J.J. appeals from a civil protection order (CPO) entered against her by the trial court on September 15, 2011, at the request of B.A., who at that time was her estranged husband. Because, in our view,
I.
The parties are the parents of a child, Z.A., who was born on January 4, 1995. It appears to be undisputed that the parties separated in November 2010, and that in May 2011, Ms. J. instituted divorce proceedings in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. On September 13, 2011, that court, per Judge Steven G. Salant, entered a “Consent Custody Order” which provided, inter alia, that: (1) the parties shall have joint lеgal custody of Z.A., who was then sixteen and one-half years of age; (2) that Mr. A. shall have sole physical custody of Z.A.; (3) that “[Mr. A.] shall endeavor to dismiss any restraining order case pending in the District of Columbia”; and (4) that Ms. J.’s claims for child support and alimony were waived. The order was entered by Judge Salant after the parties had agreed on the record, in a proceeding before Family Division Master Charles M. Cockerill on September 9, 2011, that “the father will ... do everything he can to dismiss ... [t]he D.C. restraining order.”
On September 15, 2011, two days after the issuance of Judge Salant’s order, a hearing was held in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on Mr. A.’s petition for a CPO, which had been filed on September 1, 2011. Mr. A. testified that Ms. J. had threatened, stalked, and harassed him; that shе had accessed his email account without his consent; and that she had attacked and mistreated Z.A. Ms. J. contested most of Mr. A.’s allegations and made several counter-accusations. She also testified that Z.A. had punched her, leaving her with two black eyes and in fear for her safety from her own child. She did not deny the claim relating to her having obtained acсess to Mr. A.’s e-mail account, but she noted that she was married to Mr. A. at the time she did so.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge granted Mr. A.’s request for a CPO. She explained that Ms. J. “admits she accessed [Mr. A.’s] e-mail account without his permission,” and that doing so constituted an intrafamily offense, namely, taking property without right.
II.
At the beginning of the Superior Court hearing, shortly after both parties were sworn, Ms. J. brought up the Montgomery County order, noting that it provided for dismissal of her claims for child support and оther benefits and that, in exchange, “[her] husband would dismiss this [petition].” She explained that “we are in court today because he has not done so.”
The trial judge then questioned Mr. A. about the Maryland order, and she elicited the following:
THE COURT: Now, this says that you shall endeavor to dismiss any restraining order pending in the District of Columbia.
MR. A.: Yes, I did endeavor, ma’am.
THE COURT: What does that mean? Tell me what you mean by, you did endeavor.
MR. A.: I thought about the idea of taking away the restraining order ... or trying to dismiss this process. When I mentioned it to my son that it would be taken away, he was very very distressed by it. He fears his mother and he fears the idea that his mother would do harm to me or to him, now that she found out where our new location is.
THE COURT: And is this a deal you worked out with the judge in Maryland? MR. A.: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. A.: Well, the deal was that I would try to see if I can get it dismissed. THE COURT: And you just decided not to?
MR. A.: Well, my son is in fear, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
The foregoing colloquy ended any direct discussion of Ms. J.’s claim that by proceeding with the ease, Mr. A. was disobeying Judge Salant’s order. Later in the hearing, however, the trial judge stated that the only remaining issue was “entering the civil protection order ... [b]ecause all the other issues have been resolved,” and she added the following:
Right. And if I do [grant the petition], it’s a question for thе Montgomery County court. They may say, you broke the deal, deal is off, and you start off at square one there, but not here
(Emphasis added.) The trial judge subsequently opined that the Maryland court “will have to decide whether he breached the agreement, because [Mr. A. is] here today.” The judge did not elaborate on these remarks, nor did she explain why a District of Columbia court could properly permit Mr. A. to disregard a Maryland court’s order while that order remained in effect.
In her pro se brief, Ms. J. argues primarily that the trial judge erred by not “honor[ing]” the portion of Judge Salant’s order addressing Mr. A.’s obligation to “endeavor” to dismiss the CPO proceeding in the District of Columbia. Mr. A., also appearing pro se, argues that he did comply with the order. We agree with Ms. J., and we conclude thаt Mr. A.’s position is legally indefensible.
Compliance with a court order is not optional. As we explained in detail in D.D. v. M.T.,
[c]ourts have a right to demand, and do insist upon, full and unstinting compliance with their commands. One who is subject to a court order has the obligation to obey it honestly and fairly, and to take all necessary steps to render it effective.... He or she may not dо the prohibited thing, nor permit it to be done with his or her connivance.... Indeed, he or she must be diligent and energetic in carrying out the orders of the court ... and a token effort to comply will not do.
Id. at 44 (citations omitted); see also Link v. District of Columbia,
Mr. A. claimed at oral argument before this court, not very persuasively, that he looked up the word “endeavor” in an (unidentified) dictionary, and thаt he learned that one of its meanings is “to look into.” Mr. A. asserted that he investigated the possibility of dismissing his petition for a CPO, and that by doing so, he “endeavored” to comply with Judge Salant’s order. At the very least, “to look into” would be an unorthodox understanding of the word of which he was claiming to be attempting to discover the meaning. According to MeRRIAM-Webster’s Collegiate Diсtionary 410 (9th ed.1985), “endeavor” means “to strive to achieve or reach,” or “to attempt (as the fulfillment of an obligation) by exertion of effort.” This is significantly different from “to look into.” One is hard pressed to discern, in this record, any “striving]” or “exertion of effort” on Mr. A.’s part. Moreover, no reasonable person could believe that in exchange for the waiver by Ms. J. of all claims for support, Mr. A. was merely expected “to look into” the possibility of dismissing the CPO petition, and that he had the right to proceed with his CPO case if he changed his mind (here, within two days after the Maryland order was issued) or if his minor son asked him not to terminate the CPO proceeding.
But in any event, even if we were to assume, solely for the sake of argument, that Mr. A., who is a profеssor of art at a local university, did not understand what to “endeavor” to dismiss the CPO proceeding required of him, this would provide him with scant solace. In D.D. v. M.T, we explained that
[i]f a party subject to a court order claims not to understand its requirements, he or she may apply to the court for construction or modification.... To fail to take such steps is to act at one’s peril as to what thе court’s ultimate interpretation of the order will be.
Mr. A. had ample opportunity to “endeavor” to dismiss the CPO proceeding. Undеr the provisions of Superior Court Domestic Violence Unit Rule 10(a), he had the right to “dismiss [his] action at any time ... before entry of a civil protection order by filing a notice of dismissal.”
III.
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution provides in pertinent part:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each state tо the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.
U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1. Although the District of Columbia is not a state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is also applicable to the District. See, e.g., Suydam v. Ameli,
The animating purpose of the full faith and credit command ... “was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the statе of its origin.”
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
Two centuries ago, Francis Scott Key, who was an attorney as well as the author of the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, argued to the Supreme Court that a judgment of a court of another state was merely prima facie evidence as to how an issue should be decided in the forum, to be considered with the other parts of the record. Mills v. Duryee,
Moreover, as the Supreme Court stated in Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt,
[regarding judgments ... the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgmеnt, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.... A court may be guided by the forum State’s “public policy” in determining the law applicable to a controversy .... [b]ut [the Court’s] decisions support no roving “public policy exception” to the full faith and credit due judgments.
Baker,
Although we are not aware of any decision in this jurisdiction presenting the question before us in a context precisely likе the factual and procedural scenario here, the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been held applicable to situations indistinguishable in principle from this case. See Hooks v. Hooks,
Our holding should not be viewed as broader than it is, or than the facts of this case require. There may well be limits on the extent to which the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires a court in the forum jurisdiction to enforce an order entered by a court in another jurisdiction requiring a litigant to dismiss an action in the forum jurisdiction. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235-36 & n. 9,
The Maryland court’s order in this case, however, does not transgress, or even approach, the limits which the Supreme Court contemplated in Baker, nor does it contravene the principles articulated in Auerbach. Under the law of this jurisdiction, Mr. A. had the unilateral right to dismiss his CPO petition, without leave of the Superior Court. See Super. Ct. Dom. Violence Unit R. 10(a). By ordering Mr. A., with his explicit consent, to endeavor to dismiss that CPO petition, the Maryland court did not impermissibly intrude on the authоrity of the Superior Court. Moreover, having agreed to the entry of the consent order in Montgomery County, Mr. A. is hardly in a position to contend that the Maryland court usurped authority that it did not possess. To entertain such a claim would effectively permit Mr. A. to barter selectively to his own advantage, by consenting in Maryland to an order requiring him to endeavor to dismiss the CPO prоceeding, by then using that ostensible concession to secure ■ dismissal of some of Ms. J.s claims (here, alleged child support arrearages), and finally by reneging in the Superior Court on the agreement made in Maryland and proceeding with a claim that was supposed to be precluded by Judge Salants order. Such a result would surely be contrary to fundamental principles of equity and fairness.
In any event, еven if the Full Faith and Credit Clause were not applicable, broader notions of comity should have led the trial judge to require Mr. A. to comply with his obligations under the Maryland consent order, as the judge doubtless would have done if the same order been entered by a Superior Court judge. Cf. Solomon v. Supreme Court of Fla.,
The trial judge, as we have seen, told Mr. A. that the Montgomery County court might rule the “deal ... off’ because Mr. A. had broken it, but this would apply only “there, but not here." (Emphasis added.) The judge was apparently of the opinion that failure to comply with the order of the Maryland court did not affect or impair in any way the right of the disobedient party to avail himself of his breach and to prevail in the District of Columbia. But aside from the general principle that “no man may take advantage of his own wrong,” Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal,
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to the trial court to vacate the CPO. Any proceedings before the trial court relating to an extension of the CPO shall be resolved in a manner consistent with this order. The costs of the transcript are awarded to Ms. J. and shall be paid by Mr. A. D.C.App. R. 39(a)(3).
So ordered.
Notes
. Ms. J. testified that Mr. A. also went into her e-mail account, but the trial judge told her that this was irrelevant because she (Ms. J.), and not Mr. A. was "in front of me for that."
. When Ms. J. attempted to deny some of Mr. A.'s other allegations, thе trial judge interrupted her and stated that "[w]e don't need to go any further because you admitted a crime. All I need is one.”
. The Superior Court docket entries reveal that Ms. J. did not file a response to Mr. A.’s petition.
. In Mills, the Court was construing the federal Full Faith and Credit statute which was enacted to implement the constitutional provision. The Court has, however, subsequently treated Mills as a constitutional decision. Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co.,
. We are aware, however, that neither party to this case is an attorney.
. We recognize that the Maryland order required Mr. A. to “endeavor” to dismiss the CPO proceeding, a phrase which could be viewed as less definite than ordering him to dismiss it. We consider this to be of no consequence, however, because Mr. A. neither dismissed his petition nor endeavored to do so.
. This court has held that only final judgments are entitled to Full Faith and Credit. Gamble v. Gamble,