J. BROTTON CORPORATION d/b/a Chances, Appellee, v. OKLAHOMA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LAWS ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, Appellant, and Columbo Foods, Inc., Intervenor.
No. 71526
Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Dec. 3, 1991
822 P.2d 683
James E. Weger, Jones, Givens, Gotcher, Bogan & Hilborne, for appellee, J. Brotton Corp.
ALMA WILSON, Justice:
The sole issue in this appeal is whether colleges and universities may be included in the definition of “public school” under
Brotton argues that the ABLE Commission should not define public schools to include colleges and universities because the legislature intended to protect children and not adults from the perils of liquor. According to Brotton the primary objective of
In determining whether Oklahoma State University is a “public school” within the meaning of
Section 518.2 is part of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act amended by the legislature in 1985.7 The act itself in
The Oklahoma Legislature delegated to the ABLE Commission the power to “promulgate rules and regulations, in the manner herein provided, to carry out the purposes of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act....”
In Peterson v. Oklahoma Tax Comm‘n, 395 P.2d 388, 391 (Okla.1964), this Court held “[t]he long-continued construction of a statute by a department of government charged with its execution is entitled to great weight and should not be overturned without cogent reasons; where the legislature has convened many times during this period of administrative construction without expressing its disapproval, such silence may be regarded as acquiescence in or approval of the administrative construction.” The ABLE Commission, and its predecessor, the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, have used their definition of the term “public school” since 1959.10
In Oral Roberts Univ. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm‘n, 714 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Okla.1985), the Oklahoma Tax Commission attempted to restrict its policy interpretation of the church exemption. In this case of first impression, this Court commented concerning legislative acquiescence to a long standing construction of a statute by an administrative agency:
We as a Court are not required to perceive at this late date the intent of that legislature. The Tax Commission‘s own undeviating position for at least 37 years plus the legislature‘s disinclination to modify the substance of the statute during that period has now caused the original construction to be so firmly entrenched that the Commission may not with the stroke of a pen undo it. That would be a power reserved only to the legislature.
Like the Oklahoma Tax Commission‘s long standing construction of the church exemption, the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board construed the term “public schools” in 1959, and the ABLE Commission adopted the same construction. If the construction were improper, the legislature has had since 1959 to change the construction by defining the term “public schools” within the liquor laws. But the legislature has chosen not to do so.
Since the legislature has declined to define the term in subsequent legislative action, acquiescence or approval of the ABLE Commission definition can be assumed. Further, “Words employed in the original or antecedent Act will be presumed to be used in the same sense in the amendatory enactment.” Letteer v. Conservancy District No. 30, 385 P.2d 796, 800-801 (Okla.1963).
In essence, the goals and purpose of
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED.
HODGES, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, HARGRAVE and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.
OPALA, C.J., and SIMMS, DOOLIN and KAUGER, JJ., dissent.
KAUGER, Justice, with whom OPALA, Chief Justice, and SIMMS, and DOOLIN, Justices, join, dissenting:
Although I might agree with the result reached by the majority opinion, I cannot concur in its legal definition of a “public school.” The majority assigns a meaning to “public schools” which contravenes the Oklahoma Constitution,1 the Oklahoma statutes,2 and Oklahoma case law.3
The majority opinion bases its determination that the term “public school” as used in
A.
We have not felt restrained previously from reviewing rules promulgated by the agency charged with regulation of alcoholic beverage laws within Oklahoma.6 We
In addition to its reference to public schools in
B.
The
“No other view is tenable under the Constitution or statutes of this state.”
In Regents of Higher Educ. v. Board of Educ., 20 Okla. 809, 95 P. 429-30 (1908), this Court determined that the term “public school” used in
The Oklahoma Constitution distinguishes colleges and universities from public schools by authorizing the existence of institutions of higher education.
The facts presented here differ significantly from those found in Oral Roberts Univ. In Oral Roberts Univ., the Oklahoma Tax Commission attempted to apply the sales tax to a church supported school. The Tax Commission in Oral Roberts Univ. had on two separate occasions assured administrators of the college that it was exempt from the payment of Oklahoma sales and use taxes. Nine years after the last representation to the university, the Tax Commission reversed its position on the tax exemption. We refused to allow the Tax Commission to unilaterally reverse its prior interpretation of the sales tax statute. In so doing, we recognized that the duly enacted rules and regulations of an administrative agency are entitled to deference. The facts here do not reveal any prior representation by the ABLE Commission which would result in reliance on its definition of public schools found in art. 2, § 16.14
The sale of liquor for consumption by the drink has been legal in Oklahoma only since November 6, 1984. On that date, the people adopted
