to comport with the practical realities for plaintiffs who are seeking to vindicate constitutional rights through claims under section 1983. Our conclusion is supported by federal appellate case law, which, despite lacking any conclusive uniformity, demonstrates definitively that defendant's first proposed accrual rule is unworkable. No federal circuit court has derived from Wallace the strict occurrence-based rule that defendant proposes. And although defendant's alternative articulation of the Wallace accrual rule-that discovery of an injury alone is enough to start the limitations period running-does find some support in federal appellate case law, we find that reading unpersuasive. In our view, a rule that requires a plaintiff to bring a claim without any regard for the plaintiff's knowledge of whom to sue is neither functional nor flexible.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that an action under section 1983 accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and the defendant's role in causing the injury. Thus, the trial court erred by applying an incorrect rule of law in considering when plaintiff's section 1983 claim accrued for purposes of defendant's motion for summary judgment. On review, the parties have not fully argued whether defendant is entitled to summary judgment under the correct accrual rule, and the trial court did not reach other arguments that defendant had asserted in his summary judgment motion.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiff's section 1983 claim against defendant is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Notes
Although OYA and defendant jointly petitioned for review, the only issue before us is the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim against defendant. Our references to defendant's arguments are shorthand for their joint arguments.
Because we resolve this case on another ground, we do not address plaintiff's and amici 's argument for recognizing the discovery rule as a tolling provision.
The summary judgment record also includes a copy of case information from the Oregon Judicial Case Information Network pertaining to 2013 criminal charges brought against Milligan. The case information shows that Milligan was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of sexual penetration with a foreign object, resulting in a lengthy prison sentence. Plaintiff represented to the trial court that he was the abuse victim in that case.
The statute of limitations for section 1983 claims "is that which the [forum] [s]tate provides for personal-injury torts." Wallace ,
No party disputes that the injury in this case was Milligan's sexual abuse of plaintiff.
Manuel left unresolved whether a claim for unlawful pretrial detention is more analogous to a claim of false arrest (which accrues at the onset of legal process) or to a claim of malicious prosecution (which accrues only upon dismissal of the charges).
We note that the Supreme Court also consulted Dobbs' Law of Torts -albeit a different version-to inform its analysis of when the section 1983 claim in Wallace accrued.
In some jurisdictions, the claim does not accrue until the plaintiff also discovers or should have discovered that "the defendant may have been negligent or otherwise legally responsible." Dobbs, 1 The Law of Torts, Practitioner Treatise Series § 243 at 878-79.