Lead Opinion
OPINION
Appellant-respondent J.H. appeals his adjudication for Driving a Vehicle Without a License,
FACTS
On September 26, 2003, seventeen-year-old J.H. borrowed his girlfriend's automobile. At some point, J.H. collided with another vehicle, and it was later determined that he did not have a valid operator's license. As a result, the State filed a delinquency petition on September 29, 2003, charging him with the above offense.
When J.H. and his mother appeared at the initial hearing three days later, J.H. and his mother acknowledged to the trial judge that they understood the allegations set forth in the petition. The following colloquy then took place:
THE COURT: [J.H.], I need to advise you that you have the right to have an attorney, a continuance to get an attorney, and if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to you at public expense, do you understand that? RESPONDENT: Yes sir.
Tr. p. 4.
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THE COURT: And while you were in detention, did you watch a video tape in which the Judge - explained your rights and this Court's alternatives?
RESPONDENT: Yes sir.
THE COURT: Did you understand it?
RESPONDENT: Yes sir.
THE COURT:; And folks, did you also watch that video tape while you were out in the waiting room?
MOTHER: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you understand it?
MOTHER: Yes.
THE COURT: And are you satisfied that he understands it?
FATHER: Yes.
MOTHER: Yes.
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THE COURT: Alright [J.H.], among rights you have is the right to have an attorney a continuance to get an attorney, and if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to you at public expense. Do you think you need an attorney in this matter?
MOTHER: No, 'cause you guilty.
RESPONDENT: No sir, I'm going to plead guilty.
THE COURT: Alright. Folks, do you think he needs an attorney?
'MOTHER: No.
THE COURT: Alright, showing a knowing, lawful waiver of your right to have an attorney. [J.H.] do you wish to admit or do you wish to deny that violation? f
RESPONDENT: I admit siz. I admit.
THE COURT: Do you understand that by admitting that petition, you're waiving your rights and that the Court advisement of rights, including your right to remain silent and you're gonna have to tell the Court what happened here today, do you understand that?
*458 RESPONDENT: Yes sic.
Tr. p. 5-6. Following this exchange, J.H. acknowledged to the trial court that he was admitting the allegations of the petition of his "own free will." Tr. p. 6. After informing the trial court that he did not have a driver's license when he took his girlfriend's automobile and slid into another vehicle, a sufficient factual basis was found to adjudicate J.H. a delinquent child. Finding that J.H. had been on parole when he committed the instant offense and further observing that he had a "lengthy history with this Court, with several violations," Tr. p. 9, the trial court recommitted J.H. to the Department of Correction with a recommendation that he serve twelve months. J.H. now appeals..
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
The dispositive issue here is whether, as the State argues, the appeal must be dismissed because J.H. was obligated to file a motion for relief from judgment in accordance with Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). As our supreme court observed in Tumulty v. State, "[olne consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the conviction on direct appeal." 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind.1996). So too, in juvenile cases, our supreme court has determined that a defendant may not appeal a delinquency adjudication following his admission to the facts of the offense. M.Y. v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). While post-conviction remedies are not available to juveniles, see Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987), the appropriate remedy for relief that a juvenile defendant must seek is through the filing of a Trial Rule 60 motion. See Haluska v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1193, 1194 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Inasmuch as J.H. is attacking the validity of his admission to the offense and he has failed to file a motion pursuant to Trial Rule 60, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal. Thus, we remand this cause to the trial court for the purpose of permitting J.H. to file therein a motion for relief from judgment.
Appeal dismissed.
. Ind.Code § 9-24-18-1.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I concur with the majority's holding that, because seventeen-year-old J.H. admitted to committing the offense of driving a vehicle without a license, he may only challenge his adjudication of delinquency in a subsequent motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60. See, eg., M.Y. v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). However, I write. separately to express my concern that the Marion Superior court's jurisdiction and subsequent adjudication of J.H. as a juvenile delinquent, rather than an adult offender, may be in contravention of Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
Article I, Section 28 of the Indiana Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that our legislature "shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." Our supreme court has held that Section 28 should be applied and interpreted independent of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
In Indiana, juvenile courts do not have jurisdiction over a "child at least sixteen (16) years of age who allegedly committed a violation of a traffic law, the violation of which is a misdemeanor, unless the violation is an offense under [Indiana Code Section 9-30-5.
The juvenile division of the Marion superior court established under IC 83-5.1-2 has exclusive jurisdiction over a child who:
(1) has been taken into eustody in Marion County; and
(2) has allegedly committed an act that would be a misdemeanor traffic offense if committed by an adult.
Similarly, Indiana Code Section 338-5-29.5-4(b) provides that:
(b) Notwithstanding IC 31-30-1-2, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over a child who:
(1) has been taken into custody in the county; and
(2) has allegedly committed an act that would be a misdemeanor traffic offense if committed by an adult.
By their express terms, these statutes give the juvenile division of the Marion and Lake Superior courts exclusive jurisdiction over children-including those at least sixteen years old-who commit misdemeanor traffic offenses. These statutes authorize the court to impose juvenile dispositions instead of criminal adjudications on certain misdemeanor traffic offenders that are sixteen years of age or older.
Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-30-1-8, the juvenile court of Marion County had jurisdiction over J.H. when it entered the dispositional order. Nevertheless, the adjudication of J.H.-whether it be: (1) wardship to a juvenile facility wherein the juvenile court determines the least restrictive and most appropriate setting available;
For these reasons, I concur and write separately.
. The Equal Protection Clause provides as follows: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
. The offense at issue is not an offense under Indiana Code Section 9-30-5. Rather, the offense of driving a vehicle without a license is an offense under Indiana Code Section 9-24-18-1.
. Ind.Code § 31-37-18-6.
. In the equal protection context, our supreme court has held that:
It is obvious that cities having a population of 100,000 or more may require larger and more varied powers than such as contain a population of 10,000 or less. The political needs of the larger community may be of a*460 different nature, and the forms and methods by which its affairs must be administered may be more extensive, complicated, and elaborate than those required in a municipality of smaller population.
Quinn v. State, 258 Ind. 399, 408, 281 N.E.2d 478, 483 (1972) (quoting School City of Rush-ville v. Hayes, 162 Ind. 193, 200, 70 N.E. 134, 137 (1904)). I agree that Marion County's population may necessitate jurisdiction of children, at least sixteen years old, who commit traffic offenses in juvenile, as opposed to adult, courts. However, the penal consequences imposed on such traffic offenders should not be different from those imposed on similarly situated offenders who reside in counties other than Marion or Lake.
. The preferential treatment at issue-ie., expanded juvenile jurisdiction-is uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated-i.e., those juveniles that live in Marion County. As such, the second prong of the Collins test is not implicated on these facts.