J. C. Snell, Inmate v. Herman Short, Police Chief, Houston Police DepartmentJ. C. Snell, Inmate v. Herman Short, Police Chief, Houston Police Department
- Reporters:
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- Before:
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Appellant Snell, a Texas prisoner, brought this pro se civil rights action under
The parties agree that the applicable Texas statute
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provides a two year period within which suit must be brought, and there can be no dispute that the statute is triggered, barring some infirmity, when the cause of action accrues. The district court held that the statute began running against Snell when his common law wife went to the police and demanded return of the money. This demand occurred before Snell was taken into custody on the robbery charge.
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Snell contends that the refusal of the police to release the money at the time of the demand was not constitutionally impermissible, because the money was being held as evidence. Thus, argues Snell, his
The district court order does not explain the rationale behind the holding that the
We think the analogy is inappropriate on these facts. Under Texas law, an officer in possession of property alleged to have been stolen cannot release the property except upon the order of a court or magistrate. Tex.Crim.Pro. Code Ann. art. 47.01 (Vernon 1966). An officer’s lawful possession of property under article 47.01 during the pendency of a criminal prosecution does not become wrongful simply because demand has been made for return of the property. Cf. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 389 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Civ.App.1965) (demand made after criminal case dismissed held to trigger conversion); Reiner v. Marceau, 338 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Civ.App.1960) (demand made after officer’s failure to comply with procedural rules regarding custody of property held to trigger conversion). Thus, a Texas court would not have held the police conduct here to have been a conversion at the point when the officers refused Snell’s wife’s demand for return of the money. The conversion action could accrue only after the police lost the protection of article 47.01.
We do not doubt that, in applying the sweeping mandate of
VACATED and REMANDED.
Notes
. Snell claims he inadvertently left the money in a taxi cab and that the money was not robbery loot. The police apparently took the money from the cab company before Snell could claim it. The sum involved is alleged to be $3,553.34.
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. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958).
. When Snell’s wife went to the taxi cab company to get the money, see note 1 supra, a robbery detective who was there told her that *1291 the money already had been seized by the police. Snell alleges that his wife immediately proceeded to the police station and asked for the money.