Opinion
Plaintiff and appellant J.H., a minor child (plaintiff), by and through her mother and guardian ad litem, Kami Shade Agbeti (Mother), appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the Los Angeles Unified School District (the school district), and three of its employees. The judgment was entered after the trial court granted summary adjudication against plaintiff on three of the four causes of action she alleged against the school district and the employees and plaintiff dismissed the remaining cause of action against them. Plaintiff also dismissed all of the causes of action she asserted against the other defendants in the case.
The case concerns physical and sexual assault and battery that plaintiff sustained at one of the school district’s grade school campuses during a voluntary after-school program. The persons inflicting the harm on plaintiff were also students who attended the program. The trial court mled that whereas school districts have an affirmative duty of care to students because of the compulsory nature of education, generally there is no duty of care with respect to children who participate in voluntary after-school programs.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Initiation of the Suit
Named as defendants in this case are the school district, the elementary school where plaintiff was assaulted (the school), the principal of the school, Susan Babit (the principal), Susan Lasken, the assistant principal (the assistant principal), and Casey Bednash, an after-school playground supervisor (the playground supervisor, and collectively with those defendants, defendants). 1
According to the complaint, in March 2005 plaintiff began attending the school as a second grade student. She also began attending one of the school’s two after-school programs, one of which requires payment for enrollment. The after-school program plaintiff attended, which is held on the school’s playground, does not require payment, but it has far less supervision for the children who attend it than the other program. There are 200 to 300 children on the playground participating in this free after-school program and only two adults providing supervision..
The complaint further alleged that on April 6, 2005, plaintiff was attending her after-school program and playing with a group of four students, Alice, Bobby, Pat and Robin.
2
These four students were members of a group known as the “kissing club.” The principal, assistant principal and playground supervisor knew of the kissing club. Indeed, it was common knowledge among faculty, employees and some students that members of the kissing club, including Alice and Bobby, engaged in impermissible sexual activities, and that Alice and Bobby had a history of discipline problems. While plaintiff
The complaint also alleged that a child who witnessed the incident, Tammy, reported it to defendant playground supervisor on April 12. On the same day, Mother learned of the incident and reported it to the police. No one from the school contacted the police or any other authority. As part of the investigation into the matter, plaintiff was required to have doctors examine and photograph private parts of her body, and was required to submit to hours of questions by the police, doctors and investigators.
Plaintiff’s first cause of action, for negligent supervision of school premises, alleged defendants had a special relationship with plaintiff and an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to protect her, including a duty to have competent employees supervise children in the after-school program, but defendants breached their duty by failing to provide adequate supervision of the children in that program, failing to break up or monitor the kissing club, and failing to lock the storage shed and deny access to it to the children. As a result of the breach, it is alleged that plaintiff suffered injuries and mental and emotional distress, and incurred costs of medical attention and continuing psychological counseling. The complaint alleged a second cause of action against the school district and the school for failure to properly supervise and train employees to ensure the safety of children in the after-school program.
Additionally, plaintiff alleged a cause of action against defendants for violation of California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (a)(7), which declares that the right to public safety extends to schools, colleges and universities such that “students and staff have the right to be safe and secure in their persons”; violation of
Government Code
section 44807
3
; violation of
2. Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion
The school district, principal, assistant principal and playground supervisor, all represented by the same law firm, filed a motion for summary judgment or alternatively summary adjudication of issues (defendants’ motion). Regarding the first three causes of action, defendants’ motion asserted that on the two days the kissing club incidents occurred, the special relationship between plaintiff and the school district ended prior to the time of the incidents because plaintiff and the other students had already left the portion of the school campus that is devoted to the after-school program and gone to the other side of the campus where the storage shed was located, where they knew they were not allowed. Defendants further claimed that even if there was a special relationship between plaintiff and the school district when the incidents occurred, the incidents were not foreseeable as a matter of law and therefore there was no duty to protect plaintiff, and moreover there is no causal connection between an unlocked storage shed and the assaults on plaintiff. Regarding the fourth cause of action (failure to report incidents to proper authorities), defendants asserted it is barred because it was not asserted in the government claim filed by Mother prior to her filing this suit. 5
Each of the three individual defendants (principal, assistant principal, and playground supervisor) submitted a declaration in support of defendants’ motion. According to the declarations, the school district’s “youth services section” runs an after-school playground program (ASPP) at nearly all of the school district’s elementary schools, including the subject school. There is no formal enrollment in the ASPP. The ASPP is free of charge to students, is taxpayer funded, and is an attempt by the school district to provide an
The declarants stated that in April 2005, the ASPP “was operated on only a portion of the northernmost end of [the subject school’s] four-acre campus. The . . . program did not provide supervision beyond its boundaries, and the remainder of the campus was closed and off-limits to [the] program participants and anyone else without a valid reason to be there.” The area where the April 8 incident occurred, and where the students discovered an unlocked storage shed, is located in the southernmost part of the school’s campus, approximately 170 yards beyond the boundaries of the ASPP area. Classroom buildings prevent the shed from being seen from the ASPP area. The playground supervisor added in his declaration that his duties as an ASPP playground supervisor included “supervis[ing] the children who chose to participate in the [ASPP] on any particular day.” He stated the program operated from 2:25 p.m., when school was dismissed, to 6:00 p.m., he was “always there for the entire time,” and he worked on both April 6 and 8, 2005.
The declarants stated they had not heard of any improper incidents involving plaintiff, Alice and Bobby until the April 8, 2005 incident was reported to the playground supervisor on April 12, 2005. Defendant playground supervisor added that on April 12, 2005, the child we have identified as Tammy reported to him that plaintiff, Alice, Bobby, and two other students had created a kissing club behind some classroom buildings on the other side of the school’s campus and had engaged in sexual activities there. Prior to Tammy’s report to the playground supervisor, none of the declarants had information or reason to believe that a kissing club existed in the ASPP, or that sexual misconduct had occurred. The declarants did not know or have reason to believe that Bobby and Alice had engaged in sexual activities before the incidents, and they still do not know of such prior sexual conduct, nor did they know or have reason to believe that Bobby and Alice had a propensity to sexually assault other students prior to April 12, 2005.
The principal and assistant principal included in their declarations statements that (1) “[t]here were no prior incidents involving [Alice] and [Bobby]
Also offered in support of defendants’ motion were pages from a deposition given by plaintiff. She testified that there was a day when Alice took her to “a shack” “which was behind one of the classes in the bungalows.” Asked if she knew that she was not supposed to be behind there at that time, plaintiff answered: “Yes.” Asked why she went there, plaintiff answered: “Because I wanted to be—Because I was scared. I wanted to see what it was.” She stated that she, Alice, Bobby and another boy went there. Alice began hitting plaintiff and asked her to Mss Bobby, and Bobby Mssed plaintiff on the cheeks. After that happened, plaintiff did not tell anyone at school that Alice slapped her because she was afraid of being embarrassed and afraid of what Alice would do to her if she told anyone. She also did not tell her parents. On another day, Alice “came up to all of us and told us to go to the shack.” By “all of us,” plaintiff meant “[t]he members of the club” and the members were plaintiff, Alice, Bobby, and another boy. Plaintiff testified Bobby put Ms private parts against her. Bobby was upset at that time and plaintiff was crying. Asked if Bobby “just rub [bed] Ms private up against you, or did he actually go inside your butt,” plaintiff answered that he “rubbed his private against me.”
3. Evidence Presented In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 6
A
Los Angeles Police Department report indicates that the incidents occurring at the school on April 6 and 8, 2005, were reported to the police by Mother on the evening of April 12, 2005. Mother contacted the police on that date after the playground supervisor told her about the April 8 incident when she came to pick up plaintiff at school. Mother told the police that the
When he was interviewed by the police, Bobby reported that he went to the shed on the playground and Alice “told him to kiss [plaintiff] or she would slap them” and so he kissed plaintiff on the cheek. Then Alice “told [plaintiff] to pull down her pants and have sex with [Bobby] ‘like adults’ ” and when plaintiff refused, Alice slapped plaintiff twice and plaintiff pulled down her pants. Alice then told Bobby to pull down his pants and when he refused he was slapped by Alice and so he pulled his pants down. Alice told him to put his privates on plaintiff’s butt and he did so even though he knew it was wrong because he did not want to be slapped anymore by Alice. After that occurred, the children dressed and they all went out to the playground.
When Alice was interviewed by the police, she had a different version of why she slapped plaintiff. She said she was told by Bobby to slap plaintiff. Alice also had a different version of why plaintiff pulled down her pants; Alice said it was pursuant to the directive of Bobby. When the police officer told Alice that plaintiff and Bobby both said it was Alice who told them to pull down their pants and have sex like adults, Alice covered her face in her hands, looked down, began to cry, and asked the officer if the officer thought she was “bad.”
The principal’s report to the school district indicates the playground supervisor learned of the April 8 incident from a fifth grade child who told him that plaintiff confided in her about what had happened. The report states that two incidents occurred; one was on April 5 or 6, and the other was on April 8. Regarding the April 8 incident, the report states that Alice threatened and hit the students to get them to go to the shed. When they were interviewed at the school, Alice and Bobby blamed each other for the April 8 incident. Each said the other made them do the things that transpired. The report indicates Bobby admitted to taking off his pants and rubbing his testicles against both plaintiff and Alice, and he asserted that Alice threatened and slapped him when he did not do as she commanded. The report also states that Alice is “often is inappropriate with her friends.” Plaintiff and Alice were in the second grade at the time of the incidents. Bobby was in the
A September 2006 school district-issued bulletin from the “Beyond the Bell Branch” of its Youth Services program states that it replaces a 2004 bulletin “of the same subject” and was updated to reflect the current assistant superintendent over the Beyond the Bell Branch and a “change in policy from age appropriate to grade appropriate for Youth Services participants.” The bulletin makes the suggestion to schools that parents be given a bulletin telling them about the ASPP and informing them that the ASPP is supervised, the playground occasionally may be closed “due to the absence of supervision,” file program is not child care and participants arrive and leave at their own discretion, and while at the program the participants must conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the rules and regulations of the school and playground.
An undated bulletin from the school district’s Beyond the Bell Branch is entitled “General Policies, Procedures and Guidelines.” Under the heading “campus security” it indicates that security “is a critical element that must be reviewed frequently in an effort to maintain optimal safety for our students.” Members of the staff are reminded that “[wjhile on duty [they should] circulate throughout the play areas and remain cognizant of the activities of all individuals on the playground as well as the areas around access/egress gates.”
Under the heading “good supervision,” another portion of that same bulletin emphasizes the importance of good supervision and observes that “[t]he duty to supervise may be the least understood and the least accepted responsibility of those in charge of youth sports, physical education, and recreation programs. The failure to supervise properly is the reason most often cited for calling teachers and coaches into court. [][] The problem is that while most athletic and recreational professionals know there is a duty to supervise, too few understand what is meant by adequate supervision, [f] There are various levels of supervision required in different situations, depending on the type of activity and the age and skill level of the participants. However, in all cases supervision means more than just being there. It requires foresight (the ability to anticipate and eliminate or minimize potential hazards) and control of the situation. Supervision also requires both quantity (enough supervisors to attend to all participants) and quality (training in the specific activity and in supervisory skills).” The bulletin lists several • steps to be followed for achieving good supervision, and one of them is to “[i]nspect... the entire playground before initiating any activity.”
A Timothy Bower testified at his deposition that the school district’s Beyond the Bell Program is an administrative division of the school district that oversees programs that operate before and after school and the Youth Services section is one of its components. The money to fund the Youth Services program comes from the school district. The guidelines for the Youth Services program in place at the subject school required at least one paid adult employee to supervise students regardless of the number of students, and required “general supervision of the areas that are visible to the employee on the playground,” including circulating the playground and observing whether any students had wandered off the playground. Based on the time sheet for playground supervision on April 8, 2005, Bowers stated it appeared that only defendant playground supervisor was supervising the APSS program at the subject school that day. 7
Bower testified further that comprehensive after-school programs are another component of the Beyond the Bell Program. Comprehensive after-school programs are funded by federal and state grants in which students are enrolled and signed in and out on a daily basis and in which there is a set ratio of students to adults (20 to one), and the students are involved in structured activities, including academic assistance enrichment and recreation. The mandatory student-to-adult ratio is part of the grant legislation. Bower
At his deposition, defendant playground supervisor testified that when he was supervising the children, there was no place that he was normally located. He had boundaries on the playground, and the children were not allowed to go past them. To inform the children where the boundaries were, he would “gather[] the kids around a couple times a week, or a couple times a month even and let them know where they weren’t allowed, where they were allowed to go, where they were supposed to go.” There were restrooms and two classrooms beyond that boundary. As part of his supervision duties he would check the bathrooms that were within the boundary but he did not go into the bathrooms. After the incidents involving the plaintiff occurred, he put “cones across the playground.”
Defendant playground supervisor further testified that at the time of the April 2005 incidents there were bungalows adjacent to the school yard. There were no barriers to prevent children from going behind the bungalows but that did “[n]ot necessarily” make it more difficult for him to keep track of the children. “From most places on the school yard [his] line of vision [would] be obstructed in the area behind the bungalows.” Asked if he ever walked to the area behind the bungalows to see if any children were playing there, he stated he “would generally walk around every day, circulate the whole playground.” At that point in the deposition the parties agreed that reference to bungalows at the deposition would mean the bungalow where the subject shed is located, also known as the “east bungalow.” The shed was behind the east bungalow and the shed was located on school property. The playground supervisor stated that from time to time he would walk back to the area behind the east bungalow to check if students were back there. Prior to April 8, 2005, he had no knowledge that students were going into the shed and he had never seen students playing back there. He had never heard of students referring to the shed as the cabin. Asked if the shed should have been locked at the time the incident occurred, he stated he was not sure.
In her own declaration submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion, Mother stated that plaintiff often participated in the school’s ASPP. It was Mother’s understanding that the program would provide adequate adult supervision for plaintiff until Mother or her husband could pick plaintiff up at school after they left work. Mother had a discussion with defendant principal of the school about the sexual assault on plaintiff. The principal said that supervision of children in the ASPP was seriously flawed and changes needed to be made so that such incidents would not happen again. Among the
At her deposition, Mother was asked what the principal had said when Mother told her that Bobby had kissed plaintiff and put his tongue in her mouth. Mother stated the principal was “very casual” and told her that the children had a kissing club after school and the club had been going on for awhile but the students had not reported that anything had happened.
At her deposition, plaintiff was asked what kinds of things she and Alice did at school. Plaintiff stated they played handball during school and after school they played basketball. Plaintiff stated Alice asked her if she wanted to be in a club but did not tell her what kind of club. Plaintiff was curious and answered she did want to be in the club. There were four people in the club including herself, Alice, Bobby and another boy whose name she did not know. She stated she (plaintiff) and Bobby did not get along well. Asked what types of things Alice wanted the people in the kissing club to do, plaintiff answered: “Inappropriate things.” Asked if such inappropriate things included going beyond the cones that were on the playground, plaintiff answered: “Well, there was [sic] no cones at the play yard. You just play wherever.”
In her declaration, plaintiff stated she participated in the ASPP on the days that Mother did not pick her up at the close of the school day at 2:30 p.m. Alice asked plaintiff if she wanted to be part of a club but did not tell her what kind of club. Later plaintiff learned it was the kissing club. Had plaintiff known what types of activities the children in the kissing club engaged in, she would not have wanted to be part of the club. The other members of the kissing club took her to an area behind some classrooms at the edge of the playground where there was an unlocked shed that the members of the kissing club called the “cabin.” While at the cabin, Alice told Bobby to kiss plaintiff. Bobby kissed plaintiff even though she did not want him to and she felt his tongue in her mouth and on her cheek. After that occurred, she was upset and stayed by herself on the playground until Mother picked her up.
Plaintiff did not tell anyone about the kiss because she was embarrassed and afraid of the other children. Two days later she was playing handball in
4. Ruling on Summary Judgment Motion
In deciding defendants’ summary judgment/adjudication motion, the trial court ruled that generally schools do not owe a duty of care to children who are participating in voluntary after-school programs. Moreover, said the court, the school district had no special relationship with plaintiff, Alice or Bobby that imposed a special duty of care on the school district to protect plaintiff from them, because there was no evidence showing defendants were aware that Alice or Bobby had sexual proclivities towards plaintiff or other students.
DISCUSSION
The facts of this case raise questions of law, including whether plaintiff was owed a duty of care by defendants in their operation of the ASPP, and if such a duty was owed, whether we can say as a matter of law, based on the evidence presented to the trial court, that the supervision of the ASPP was adequate and did not fall below the standard of care imposed by that duty or, if it did fall below the standard of care, whether defendants’ actions were nevertheless not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
1. Standard of Review
We review the order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment/adjudication on a de novo basis.
(Price v. Wells Fargo Bank
(1989)
When the defendant is the moving party, it has the burden of demonstrating as a matter of law, with respect to each of the plaintiff’s causes of action that is addressed in the motion, that one or more elements of the cause of action
Because a summary judgment denies the adversary party a trial, it should be granted with caution.
(Michael J.
v.
Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions
(1988)
2. Relevant Case Law
a. Overview
The law regarding the duty of supervision on school premises is very, very well established. “It is the duty of the school authorities to supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection. [Citations.] The school district is liable for injuries which result from a failure of its officers and employees to use ordinary care in this respect. [Citations.]”
(Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co.
(1941)
In
Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist.
(1978)
The
Hoyem
court stated the school district had a “firmly established duty to exercise due care in supervising [the plaintiff]
while he was on school
premises.”
(Hoyem, supra,
b. Special Relationship Between Schools and Students
The duty of care imposed on a school district towards its pupils arises from their special relationship. In
M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist.
(2003)
The
M.W.
court stated that “[a] special relationship is formed between a school district and its students resulting in the imposition of an affirmative duty on the school district to take all reasonable steps to protect its students [and t]his affirmative duty arises,
in part,
based on the compulsory nature of education. [Citations.]”
(M.W., supra,
Moreover, not all students attend education classes that are mandatory. The
Hoyem
court noted that parents place trust in schools to supervise their children and “[a] large number of working parents enroll their children in summer school because they cannot afford alternative adult supervision. Surely these parents may legitimately expect adequate supervision.”
(Hoyem, supra,
“Either a total lack of supervision [citation] or ineffective supervision [citation] may constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision. Under section 815.2, subdivision (a) of the Government Code, a school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by such negligence.”
(Dailey, supra,
In
Forgnone
v.
Salvador U. E. School Dist.
(1940)
c. The Immaturity of Children As a Factor in Duty of Care
California cases have cited the immaturity of children as a factor in the issue of a school district’s duty of care to students. In
Forgnone, supra,
Noting that proximate cause is generally a question for the trier of fact, the
Hoyem
court rejected the defendant school district’s assertion that assuming arguendo there was negligent supervision on the part of the district, the court
In Dailey, the court stated that a conclusion that negligent supervision was the proximate cause of a student’s death was not precluded by the fact that the decedent sustained his injury while engaging in “boisterous behavior” by slap-boxing, nor by “[t]he fact that another student’s misconduct was the immediate precipitating cause of the injury.” (Dailey, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 748, 750.) The court observed that “[supervision during recess and lunch periods is required, in part, so that discipline may be maintained and student conduct regulated. Such regulation is necessary precisely because of the commonly known tendency of students to engage in aggressive and impulsive behavior which exposes them and their peers to the risk of serious physical harm. High school students may appear to be generally less hyperactive and more capable of self-control than grammar school children. Consequently, less rigorous and intrusive methods of supervision may be required. Nevertheless, adolescent high school students are not adults and should not be expected to exhibit that degree of discretion, judgment, and concern for the safety of themselves and others which we associate with full maturity. . . . Recognizing that a principal task of supervisors is to anticipate and curb rash student behavior, our courts have often held that a failure to prevent injuries caused by the intentional or reckless conduct of the victim or a fellow student may constitute negligence. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 748-749, italics added, fhs. omitted.)
In the instant case there is evidence defendant playground supervisor told ASPP students to stay within a certain area of the playground. However, given the nature of children, especially young children, to act impulsively and disregard directives regarding their own safety, spoken boundaries may be disregarded by them, including boundaries beyond which lay a hidden area accessible by these young children, and a hidden unlocked shed. Young children may use such hidden places to act in ways they would not act if they remained in the plain view areas of the playground. Other problems may also arise. A child may be injured in a hidden area and not receive aid for some
d. Foreseeability, Prior Similar Incidents, and Assumption of Risk Issues
“It is not necessary to prove that the very injury which occurred must have been foreseeable by the school authorities in order to establish that their failure to provide additional safeguards constituted negligence. Their negligence is established if a reasonably prudent person would foresee that injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in the absence of such safeguards.”
(Taylor, supra,
In
Lucas v. Fresno Unified School Dist.
(1993)
CONCLUSION
Under California law, defendants have a duty to use ordinary care in supervising the ASPR What constitutes ordinary care is a matter for the trier of fact with reference to the facts of the case. Plaintiff presented evidence that she sustained injuries in the playground shed, and defendants may be held liable for such injuries if plaintiff can prove that they were proximately caused by defendants’ alleged negligent supervision and were a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of harm. Whether defendants were negligent in their supervision of the ASPP, whether such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, and whether those injuries were an unreasonable risk of harm that was foreseeable by defendants are also questions for the trier of fact.
Plaintiff need not show that the very type of injury she sustained was foreseeable in the absence of adequate supervision. Thus, although one might argue that the instant case raises the question whether it is foreseeable that first and second grade students would sexually assault plaintiff, the question is accurately framed as whether it is foreseeable that one child may be assaulted by another child during the ASPP in the absence of adequate protective safeguards, as plaintiff asserts occurred in this case. Although a sexual assault on a young student by a child of similar age is shocking, nevertheless playground supervisors are required to be on the lookout for the safety of their charges, including assaults on children, not just for specific forms of assault. Unlocked sheds and the back sides of classroom bungalows provide cover for assaults of any nature and moreover, there is evidence that the harm to plaintiff included nonsexual physical assault.
The summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. Costs on appeal to plaintiff.
Klein, P. L, and Aldrich, L, concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 14, 2010, and respondents’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 23, 2010, SI82409.
Notes
Also named as defendants are the minor students, who the evidence shows assaulted plaintiff, and their parents.
Plaintiff’s complaint makes specific reference to a total of five students who attended the subject after-school program. The complaint uses only the initials of the children to identify them. To further protect the identity and privacy of those students, as well as to facilitate the reading of this opinion, we have substituted fictitious first names in place of the children’s initials.
Apparently the intended reference in the pleading was to Education Code section 44807, which requires teachers in public schools to “hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or during recess.”
California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 5552 states: “Where playground supervision is not otherwise provided, the principal of each school shall provide for the supervision by certificated employees of the conduct and safety, and for the direction of the play, of the pupils of the school who are on the school grounds during recess and other intermissions and before and after school.”
Actually, the claim filed by Mother with the district states that “[n]o one at the school contacted the police or any other authority.”
Defendants made objections to portions of the evidence plaintiff submitted in support of her opposition to their motion. We have reviewed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard
(Great American Ins. Cos. v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.
(2008)
We observe that despite the nearly 200 pages of evidence submitted by plaintiff in support of her opposition to defendants’ motion, her evidence is essentially unmentioned by defendants in their appellate brief.
Defendant playground supervisor’s attendance report for April 8, 2005, the day of the sexual assault on plaintiff, shows there were 113 children participating in the APSS program on that day.
In referencing its statement in
Dailey
v.
Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra,
In the instant case, as noted in footnote 4, ante, California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 5552 directs that playground supervision must be provided for “the conduct and safety, and for the direction of the play, of the pupils of the school who are on the school grounds during recess and other intermissions and before and after school.” There can be no doubt that at least one purpose of this regulation is protection of students. Another could be to minimize school district liability for injuries to students.
Although the trial court in this case acknowledged the
Hoyem
and
Dailey
decisions, the court nevertheless granted defendants’ summary judgment motion because it concluded that generally a school district does not owe a duty of care to children participating in voluntary after-school programs. The court cited
Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Sch. Dist.
(1978)
In Dailey, the court noted that “[i]t is the uniform rule that the determination of whether the supervision is adequate, that is, whether it amounts to due care, is a question of fact for the jury. [Citations.]” (Dailey, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 749-750, fn. 6.) The court summarized the facts (or alleged facts) in seven cases in which there was sufficient evidence of either no supervision or inadequate supervision at the time the student plaintiffs’ injuries occurred to submit the issue of the defendant school districts’ liability to a jury, to support a jury’s verdict of liability, or to overrule a demurrer to a complaint. (Id. at p. 749, fn. 5.)
In
Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist.
(2003)
In that respect, the concurring opinion in
M.W.
observed that cases which address premises liability for third party criminal acts and require that there be prior similar incidents to show foreseeability of such third party criminal acts, such as
Ann M.
v.
Pacific Plaza Shopping Center
(1993)
Likewise, because
M.W.
involved the special relationship between school districts and students and the duty of care of supervision imposed by that relationship, the
M.W.
court rejected the defendant school district’s contention that under
Chaney v. Superior Court
(1995)