2026-0050
N.H.
Jul 10, 2026

J.L. v. C.M.

In Case No. 2026-0050

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT

July 10, 2026

In Case No. 2026-0050, J.L. v. C.M., the court on July 10, 2026, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The defendant, C.M., appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Gorman, J.), issued following a hearing, granting a domestic violence final order of protection to the plaintiff, J.L. See RSA 173-B:5 (2022). We reverse.

The relevant facts follow. The parties were a couple for fourteen years and together have two minor children. The parties separated twelve years ago, after which the plaintiff and the children resided in Connecticut where a child custody matter appears to remain pending. The plaintiff and the children moved to New Hampshire three years ago. The parties have not had direct contact in twelve years. The defendant lives in Massachusetts.

The plaintiff filed a domestic violence petition in October 2025. Following an ex parte hearing, the trial court issued a temporary order of protection and scheduled a hearing. The plaintiff testified at the hearing that she had obtained prior restraining orders against the defendant and that “years ago,” the defendant had been arrested for violating one of them. She also testified that the defendant was serving a suspended sentence on a felony charge of domestic assault against another woman. In addition, the plaintiff testified that three months prior to the final hearing her daughter had first disclosed to her that the defendant had sexually assaulted the daughter when she was five to eight years old. According to the plaintiff, the daughter wrote a three-page statement about the incidents, the plaintiff contacted the police department, and there was a police investigation underway.

The defendant acknowledged that he had been convicted by a jury of “one felony count” of slapping a woman, not the plaintiff, and that his probation would terminate on January 15, 2026. He also testified that he had completed an intimate abuse education program. In addition, he testified that he had not molested his daughter and that he had not had contact with the plaintiff in twelve years, “[n]o emails, no phone calls, no contact.”

Following the hearing, the trial court issued a final order of protection. In support of its order, the trial court found that the defendant had committed abuse when he sexually assaulted the parties’ minor daughter and that, although the conduct had happened years ago, the report had just been made. The trial court also found that the defendant had previously been arrested for violating a restraining order and that the plaintiff had prior restraining orders against the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argues, in part, that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of abuse.

In an appeal from an order on a domestic violence petition, the trial court‘s “findings of fact shall be final,” and we undertake de novo review of “questions of law.” RSA 173-B:3, VI (2022). We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law, upholding the findings of fact and rulings of law of the trial court unless they are lacking in evidentiary support or tainted by error of law. See S.C. v. G.C., 175 N.H. 158, 162 (2022); RSA 173-B:3, VI. When conducting this review, we accord considerable weight to the trial court‘s judgment on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. S.C., 175 N.H. at 162-63.

To obtain relief under RSA chapter 173-B, a plaintiff must show “abuse” by a preponderance of the evidence. Achille v. Achille, 167 N.H. 706, 716 (2015). RSA 173-B:1, I defines “abuse” as the commission or attempted commission by “a family or household member or by a current or former sexual or intimate partner” of one or more specified criminal acts “where such conduct is determined to constitute a credible present threat to the [plaintiff‘s] safety.” RSA 173-B:1, I (2022). “Abuse” is therefore composed of two elements, both of which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a family or household member or current or former sexual or intimate partner of the plaintiff committed or attempted to commit one or more of the enumerated criminal acts; and (2) that conduct constituted “a credible present threat to the [plaintiff‘s] safety.” RSA 173-B:1, I; see Achille, 167 N.H at 716. In determining whether abuse has been shown, a court may consider evidence of the enumerated criminal acts “regardless of their proximity in time to the filing of the petition, which, in combination with recent conduct, reflects an ongoing pattern of behavior which reasonably causes or has caused the [plaintiff] to fear for his or her safety or well-being.” RSA 173-B:1, I (emphasis added).

The trial court found the “threshold misconduct,” that is, the requisite criminal act, to be the defendant‘s sexual assault of his daughter. See RSA 173-B:1, I(c). In support of its finding that the defendant‘s conduct constituted a “credible present threat” to the plaintiff‘s safety, the trial court found:

The assault occurred when the child was young, but was only recently reported; there is a long history between the parties with prior restraining orders; defendant served time in prison for a DV related offense on another woman and is scheduled to end probation in January 2026; plaintiff expressed fear for herself and her daughter now that she has come forward and made additional criminal allegations against the defendant.

The defendant disputes the trial court‘s finding that he sexually assaulted his daughter but we need not address that issue because the trial court erred when it found that the defendant‘s conduct constituted a “credible present threat” to the plaintiff‘s safety.

According to the plaintiff, the alleged assault on the parties’ daughter occurred seven to ten years before the filing of the petition. No evidence was presented at the hearing that the defendant had threatened the safety of either the plaintiff or the parties’ daughter since the alleged assault. Indeed, the plaintiff responded “no” when the trial court inquired whether the defendant had tried to communicate with the plaintiff while she lived in New Hampshire, and she also acknowledged that the parties had not communicated with one another except through third parties in twelve years. In this case, the plaintiff did not present evidence of any recent conduct by the defendant that created a credible present threat to the plaintiff‘s safety as required by RSA 173-B:1, I. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it entered a final domestic violence protective order.

Reversed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, GOULD, and WILL, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,

Clerk