204 P. 1097 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1922
This is an appeal from the judgment in favor of the defendants for costs in the second trial of an action brought originally for the cancellation of a lease upon the ground of nonpayment of rent and for the recovery of *246
damages for waste, alleged to have been committed upon certain leased premises. In the first trial judgment went for the plaintiff, but upon appeal it was reversed (
To this complaint as thus amended the defendants demurred generally and specially, and the demurrers were by the court sustained to the first and third counts, trial being thereafter had upon the question of damages claimed in the second count.
[1] On this issue the court found that the defendants, in making certain permissible changes in said building, had committed no substantial waste, and that if said building was damaged by the making of said changes the damage had been done before the plaintiff became the owner of the premises and that it existed at that time. The evidence also disclosed that the plaintiff, through its president and others, examined the property before purchasing the same; that it knew the nature of the repairs that had been made to the building and regarded the consequent damage thereto as of a trifling nature. Under these circumstances it is clear that the plaintiff cannot maintain an action for waste in the absence of an assignment to him of the cause of action therefor. Title to the property at the time of the commission of the waste is necessary to sustain the right to an accounting for such waste. (40 Cyc. 527; 30 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 282; Shelby v. Hearne, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 512;Hughlett v. Harris,
Respecting the order sustaining the demurrer to the first count, as it appears from the complaint itself that the damages to the property had been done prior to the purchase of the premises by the plaintiff, it follows from what has been stated that the count in question stated no cause of action and that the order of the court was correct.
[2] Coming to the third count, it was therein alleged that the defendant had wrongfully and unlawfully changed the renewal term of the lease from nine years to ninety-nine years.
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Richards, J., and Tyler, P. J., concurred.